massacre. On May 18th it was announced by Lord Derby in the House of Lords that in consequence of communications received from our Ambassador at Constantinople, the Mediterranean fleet had been ordered to Besika Bay, that one ship had been sent to Salonica, and a gunboat to Constantinople. While some amount of attention was thus being again drawn to the East, both by the persistence of the revolt and by the massacre of the Consuls, news came that the Chancellors of the three Empires had met at Berlin (May 9th), and that their conferences had continued during some days. Curiosity was excited about the scheme which they would propose. Would it be in the direction of "Order" or of "Emancipation"? No one seemed to imagine that England would stand in the way, if the Emperors had some scheme for securing the latter; and if in some quarters little was hoped in that direction from the new effort, it was not supposed that any obstacle would be interposed by England. It was thought not unlikely that England might repeat her adhesion to a futile Consular Mission, and a futile Andrassy Note, by an adhesion to a futile Berlin Memorandum. The Spectator believes the autonomy of the discontented provinces will ultimately emerge at the Conference, as that which will divide the Powers the least.-(May 13th.) The Times speculates as to the course the three Powers will adopt. Whatever end may seem good to them they cannot get it adopted unless they go the length of showing themselves ready to enforce it if need be; and the same telegrams that tell us that the three Powers have come to an agreement as to what should be done, give us to understand that this scheme of common action does not involve any employment, or even demonstration, of force. Thus nothing is really effected. It surely ought to be evident to all men that the Porte cannot execute the reforms that have been promised. . . . As for the part we are to play, we may, at all events, prevent a settlement being delayed while time is spent in the pursuit of unavailing measures of didactic remonstrance. It would seem, in fact, that there really is an opening for us to be useful. What Austria and Russia really need is a friend who will make them face the truth.-(May 15th.) At this juncture there appeared a second letter from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, which it appears was written before he had heard of the murders at Salonica. With a hope that England will now at length take a more decided part in the Conference, and that the Conference, enlightened by recent experience, will extend its views to the full range of that question of which the Herzegovinian insurrection is only a fragmentary exponent, I shrink not from placing on record an outline of such remedial measures as in my judgment offer the only prospect of bringing the Eastern difficulty to a peaceful solution. [He details seven specific reforms, and adds as the eighth] That the preceding articles shall be made the substance of a convention between the Sultan and his allies, the Mediating Powers, and that the effective execution of the same be placed under the superintendence of a mixed, responsible Commission. .. [He goes on to say-The right of foreign Governments to carry their interference to this length is justified by the magnitude of the issues involved.] If something more positive in point of right is required we must take into account the Porte's unfulfilled engagements, the services, attended with much cost of life and treasure, which the Allies, or some of them at least, have rendered in recent times to the Empire, and the sacrifices which they are still eventually bound to make on its behalf. [As to the danger of the resistance which Moslem fanaticism might offer], such a resistance is, no doubt, possible, but it would be full of danger to the Turks themselves, and the experience of a century encourages a very different expectation. Let it not be forgotten that the actual position of Turkey is one of tutelage displayed unmistakably from time to time. [He speaks of the serious consequences of a failure to comé to some arrangement, and proceeds to say that another solution] if not more agreeable to the Porte, at least more decidedly remedial, has been thrown out quite recently by the public press. lt was even described as likely to become an object of discussion at Berlin. Herzegovina and Bosnia might be put into a state of vassalage to the Sultan, similar to that in which Servia stands. A belt of such principalities, including Moldavia, Wallachia, and Montenegro, interposed between Russia and Austria on the one side and Turkey on the other, might operate as a protection to the Ottoman dominion in Europe, and a pledge of durable peace in that quarter. [The tribute arising from such States, if properly arranged, might relieve the Sultan of his financial difficulties.] When great interests are at stake, and the complications almost, if not quite, as great, the human mind, when not depressed by the difficulty, takes an unwonted spring, and, as in the famous example of antiquity, cuts the knot which it sees not the way to untie.-Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in T. May 18th. § 4. Effect of the Rejection of the Berlin Memorandum Such were the expectations with which the result of the deliberations of the three Chancellors was awaited in England. That result was soon embodied in the celebrated Berlin Memorandum,1 the 1 Turkey, iii. 1876, No. 248, Enclosure 2; see Argyll, p. 192 and following. effect of which may be indicated by saying that it pointed, perhaps a little more explicitly than had the Andrassy Note, to ulterior intervention of some kind. But the English Government was preparing a great surprise-and about May 20th it became known that Lord Derby had rejected the propositions of the three Emperors.1 Hitherto there had been a general impression, founded on a belief that the European Powers were substantially agreed, that a solution of some kind or other would speedily be reached. But this act at once dispelled the pleasing illusion, and revealed a serious divergence of purpose between England and the three Emperors. But in what direction exactly the policy of England was diverging was as yet matter of conjecture. The papers were not laid before Parliament till the beginning of July, 2 and meanwhile Ministers refused to go beyond such very general statements as that they did not consider the proposals likely to effect the object in view. Questions were asked in both Houses on May 22nd. Lord Derby expressed his regret, and his inability to give further reasons, and denied that the Government had been at all influenced by the fact that they had not been consulted in framing the document. There was a strong disposition to believe the Government had done right, but the grounds of approbation were very various. Though the wind was blowing from all round the compass, in some