provision for the representation of minorities contained in the Reform Bill of 1867, was just the circumstance which led to the establishment of the Caucus system. By that Bill the so-called "three-cornered constituencies" were introduced, amongst which Birmingham was conspicuous. These constituencies returned three members each, but each elector might vote for two candidates only. In boroughs where the number of the Liberal electors exceeded three-fifths of the whole constituency, the Caucus promised that if the members of the party would vote for the two out of the three Liberal candidates who should be assigned to them respectively, quite irrespective of any choice of their own, then the three Liberal candidates should be returned. It was, in fact, a machine for gathering up voting power as it were into a reservoir, and distributing it in the most economical manner, on the assumption that the end of party organisation would be attained by the return of a majority of members to the House of Commons who could be relied on under all circumstances to give a strict party vote. The "Hundreds," however, were not confined to the three-cornered boroughs; in others, even though votes had not to be distributed in the way described, they could still perform the functions of selecting candidates, of carrying on electoral contests, and of" uniting the party."

The further step was taken in 1877 of federating the various liberal associations together so that delegates from them might formulate the policy which was to be adopted by the Liberal party as a whole. The prominent figure in connection with this step that of Mr. Chamberlain,1

is

The first conference of the delegates took place at Birmingham, and the occasion was celebrated by a great meeting at the Bingley Hall.2

We must recognise here the germ of a formidable rivalry to Parliament as a deliberative body. The full development of the Caucus system would relegate the House of Commons to the position of an electoral college, with the purely mechanical func

1 See "A New Political Organisation" by J. Chamberlain, Fort. Rev. July, 1877. "The Birmingham Caucus" by W. T. Marriott, 19th Cent. June, 1882. The Daily News (June 1, 1877) indeed said: "It is expressly understood that no attempt shall be made to induce the federated associations to adopt any particular policy." But this idea seems to have dropped out of mind; e.g. the meeting of delegates at Leeds in the autumn of 1883, when it was determined that the Franchise Bill should have precedence of the Reform of the Government of London in the party programme.

On May 31st, 1877. But the chief significance of the meeting relates to another point. (Post, chap. xvi.)

tions of nominating the designated Prime Minister of whichever party happened to be in a majority at the polls, and of registering the party decrees as the Premier should present them. It may be said that even so the result would amount to nothing more than a mere change of forum, and that the essential consultative character of the English constitution would remain unaffected. But this is to overlook the all-important difference between the results of discussion where men of diverse views meet together, and the results where opposite views of the matter have been already discussed by separate meetings of the persons who hold them respectively. The "Caucus," to give it its popular name, is an institution which must be reckoned with in estimating the prospects of Consultative Government in England.

§ 7. Special Tendencies making against the Consultative Element.

Besides the general modern tendencies of which we have spoken as inimical to the consultative element in our constitution, the time of Lord Beaconsfield's administration was marked by special circumstances, likely, a priori, if there were any latent tendency in favour of Arbitrium, to bring it to a head.

In the first place, it was a time when foreign affairs came to the front, and in foreign affairs the consultative method has great difficulties to contend with. It is indeed, generally admitted that the public discussion of delicate negotiations while in progress would render a successful issue impossible; and so it has been urged that to permit any interference whatever with the arbitrium of the person charged with the conduct of our foreign relations is unwise.

In the next place it was a time when not only foreign affairs, but Mr. Disraeli came to the front. Mr. Disraeli was a man who in "a remarkable series of political primers" (as the Spectator somewhere calls his novels) had spoken of the House of Commons as by no means destined to be for ever the ultimate depositary of power. Few, to be sure, imagined that much serious meaning was to be attached to his novels, or that they had any other purpose than to be amusingly extravagant; but if indeed they gave the clue to his inner conception of what the constitution of the country ought to be, now was his opportunity.

§ 8. Significance and Importance of the Domestic Struggle which marked Lord Beaconsfield's Ministry.

