grant permission for the passage. This was spoken of by some critics as a breach of treaty stipulation. The language used in Parliament by Lords Granville and Hartington was very cautious and guarded.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that the rule only operated when the Porte was at peace." But the English fleet remained in the Sea of Marmora after the signature of the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3rd, a circumstance which did not escape criticism, both abroad and at home.

The National Zeitung says, that whatever might have been the case during the war, the presence of the British fleet inside the Dardanelles in time of peace is a clear breach of the Treaty of Paris.-Berlin telegram, D. N. March 15, 1878.3

To be sure, the English Government did not recognise the Treaty of San Stefano as "valid"; and though technically the state of war between Turkey and another Power which causes the rule to cease to operate was not existing, actually the condition of things was more like an armistice than actual peace. But the English fleet did not repass the Dardanelles for some time after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin.

No one seems to have considered it worth while to raise the technical question of the exit of the English fleet through the Dardanelles, after the conclusion of peace. At the close of the Crimean War it was thought necessary to provide by a transitory article to the general treaty of peace, that the provisions as to closing the Straits should not apply to vessels of war employed by the belligerent Powers for the evacuation by sea of the territories occupied by their armies. But the Treaty of Berlin contains no provision providing for the exit of the English ships. At the Congress of Berlin (sitting of July 9th) when discussing the Article (53) of the Treaty of Berlin, which provides that the Treaties of Paris and of London are maintained in all such of their provisions as are not abrogated or modified by the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, Lord Salisbury

1

raises objections to the general arrangement, which maintains the former treaties without specifying more exactly the points modified by the present arrangements. His Excellency does not consider the decision sufficient, in particular as regards the Straits. (Turkey, xxxix. 1878, 16th Protocol, p. 242.)

e.g. "Scrutator," T. Feb. 7, 1878.

2 e.g.

Sir Edward Harris, T. Feb. 12, 1878.

3 Compare Mr. Gladstone's speech, H. of C. July 10, 1878, post, r. 149.

The result of the discussion was that the majority of the Congress was favourable to the wording which recognised that the principle established by Article II. of the Treaty of London (that is the article which reaffirmed the "ancient rule") is maintained in all its integrity.

At a subsequent sitting Lord Salisbury asked that the following declaration, which, he said, is binding only on his Government, might be inserted in the protocol.

Considering that the Treaty of Berlin will modify an important part of the arrangement sanctioned by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and that the interpretation of Article II. of the Treaty of London, which is dependent on the Treaty of Paris, may thus become a matter of dispute:

I declare on behalf of England that the obligations of Her Britannic Majesty relating to the closing of the Straits do not go further than an engagement with the Sultan to respect in this matter His Majesty's independent determinations in conformity with the spirit of existing treaties.

Count Schouvaloff reserved the right of inserting in the protocol a counter-declaration if necessary.-(18th Protocol, p. 270.)

At the next sitting

Count Schouvaloff, referring to the declaration made in the preceding sitting by Lord Salisbury on the subject of the Straits, demands the insertion in the protocol of a declaration on the same subject, presented by the Plenipotentiaries of Russia :

The Plenipotentiaries of Russia, without being able exactly to appreciate the meaning of the proposition of the Second Plenipotentiary of Great Britain respecting the closing of the Straits, restrict themselves to demanding, on their part, the insertion in the protocol of the observation: that in their opinion, the principle of the closing of the Straits is an European principle, and that the stipulations concluded in this respect in 1841, 1856 and 1871, confirmed at present by the Treaty of Berlin, are binding on the part of all the Powers, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the existing treaties, not only as regards the Sultan, but also as regards all the Powers signatory to these transactions. (19th Protocol, p. 277.)

In the debate on the Treaty of Berlin this incident did not pass uncriticised.

But what have you been doing to public law yourselves? You sent your fleet within the Dardanelles and kept it there in time of peace. Was not that a violation of the public law of Europe? What declaration do we find in the protocols about the Dardanelles? We find Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, Lord

Salisbury, has taken upon himself to determine on behalf of England, without the consent of the other Powers of Europe, in what way he shall hereafter understand and construe that article of the Treaty of London which refers to the closing of the Dardanelles. What right has he to do that? It appears to me that it is a flat violation, as it stands, of the Treaty of London. The Russians met it by saying that the principle of the closing of the Straits was a European principle, and that the stipulations of the subject were binding on all the Powers in accordance with the spirit and letter of the existing treaties.—Mr. Gladstone, H. of C. July 30, 1878.

In April and May 1885, when relations between England and Russia were very strained in consequence of the dispute on the Afghan frontier, it was seen that one of England's most effective weapons would be to send her fleet into the Black Sea.

