elements of anti-Russism seem capable of producing their full effect.

The distinction between the European and Asiatic factors is tolerably obvious, and was adopted by many writers.1

Side by side as it were with anti-Russism runs what Mr. Gladstone somewhere called "The kindred but more advanced disease of Turkomania." But to avoid giving to any phase of opinion a name implying in it a diseased character, we may adopt in preference the neutral term philo-Turkism. This nomenclature has also the advantage of being symmetrical, the two ends of the scale thus being filled by anti-Turkism and philo-Turkism. The symmetry would be perfect if we had a view "philo-Russism serving as the counterpart of anti-Turkism at the "violet" end of the scale. There was indeed a good deal of English sympathy with the Russian position in respect to the particular controversy in hand; but this was not the same thing as the general admiration for Russia which was expressed on one occasion by Carlyle.2 At most, such an element appeared only as an unimportant "apologetic" factor.

For the most part philo-Turkism was subordinate to antiRussism. Turkey was regarded as a counterpoise to, or perhaps as a weapon which might be used against, Russia. PhiloTurkism must not, however, be absolutely identified with antiRussism, as we find traces of a desire to uphold Turkey independently of any use which might be made of Turkey as against Russia.3

Moreover, as we have seen, a certain jealousy of Russia, and a desire to erect the most efficient barrier against her advance towards the south, entered into the view diametrically opposed to

1 Compare Sir R. Alcock. He distinguishes :-

Three groups of questions which together form the Eastern Question.

(a) The future destiny of Turkey and Constantinople, which chiefly affects Europe and more immediately Russia and Austria.

(4) Persia and Egypt enter into a second group, comprising Central Asia, in which Great Britain and Russia alone of the European Powers are concerned as principals.

(e) The Far East, in which Russia and China alone have political and territorial interests engaged. The other European Powers have only commercial interests.

These three groups, he says, dovetail into and overlap each other, so that they can never be entirely separated. Russia is a principal factor in all three, and thus a great European Power connects them inseparably. [Fort. Rev. Jan. 1876.] We may put aside the considerations involved in Sir R. Alcock's third group, but it will be observed that the other two answer to our European and Asiatic anti-Russism.

2 Post, § H.

Such a desire was, as we shall see, attributed to Lord Beaconsfield himself.

philo-Turkism. In this sense Russophobia was a factor of antiTurkism itself.

Lastly, many opponents of Russia refused to be considered as apologists for Turkey. They were content to say that one was as black as the other, and that British Interests must be upheld irrespective of these matters. Still, it was the characteristic of anti-Russism to count as a loss to England any success which Russia might achieve by her diplomacy or by her arms in reference to the particular matters then occupying the attention of the world. As these were matters in which Russia was making demands which the Porte was resisting, for practical purposes hostility to Russia and support of Turkey tended to become undistinguishable. In the diplomatic notions Turkey, representing the status quo, appears as the counterpoise to Russia, and in the sentimental notions we get a contrast between the Russian and the Turkish government or character, drawn unfavourably to the former. Anti-Russism and philo-Turkism were often the same thing looked at from a different side. Thus, although the theoretical distinction does not entirely disappear, we may, as a matter of convenience, consider the various notions of anti-Russism together with the corresponding notions of philo-Turkism.

SA. Russia a big Aggressive Power.

We find the leading notion of European anti-Russism in the conception of Russia as a Power which, by a course of systematic and persistent aggression on her weaker neighbours, advances of set purpose to an irresistible ascendency in Europe, if not to universal empire. Hence it becomes the interest of every European State to assist in maintaining whatever barrier may confine her to her frozen steppes, and keep her from bursting out upon the world beyond.

"Russia has always from the time of Peter the Great systematically laboured without any deviation to realise the scheme of the conquest of Turkey. When checked in her advance, she draws back, but only to take advantage of the first favourable opportunity."-[Quoted from Lord Palmerston's speech in Parliament, March 25th, 1854: the reviewer continues] We hold this to be an invariable truth in politics. M. Boukharow, himself a Russian, boasts that the extension of Russia in the last century is a fact unexampled in history. Since 1772 she has doubled her territories; within eighty years she has advanced 350 leagues on the road to Vienna and to Paris; she has swallowed up half Sweden,

and of Poland as much as would make another Austrian empire. She has conquered from Persia about as much as the area of Great Britain. From Turkey she has wrested by successive wars and treaties States as large as Prussia was before the war of 1866, and we have recently seen her advancing over Central Asia with accelerated rapidity. To this movement as against Europe and Turkey the Crimean War put a stop. . . . To denounce as worthless results obtained by so great an effort seems to us to be sheer folly.-Ed. Rev. Oct. 1876.

The mere fact of the bigness of Russia was accountable, no doubt, for some of the hostile feeling which was evinced towards her. Perhaps some half-unconsciously received tradition of the balance of power influenced the minds of some people who appear to have been disturbed and excited by the contemplation of Russia upon the map.

It is better at once to recognise that this grand theory about the necessity of repressing the Slavic nationality is as unsound in policy as it is cynically selfish. The notion of consigning certain populations to eternal servitude because the section of the Aryan race to which they belong happens to be numerous, has been reserved for the philosophers of an enlightened age. [The writer quotes John Bright's remark to the working men in reference to the franchise, "You cannot help being numerous."]-T. Aug. 16th, 1876.