In view of the various tendencies which have been spoken of, the question arises, "What was the real significance of the vehement domestic conflict which characterised Lord Beaconsfield's ministry?" Clearly the events of the time are worthy of careful study with reference to the course of Public Opinion on the one hand, and of the foreign policy of the English ministry on the other. It will be important to trace the reaction of these two things one upon the other. We may perhaps best test whether Public Opinion was in fact sovereign by considering what were its manifestations, and how far the course actually taken was in accordance with them, or contrary to them.1

The chronological survey from these points of view which forms the bulk of the present work has been attempted in the belief that the circumstances of the recrudescence of "the eternal Eastern Question" in 1875-8 will be of permanent interest to students of our Constitution even should the Eastern Quetions itself be finally closed and forgotten.

To what conclusion the facts point, every one must judge for himself; but if it be allowable to venture an opinion, it would be somewhat as follows:- On the one hand the distinct and emphatic approval by the heavily preponderating opinion of the country failed to secure the adoption by English diplomacy of the course of policy which the country earnestly and ardently demanded; nay, it even failed to counteract a leaning which used the influence of English diplomacy in the councils of Europe in a direction to which the country was most distinctly opposed. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the vehement resistance of Public Opinion did succeed in preventing English diplomacy from calling to its aid the last argument of kings, and from engaging England in actual war in support of the policy which the country disapproved.

Now, if the conclusion which has just been stated is at all borne out by the facts, the time was one of serious constitutional aberration, to state the case at the very lowest.

1 In considering the course taken by the English ministry we are, of course, confined to the materials furnished by published documents. The precise moment exerted on each Cabinet meeting and each act of diplomacy by the utterances of the British public, is a matter beyond our ken. But in published and ascertainable facts ample data are to be found for the consideration of the problem before us. 2 Part iii.

While people were relying on the constitutional machinery to insure that the course of the state should answer the judgment of Public Opinion (not, to be sure, as a ship answers her helm, but rather as she shapes her general course for the port prescribed by the owners,) in reality the constitutional machinery had got sadly out of gear. Public Opinion, recognising the failure of its constitutional organs to give expression to its thought, resorted to extra-constitutional organisations of itself in its struggle to make its will effective; and the control of the executive, so far as it was controlled at all, passed to the nation meeting in vast primary assemblies, with the newspapers as fuglemen. Thus the influence of the prevailing Public Opinion, so far as it was effective at all, acted as Public Opinion acts in states where it is unorganised; or at best, it acted through rival and extra-constitutional organisations.

May it not be anticipated that such a crisis can hardly have been passed through without leaving grave and lasting effects upon the Constitution itself?

But according to a view which largely prevailed at the time, it would be greatly to understate the case to speak of the crisis merely as a time of serious constitutional aberration. It was regarded as nothing less than a renewal of the "perennial conflict" between Arbitrium and Public Opinion. Arbitrium, it seemed, had succeeded for the time in securing an advantage, and in ousting Public Opinion from its sovereignty. Would the usurpation be lasting? Did what was happening amount to a revolution?

The Premier was credited with the inner desire to invest England more and more with the character of a great military Empire. He was believed to be aiming, not without success, at giving effect to his conceptions by evading parliamentary control, by throwing slights and discredit upon Parliament itself, by pandering to a fictitious and illusory Public Opinion, and by venturing on acts unconstitutional to the verge of illegality.

There were doctrinaires who came to the front with the assertion that according to the true intent and meaning of the constitution, Public Opinion, organised in the constitutional way, has no business to concern itself about the conduct of foreign affairs; and that foreign affairs belong of right to monarchs and ministers conversant with the higher and permanent interests of the country, and so representative in some transcendental way of Public Opinion. These men were regarded as only enunciating

doctrines which the Premier was beginning to carry into practice. Yet bolder flights were looked for if a general election should confirm the usurpation, a result which might well have happened in 1880 had attention been called off from the vital point at issue.

The publication of the memoirs of the time at some future date may afford better means than are open to us at present of judging whether any designs like these were really entertained by Lord Beaconsfield. But it was this assumption which gave intensity to the new controversy in the sphere of party politics which is indicated by the appearance of such phrases as Imperialism, Tory Democracy, and Personal Rule.

Or perhaps we should rather say that an old controversy which everybody thought had been finally settled long ago, suddenly raised its head again in the last half of Lord Beaconsfield's ministry. The overshadowing of ordinary party contentions by this great controversy is the salient feature of the general election of 1880; and the decisive character of the election in this respect is just the circumstance which now tends to make us forget how real the danger seemed and how vital that controversy appeared to those who were engaged in it.