The above tables are intended to show how the "Notions," arranged in their order, group themselves into "Views," and how from these views definite "Policies" resulted. The letters in Table I. refer to the sections of the respective sub-headings of Chapter IV. in which the notions are discussed seriatim. For the sake of convenience of reference this table is sometimes spoken of as a "spectrum" where "violet" corresponds to anti-Turkism and "red" to philo-Turkism. Table I. is also intended to exhibit how notions lying in different parts of the scale are connected with more general considerations. It is not to be expected that the whole scale should be definitely mapped out in this manner, yet some such connections can be traced. Where this is the case, the connections are worth noticing, because they may afford some clue to the ebb and flow of Public Opinion, by showing how circumstances which gave currency to some maxim, or excited some instinct, would tend strongly to reinforce a particular policy; and how in this manner, Public Opinion might be played on by any hand which could manipulate its stops. It is as if we could make some general propositions about the different colours of the spectrum and the eyes to which they were visible, and the treatment which would render the colour-blind eyes more sensitive to them. In the first place it is pretty obvious that the conception of the rule of conduct underlying such notions as " Humanity" was general Morality. Coming to the notions which make up "Legalism," it is no less obviously International Law. For such a notion as conciliating the Mahometan population of India by supporting Turkey, it is Interest. At the extreme red end of the spectrum we seem to have got into a region where the criterion is a mere æsthetic like or dislike. So also, the suggestion of historic fitness with regard to the destiny of Constantinople, a suggestion which enters into the notion spoken of as the "Historic Instinct," the violet end of the spectrum, may perhaps be regarded as an aesthetic factor founded on taste. Thus the notions towards either end of the scale are founded on considerations of a more general character than those occupying the centre regions. These last contemplate the exigencies of an actual political system, and (though not necessarily ultimately contrary to morality) appeal to some other criterion of conduct than morality at first-hand. We may perhaps say the criterion to which they appeal is interest, or else some general maxim of international conduct. Hence we call them "diplomatic." The "non-diplomatic" notions seem to be based directly on a sentiment, whether that sentiment be of a moral, or again of what may be called an æsthetic nature. Hence they may be spoken of as "sentimental," using the term as synonymous with "non-diplomatic." But it is to be observed that such moral considerations merge into considerations which, though not " diplomatic" in the sense mentioned above, are really political, in the sense of supplying adequate motives on which to found political action. As, for instance, when it is conceived of as a matter of religious duty to avoid war, or on the other hand to succour the oppressed. The distinction between the diplomatic and non-diplomatic notions answers roughly to the antithesis sometimes drawn between "policy" and "sentiment." But we notice that the æsthetic factors of philo-Turkism more properly deserve the term "sentimental," as used in common parlance to connote frivolous or inadequate motives, than the factors of antiTurkism which were often so called, seeing that the latter were, for the most part, founded on moral considerations. The portions of the scale where the Asiatic factors of antiRussism and philo-Turkism occur, answer to the conception of England as an Asiatic Power, or the imperialistic conception, and the related doctrine of " British Interests." It is not surprising to find in connection with the "red" policy the rise and active dissemination of this doctrine, and that this again is connected with the biases towards Disraeli Toryism and a High-handed Foreign Policy. The statement on p. 142 as to the coasts of the Black Sea previously to 1774 must be understood generally, for it appears that there was a temporary exception between 1699, when Azoff was ceded to Peter the Great at the peace of Carlowitz, and 1711, when the Czar was forced to restore it at the peace of Falczi. See Holland's lecture (referred to ante, p. 117) p. 4. |