Thus while the policy " Egypt" seems incompatible with most of the notions which lie about the middle of the scale, anti-War, Order and Legalism, it was connected in some of its forms with factors of anti-Turkism and of anti-Russism, and moreover it was very closely allied with the hankering after a strong foreign policy, and the cry for British interests, which we find in connection with the anti-Russian view.

We have no necessary sympathy with this effete despotism, this government of women and slaves which has weighed like a nightmare on Eastern Europe for 400 years. It is our interest alone which we consider, and the shortsightedness of the Porte itself may compel us to change our policy. . . . Perhaps circumstances may be too strong for us, and Turkey break up in spite of our efforts. In that case, no scruples, which will assuredly not occur to any of the other great Powers, should prevent us from benefiting by the accident, and obtaining at least Egypt and the Euphrates route as our share of the spoil.-Leppel H. Griffin, Fort. Rev. Jan. 1874.1

Mr. Grant Duff says-[Our efforts should be directed to have placed at Constantinople whatever European Prince the European Powers think the most convenient, or the least inconvenient. Otherwise as a pis aller, we must have Egypt, and a coaling station in Crete].-19th Cent. July, 1877.

With this may be compared the opinion of M. de Laveleye :

England must occupy Egypt and Cyprus if Russia annexes Armenia. I say Cyprus and not Crete.-Fort. Rev. July, 1877. But perhaps the most prominent spokesman of the policy "Egypt" was Mr. Edward Dicey, who says:

[Granting that the preservation of our Indian Empire is important we must protect ourselves from the mere possibility of Russia's getting a footing at Constantinople or in the Euphrates Valley. No precaution within our power can place us in so strong a position as we now occupy. The presence of an inert, unaggressive and friendly Power on the Bosphorus is the best buffer between Russia and ourselves. But, wisely or unwisely, we are not prepared to fight for Turkey, and we must look out for something else.] Russia, from the days of Nicholas and Sir Hamilton Seymour, has advocated a partition of the Turkish Empire, in which Egypt should fall to the share of England; and I have reason to believe suggestions of such a scheme were made within the last few weeks. The title to the Canal rests with the Sultan, the Khedive, and the Company. As to the Sultan] we cannot afford to shape our action in deference to the wishes of a moribund Power. [The Company would be compensated. Practically all rights could be bought for 15,000,000l. The Khedive would 1 "Present State of the Eastern Question."

exchange the suzerainty of the Sultan for English protection. France now would not mind, that is why the present moment is advantageous.] It would be mere hypocrisy to contend that the primary motive with which I advocate the occupation of Egypt is a desire to benefit the condition of the people. [Still they would be benefited.]-19th Cent. June, 1877.

Mr. Dicey replies to some objections which had been brought against his article. He says:

[The proposal has met with a great response. He does not grumble at Muscovite aggression. They have as much right to extend their dominions as we ours, or as little.]-19th Cent. Aug. 1877.

At the same time an important contribution to the controversy appears from Mr. Gladstone.

It is not to be denied that the territorial appetite has within the last quarter of a century revived among us with an abnormal vigour. [Ministers foster it; the newspaper press panders to it]. It is my firm conviction that as a rule enlargements of the empire are fraught with serious danger. [Parliament has too much to do. There are too few of us to manage and defend much more than we have already. But see] the aspect of these schemes before the high tribunal of international law and right. [We have had the status quo, Turkey's independence and integrity, and the treaties of 1856, held up to us as our proper objects. Now the consecrated ensign is "British Interests.' But why should we make the Turk a victim to them? Turkey may well say "Save me from my friends."]-19th Cent. Aug. 1877.2

Mr. Dicey rejoins,3 and simultaneously appears a further protest against the suggested policy.

Fall the Ottoman Empire will, by corruption if not by the sword; and its fall will apparently bring on a crisis in the destinies of England, which will be called on to decide whether out of the wreck she will take Egypt. . . The present helplessness of France no doubt is our opportunity, but we are credibly assured that her jealousy will be at once aroused and that her hostility awaits us in the end. . . . It is probable that in the present mood of the nation aggrandisement will carry the day. We say mood, and it does not seem that there has been any definite change of conviction such as new arguments produced since the time when more moderate views prevailed. But the nation is now flushed 1 "Our Route to India."

2 This article was republished in pamphlet form "by permission" in June, 1884. The anonymous preface states that only one passage has been omitted, as being liable to misconstruction and unnecessary, and that, although Mr. Gladstone might be inclined to modify slightly one or two phrases, the entire substance seems applicable to the present situation.

3 19th Cent. Sept. 1877.

with wealth . . . it is infected with the military spirit. . . . The aristocratic party is in the ascendant, and British aristocracy as well as Russian despotism is willing to divert the mind of the people from progress at home to aggrandisement abroad. . That there are special classes-administrative, military, and commercial-which have a special interest in a policy of aggrandisement no one needs to be told; our ears ring with vociferous demonstration of the facts. . . . [Putting aside the question of morality, would the occupation of Egypt be for our interest? In truth the question of morality] does not present itself in a very serious form as far as the occupation of Egypt is concerned. The general concurrence of the Powers at all events, if it could be obtained, might relieve us from any misgivings on that score. The Khedive is to the mass of his unhappy subjects not a national sovereign, but an alien oppressor. . [Is India a source of strength to us?] The whole foreign policy of England quivers with alarm for India. We are constantly drawn away from that which would otherwise be the manifest line of our interest by that besetting fear. [He argues that aggrandisement is a danger both to our political institutions, and to our national character, which suffers from being brought into contact with subject races.]— Goldwin Smith, Fort. Rev. Sept. 1877.

...

Perhaps it would be too much to say that "Egypt" was adopted as an actual policy by any large body of Public Opinion. Still it was present to the public mind as a possible policy, which at any moment might come to the front in some form or other. And, indeed, England has become involved in the destinies of Egypt in a manner of which it is impossible to foretell the upshot.

We have now considered the divers answers which Public Opinion returned to the question, "What had better be done?" And in them we get ultimately three distinct policies competing for adoption. The claim of any one to prevail was founded upon its claim to be the preponderating opinion of the country, taking into account all those circumstances which ought to be reckoned in the evaluation of Public Opinion. Now that we have made the acquaintance of these dramatis persona, so to speak, it will be our aim to trace the course of events from this point of view, to mark the wax and wane of rival policies, to compare the course of the English Government with the policy which embodied the preponderating opinion, and to endeavour to ascertain to what extent Public Opinion was really master of the destinies of the country at a momentous crisis.

1

Compare the passage where the Reviewer speaks of the possible necessity which the possession of India may lay upon us to hinder progress in European Turkey as "immorality to which that damnosa hereditas has committed us."-Fort. Rev. July 1876, "Home and Foreign Affairs."

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