mysterious manner it seemed to be converted at every point into a favouring gale for the Government. In fact, Public Opinion was still docile, and inclined to the presumption that in a question of foreign affairs the Government of the day was right. The mere fact that England had vindicated her importance was enough to win the suffrages of many. There was a very strong objection to the Holy Alliance's taking upon themselves to deal with the matter in this manner, instead of concerting their measures with the other Powers. Of course the public was still very much in the dark as to the exact nature of the proposals made from Berlin. From rumours and telegrams two things mainly were gathered: there was to be an armistice and there was to be an International Commission. Was there any better hope from this than from former 1 It is not unworthy of notice that the Daily Telegraph of May 18th was able to announce that the Berlin Memorandum would in all probability be rejected, giving as the reason that it was unfair, and adding that it was "becoming" for England to demand justice for the Turks. 2 The Times of July 4th prints the full text of the Berlin Memorandum. efforts which had proved futile? Accordingly we find at first a disposition to approve the decision of our Government in refusing to concur in the proposed scheme, on the ground that it was hardly likely to be effectual, and the Government was urged to come forward with a proposal for a real measure of emancipation. But this notion was short-lived, and speedily gave way to the impression that somehow the English Government had assumed an attitude of opposition to Russia, and of more or less support to the Turkish Government against her. The tendency of English Opinion to polarise about the two ends of the scale, or, to change the metaphor, to divide into two camps, a pro-Turkish and an antiTurkish camp, begins to be recognised. Such a polarisation was clearly commencing at this time; and must be connected with the "erubescence," which, as we shall presently see, set in during the next few weeks. Thus the impression that in rejecting the Berlin Memorandum the English Government was actuated by a "violet" policy drops out, and gives place to the impression that they have in view something like an Anglo-Turkish alliance,which an important section of Public Opinion, it was evident, would be very far from approving. [It cannot be the duty of England to stand irresolutely apart, and allow the fate of the East to be decided without her; and it will be neither honourable nor expedient to encourage the Sultan to a defiance in which we should certainly not support him in the hour of need. A temporary reserve must not be understood as an abnegation of England's position, or as an attempt to withstand a settlement.]-7. May 20th. The Daily News regards the scheme of pacification as incomplete. The scheme looks as if it was put forward by Governments which want to gain time either for advancing some object which they are not yet prepared to avow, or to come to an understanding on points as to which they are not at present agreed. Our Foreign Office, however, cannot be asked to accept a Bill in blank, however respectable may be the drawers.-(May 20th.) The Spectator says a Commission such as proposed, if ineffective, would drive the Christians to despair by increasing the hostility of their enemies; while if efficient, it would constitute an imperium in imperio of the worst kind.-(May 20th.) If the consequences of accepting the new proposals of the Powers would be to kindle in half a dozen points throughout the Ottoman Empire the flame which has burst to the surface at Salonica, and since, it seems, at Piedor, the responsibility of pressing these proposals at Constantinople will be proportioned to the results which wait upon such a policy. [Probably the chief object of the recent meeting at Berlin was to decide what should be done in the event of the refusal of the proposals. England is right in refusing her sanction if she has not been informed of the ulterior steps contemplated. Moreover the proposals themselves are probably] of a more stringent nature than those to which our Government gave a cautious and qualified adhesion in the Andrassy Note. [Moreover the Porte itself is opposed to them, so that] our accession to the side of those who are preparing to put such pressure on Turkey would have an entirely different meaning.-P. M. G. May 20th. The Post, takes almost exactly the same line as the Pall Mall Gazette. (May 20th.) The position which the Government has assumed is not easily assailable. It is in accordance with a foreign policy which has been praised and practised by each Party in succession. . . . To avoid entangling alliances or engagements of which we cannot see the end is almost certainly safe, and does not want a certain air of dignity... [Lord Derby was right in saying that the Memorandum was not likely to effect its object. It sprang out of a divergency of sentiment between Austria and Russia.] Count Andrassy went to Berlin pledged to oppose Russian plans which tended to more or less radical changes, beginning with virtual tutelage of the Turkish Empire, and ending with its dismemberment. [In the result this more extreme scheme was abandoned, and the new scheme simply proposed to find guarantees for the execution of the reforms already formulated in the Andrassy Note. But the new scheme though Austrian in principle is Russian in detail, and the suspicions with which a British Minister may regard it arise from the probability that the details may overmaster the principle. But the Times trusts that their present inactivity will not be represented by our own Government, or understood by foreign Governments, as an abandonment of the position which was assumed by the Treaty of 1856, and maintained by the support of Count Andrassy's Note]. . . . The question is sometimes argued as if we had no further interest in Turkey because we have lost our illusions about the Turks. It is admitted that we should not stir to defend them against their Christian subjects or indeed against anybody. . . . To prevent the absorption of Turkey by any European Power may be taken as the chief end and aim of our policy. Now we say that this will not be attained either by abstaining from Eastern affairs, or by assuming such an attitude as shall encourage the Sultan's Government to resist the reasonable, as well as the unreasonable demands which may be addressed to it. . . . If, by keeping apart, we prolong the struggle, we shall effectually play what is supposed to be the game of Russia. Every month which passes makes more probable some horrible occurrence which would seal the fate of the Turkish Empire. . . . We ought to be able to see that all this delay and circumlocution arise from the fact that no reform effected under Turkish authority will satisfy the insurgent populations. or per |