True, twenty years ago no English statesman would have sanctioned the Andrassy Note, but] the paradoxes of twenty years ago are the commonplaces of to-day, for we have all reached a new climate of opinion. . . . . The Liberal Party will be false to one of its most honourable traditions if it should forget some less strictly political facts. . . . [It] has some reason to boast of the support which it has given to oppressed populations. But the sufferings of the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Italians were slight compared with the detestable oppression which the Christians of Turkey have for ages suffered.-T. Feb. 7th. The Pall Mall Gazette commenting on this article complains that while the Note was under consideration the Times minimised, whereas now they maximise, the significance of the English Government's assent. All this anxious deprecation of possible hostility and all this eagerness to defend the Cabinet against apparently improbable criticism is and can only be a part of the same policy-the policy which seeks to draw the English Government beyond the line which they have marked out for themselves, and to do so in the most insidious of all ways, namely, by insinuating that whether they like it or not, they have overstepped that line already. [The writer hopes the Government will not be so drawn on.]P. M. G. Feb. 7th. The official leaders of the Opposition in the debates on the Address in both Houses, showed at least a certain uneasiness as to how far the action of the Government could be reconciled with the sovereign rights of Turkey and our treaty obligations, and seemed half inclined to constitute themselves the champions of Treaty Legalism, and to join battle on this ground. But any such disposition was checked by the remarkable speech in which Mr. Gladstone offered his support to Mr. Disraeli's Government in carrying on an Emancipation policy. Lord Granville wished to know whether we had any part in the negotiations which led the three Powers to frame the Note, or were we only consulted when the Note was settled? The next question, of the gravest importance, was whether the Note did or did not infringe the provisions of the Treaty of 1856 as revised in 1871 He thought that what they learnt to have been done disclosed no infringement, and that neither Lord Clarendon nor Lord Palmerston ever considered that the treaty precluded us from attempting in common with other Powers to obtain from the Porte the fulfilment of the promises admittedly embodied in the treaty. Lord Derby was aware that the course the Government had adopted might be attacked from two opposite points of view. Some might think any interference in the internal affairs of Lord Hartington said no doubt a step had been taken in the direction of increasing the independence of the Christian subjects of the Porte, which was likely ultimately to favour a solution of the difficulty, though not in the direction indicated by Lord Palmerston, namely, reform of the Turkish administration. "I am not disposed to raise any preliminary objection to the action which Her Majesty's Government has taken. I have no doubt that as far as it was in their power they have taken steps to maintain the independence of the Porte." He thought Lord Palmerston, who was himself one of the greatest supporters of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, would not have been averse to such interference as appeared to have taken place. He cited his dictum to the effect that the reference in the Treaty of Paris to the Firman gave the Allied Powers (if the Firman should remain unexecuted) "that moral right of diplomatic interference and remonstrance with the Sultan which I am perfectly convinced would be quite sufficient to accomplish the desired purpose.' "1 He trusted the papers would show that the intervention had not exceeded those limits pointed out by Lord Palmerston on that occasion. Mr. Disraeli said if we had refused to sanction the Andrassy Note, we should have placed ourselves in a state of isolation, and the Sultan would probably have rejected it; it would not do for us then to tell the Sultan we gave him advice, but were not prepared to support him when he acted on it. Besides, it was the desire of the Porte, however much they might be opposed to receiving such a Note, that if such a Note was presented England should not stand aloof. The fear that England was embarked on an intervention without limit was groundless. If this attempt should fail, England was quite free; and would act as far as her present administration is concerned, as becomes those who wish to maintain the Empire 1 Quoted from Lord Palmerston's speech in the debate on the Treaty of Paris, H. of C. May 6th, 1856. of England, its independence and its freedom in all those quarters which are affected by this great controversy." Mr. Gladstone said he had no authority, nor did he assume to explain, but he could not discover the implied censure which some members appeared to think Lord Hartington suggested on the Government for adhering to the Andrassy Note. The reasons given by Mr. Disracli were enough to justify them, but he hoped the Premier did not intend to convey that there were no other, and broader and deeper motives for the step, than those he had assigned. At any rate he wished to explain his own view of the position. To do so he must go back to the Crimean War. Lord Palmerston knew that a redress of grievances within the Turkish Empire was a vital and essential condition of its integrity and independence. The war would never have been entered on, anxious as people were to stop Russian aggression, unless they thought they had conclusive guarantees for the redress of their grievances. The solemn instrument by which the Sultan pledged himself was one of the fundamental facts. His proposition was that after all this it was impossible to fold our arms and say the relations of the Sultan and his Christian subjects are no concern of ours. "I am most grateful, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government instead of being actuated by that principle, a principle totally inconsistent with the facts of history and the most obvious and elementary obligations of national duty, have given in their adhesion to the Austrian Note." He would not enter into the question whether or not the promises of the Ottoman Government had been shamelessly broken, but if they had really failed in their fulfilment, Europe would expect some other sort of security. Mr. Butler Johnstone complained that Mr. Gladstone, under cloak of approving the Government, recommended a policy directly contrary to theirs.