At all events in the contest between Russia and Turkey, the relative size of the combatants operated to conciliate some amount of sympathy to the smaller. If, from one point of view, this appears to be a matter of mere sentiment, yet in another aspect it is closely related to an objection to seeing small States absorbed by large ones, entertained as a general political principle.

Sympathy with the weak is pleaded in the case of the Turk as it was pleaded in the case of the slaveowner, by way of giving a chivalrous aspect to what might perhaps be felt in itself to be rather a questionable predilection. Sympathy with the weak is infinitely to be commended; but we should have thought that the weak in the former case were the slaves, and in the present the Christian subjects of the Turk.-Goldwin Smith, Contemp. Rev. Nov. 1877.1

As to the character of the aggressive Power that was so much dreaded, few had formed anything like a definite and accurate notion. Two conceptions, to some extent cpposed to each other, are met with, which may be distinguished as the "Panslavist" and "Holy Alliance" conceptions. The former of these saw the chief

1 Compare extract from Fraser, quoted in Anti-Turkism, § E, ante, p. 92.

danger from Russia in a destructive propaganda working through secret societies. The notion of the Russian Secret Societies as constituting the chief danger to Europe, was characteristic of Mr. Disraeli.1

What happened? That happened which was not expected. Servia declared war upon Turkey. That is to say, the Secret Societies of Europe declared war upon Turkey. I can assure you, gentlemen, that in the attempt to conduct the government of this world there are now elements to be considered, which our predecessors had not to deal with. We have now to deal not merely with Emperors, with Princes, and with Ministers; there are the Secret Societies, an element which we must take into account and which at the last moment may baffle all our arrangementssocieties which have regular agents everywhere, which countenance assassination, and which if necessary could produce a massacre.-Beaconsfield.2

Mr. Kinglake speaks of

the submission of Alexander II. to the Panslavistic fraternity, and the consequent accession of Russia to the cause of a half-hearted democracy. [Prince W. Mestchersky's recent account of the political Russia of the present day is referred to. The Prince] plainly agrees that it is a democracy not applying its energies to home politics, but attending, on grounds of fraternity, to foreign affairs.- Crimea, Preface to (Cab.) Ed. 1876.

Mr. Wallace, writing on the Russian Secret Societies distinguishes between the Panslavist and the Nihilist Societies.3 Internationally the former only are important; and it is these that are mainly alluded to in the expressions of the factor of opinion now under consideration. It is difficult to estimate the effect of the existence of the Nihilist element in Russia on English Public Opinion. The aim of the Nihilist Societies is a subversion of home institutions, and a certain internationalist character might be expected to attach to them. This character, however, does not appear to be strongly developed. Mr. Wallace tells us that in times of national crises, as in the Polish insurrection of 1863, patriotism triumphs over liberalism with the Nihilists.

So far as Russian Nihilism was taken into account at all, this element of opinion belongs rather to the sentimental group.

1 We may recall the character of mystery and terror with which he invested his picture of English Trades Unions (Sybil, book iv. chap. iv.).

2 At Aylesbury, Sept. 20, 1876. Post, chap. xiii. § 3.

3 Fort. Rev. Aug. 1877.

It must be noticed, however, that, by a curious apparent incon- . sistency, points of weakness in Russia were often laid most stress upon by the very persons who were urging most strongly the danger to be apprehended from her. They seemed so anxious to make her out contemptible that they almost forgot to make her formidable. But underneath this inconsistency lay the substantial notion that the very weakness of the Russian Government was a source of European danger.

There is something quite pathetic in the picture we form of the kindly indolent, nervous man [Alexander II.] worried by gigantic responsibilities and never-ending business, dreading the enterprises which he dares not refuse, and over-mastered by men whom he is afraid to trust.-F. Harrison, Fort. Rev. Dec. 1876. Such considerations (to which we may perhaps add the financial embarrassments of Russia) made her action seem less likely to be guided by the sane calculations of prudence. She was, so to speak, a volcanic element in the European system, an occult and irregular force, of which quiescence at one point was only the sure indication of activity at another.

As a pendant to this we have Turkey regarded as keeping the peace among her subject populations. We recognise the concep tion of the status quo as the alternative, not only to a scramble by the Great Powers, but also to internecine conflicts between the varied and intermingled populations of the Balkan peninsula.

$ B. Russia represents the Holy Alliance.

The other conception of Russia as an aggressive power had its root in the historical connection of Russia with the Holy Alliance. According to this view, in spite of the great changes which had come over Europe since the beginning of the century, Russian diplomacy was still animated by the propaganda of a cruel and repressive system of government. The spirit of the old Holy Alliance was only dormant, not dead, and Russia was identified. with it. Russian diplomacy was regarded as a malign influence, hostile to liberal institutions everywhere; and resistance to Russia was identified with the maintenance of the liberties of Europe. The dread of Russian ascendency had double poignancy given to it by such considerations as these.

The popular view may be nearly expressed thus: Ever since the battle of Waterloo Russia has been the fountain of misery to