It

Lord Stratheden and Campbell rose to move an humble Address to the Crown for the protocols or treaties by which the authority of the Sublime Porte to admit foreign ships of war into the Dardanelles was regulated. [He spoke of the restrictions imposed by various treaties, and said in 1871 they underwent a great modification, intended as a counterpoise to the permission to Russia to have cruisers on the Black Sea.] In the event of difficulties occurring between Russia and Great Britain, either now or at any future period, it would be important to have this matter cleared up. . . . If, therefore, it turned out that there was a power of closing the Black Sea, Russia would, according to past experience, be well entitled to deem herself invincible. was important, therefore, to see whether the Sultan could in any case be compelled to grant Russia an immunity against the only danger which experience had taught her to be a grave one. There was, it seemed to him, only one view which was adverse to his motion-namely, that the danger was entirely past. [But, the storm might descend at any moment.] The Marquis of Salisbury:The object of the declaration which I had to make on behalf of Her Majesty's Government I understood to be to establish the principle that our engagements in respect of the Dardanelles were not engagements of a general European or international character, but were engagements towards the Sultan only, the practical bearing of that reservation being that if, in any circumstances, the Sultan should not be acting independently, but under the pressure of some other Power, there would be no international obligation on our part to abstain from passing through the Dardanelles. I merely wish to point out that it was not merely with respect to Batoum, but with respect to any other matters which may arise calling for our presence in the Black Sea that the reservation then made was made.-H. of L. May 7, 1885.

The following criticism may perhaps enable us more "exactly

to appreciate the meaning of the proposition of the Second Plenipotentiary of Great Britain."

Lord Salisbury explained the object was to assert our engagement with the Sultan only, not with the other great Powers. It is well to notice this assertion was expressly controverted by the Russian Plenipotentiaries at the Congress.-Professor T. E. Holland, T. May 11, 1885.

Meanwhile in many quarters the Rule of the Straits appeared to be entirely forgotten, or quietly ignored, and many of the English newspapers seemed inclined to write as if an attempt on the part of Turkey to prevent the passage of our fleets through the Straits, or the action of other Powers in urging her to do so (of which there were rumours), would be an unfriendly, if not a hostile act to this country. It seemed taken for granted that in case of war the English fleet would find its way into the Black Sea. If this be so, it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the supposed barrier which the Rule of the Straits presents to the appearance of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean is equally futile, and that the labour and the care spent over the famous Rule have been absolutely wasted. But in 1876-8, at all events, the maintenance of the Rule was conceived of as one of those British Interests which were threatened in the controversy.

§ E. Russia threatens the Rule of the Straits.

We distinguish, then, the notion of Russia as threatening the Rule of the Straits from the notion of Russia as threatening Constantinople.

The abrogation of the rule would, of course, be involved if Constantinople were to pass into Russian hands; but the rule might conceivably be abolished, and Russian ships of war might pass in and out of the Black Sea, so far as any prohibition of European law is concerned, although Constantinople might remain in the hands of the Turks. Russia after a successful war with Turkey might demand the abrogation of the Rule of the Straits, perhaps even exclusive provisions in her own favour as the price of victory, short of claiming possession of Constantinople itself.

Whatever might be the case with regard to the fate of Constantinople, the opening of the Straits to Russian men-of-war would be calculated to touch England as the leading maritime Power, and

also as having a vital interest in the route to India, more closely than it would touch the other European Powers.

From this point of view there were two things deprecated by Eng and as the result of the abrogation of the rule, namely, (1) the entrance into the arena of a new navy, perhaps rivalling that of England; (2) the taking up by Russia of a position of strategic advantage on the flank of our route to India. Thus we arrive at the two factors of anti-Russism which spring out of the idea that Russia threatens the Rule of the Straits.

If we accept the doctrine that English naval supremacy is an element in the European balance of power, the notion that the Russian Black Sea fleet should be kept out of the Mediterranean may be regarded as having relation to the politics of the system of Europe as well as to purely English interests; and in the notion of the Russian Black Sea fleet threatening England's communications with India we get a connecting link between European and Asiatic Russophobia.

With a great arsenal on the Bosphorus-the gates of the Black Sea in Russian keeping-to close or to open at pleasure— the position of all the maritime Powers would be affected, and those of Europe critically, by altered conditions of security, and the proximity of a first-class Power.-Sir R. Alcock, Fort. Rev. Aug. 1875.

The strategic questions involved in the possession of Constantinople by the Russians or the opening of the Straits to Russian men-of-war, were a good deal discussed in magazine articles and elsewhere, and notably in connection with our relations to Egypt and the Suez Canal.1 It would be always necessary, it was said, for England to keep a powerful squadron like a chained watch-dog at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Among the possibilities discussed were the advance of Russia to the banks of the Suez Canal itself, and the acquisition by her of a naval station on the Persian Gulf.

It was sometimes suggested that the Rule of the Straits operated as a protection to Constantinople.

If Russian fleets issuing from the ports of the Euxine are to pass at will down the Bosphorus, Constantinople becomes a subject city.-F. Harrison, Fort. Rev. Dec. 1876.

1 e.g. Sir H. Havelock, "Constantinople and our Road to India," Fort. Rev. Jan. 1877; Sir G. Campbell's Handy Book of the Eastern Question; Dicey, "Our Road to India," 19th Cent. June, 1877; and "The Future of Egypt," 19th Cent. Aug. 1877; Mr. Gladstone, " Aggression on Egypt," 19th Cent. Aug. 1877; "The Khedive's Egypt and our Route to India," Blackwood, Oct. 1877.