-H. of C. Feb. 8th. The importance of Mr. Gladstone's speech is very great. It cut the official leaders of the Liberal party adrift from the old policy. The result of the debate seemed, in spite of a protest here and there that the intentions of the Government were entirely misunderstood, to be that the old policy was to be abandoned by the Government, with the hearty approval of the bulk of the Liberal party, even if there was some disposition to hesitate on the part of the Opposition leaders. It is evident that if Earl Granville and Lord Hartington had definitely decided to stickle for the independence of the Porte, as something which precluded the European Powers from recognising and dealing with the deep-seated causes of the revolt, they would entirely have failed to carry not only the country, but a great part of their party with them. There were not wanting clear indications that it was from Mr. Gladstone that the bulk of the independent Liberal party would take its cue, and this not because they were prepared blindly to follow his lead, but because they were already inclined to be in sympathy with the views which he enunciated. Lord Hartington spoke in a tone similar to that of Lord Granville. . . . On the other hand, the remarkable speech of Mr. Gladstone makes up for any coldness or reserve on the part of the recognised leaders of the Liberal party. . . . Mr. Gladstone's generous language will find an echo among every class of his countrymen. He showed last night that he still represents the Liberal party in one of their most worthy qualities—their hatred of tyranny and oppression wherever they are to be found. His speech proves that if the Government proceed in the undertaking they have begun, they need fear no hindrance from the Liberal Opposition.-T. Feb. 9th. The foreign policy of Great Britain may be drifting, as it usually is, but it is drifting in a direction which, in our judgment, Liberals may cordially approve. We hold that according to the settled principles of that party, they ought to wish that Turkish rule in Europe should finally cease. The termination of their rule, either by insurrection or external attack, is a result as much to be desired as the overthrow of Bourbon rule in Naples, and this country is bound to desist from giving it further help. [The writer then reviews the chief speeches at the opening debate, and after speaking of Lord Granville, continues] Mr. Gladstone, however, who, not being an aspirant for office was less bound by diplomatic reserves, was more outspoken, and his speech, we trust, will yet prove to be only the first expression of the awakened conscience of his party.-Spec. Feb. 12th. Thus we note as the result of the meeting of Parliament the fact that Mr. Gladstone introduces as it were a powerful reagent into the floating and inchoate body of Liberal party opinion, which at once causes it to precipitate itself. And thus the Liberal party gives up the legalistic interpretation of the Treaty of Paris and the policy of supporting Turkey, and becomes thenceforth prepared to offer a frank support to the policy of favouring some measure of emancipation for the Provincials. We note too that Mr. Gladstone came to the front as in a special sense the spokesman of this new development of the party policy. Of his speech on the opening night of the session those showed themselves strangely and culpably forgetful who afterwards represented Mr. Gladstone as having lain by until he saw that a great storm of unpopularity might be directed against the friends of Turkey, and as then doing everything he could to arouse this feeling for the purpose of embarrassing the Government. § 2. The Royal Titles Bill. Thus while the attitude of the Parliamentary Opposition was critical as to the purchase of the shares, and on the whole friendly to the part the Government was supposed to be taking in the Andrassy negotiations, on neither of these points did any lively Parliamentary contest arise. But there was a source of strife at hand. The Queen's Speech, referring to the hearty affection with which the Prince of Wales had been received in his progress through India, stated that Her Majesty had been advised to assume, under the authority of a Bill to be brought in, a title derived from India. This proposal attracted little notice for a time, and the first impulse was to approve, though Earl Granville gave a signal of objection in his speech on the Address. The public will be quick to credit Mr. Disraeli with this happy idea.-7. Feb. 9th. But the more people looked at it the less they liked it, and before the matter was settled, it gave rise to much hostile newspaper criticism, and to the first warm Parliamentary contest since the General Election. One effect was to divert attention from the Eastern Question, with which no one at the time dreamed it had any connection. When it became definitely known that the title contemplated was that of "Empress," the feeling of distaste became noticeable. The arguments then brought forward against the measure fell mainly into two categories. First there was the aesthetic argument, that the step was in bad taste. It was said that Disraeli was going to "electro-plate the Crown." It was pointed out that "Emperor" was a title unfortunately associated with the enterprise of political adventurers, and that by its adoption something would be lost of that historic dignity which formed the truest support of the Crown of England.1 Next there was the constitutional argument. This treated the violence done to historic traditions, as something more than an affair of good or bad taste. The step was an innovation; apparently in the direction of personal government; and the danger of such an innovation might rebound on the Crown itself. 1 See Punch, April 1st (cartoon): "No, no, Benjamin, it will never do! You can't improve on the old Queen's Head !'" See also at p. 128 parody of "King John," Act. iv. sc. 2. |