On the other hand, it appears sometimes to be imagined that mediation implies an ultimate resort to force by the mediator, if his solution is not acquiesced in; and a distinction is drawn between mediation and "good offices.”1 Unsought mediation is not always acceptable to belligerents. The substance of the objection seems to be an assumption that the propositions made by a third power are backed by force as an ultimate sanction. During the civil war in the United States, Russia made to the Government an offer of its friendly offices to put an end to the war. .. The French Government afterwards asked the attention of England and Russia to a joint offer of mediation. . . . . The Russian Government apprehended that the proposed joint action would have the appearance in the United States of pressure, and would excite fears of intervention.—(Wheaton, § 73, Dana's note.) In regard to the numerous efforts which have appeared in the foreign press on the subject of English mediation, the Agence Russe again points out that, by international law, mediation is only possible when solicited by both belligerents. "Now, Russia," it is added, "though always ready to listen to any overtures for peace which might be addressed by the Porte direct to the Russian headquarters, has never done anything to give rise to the supposition that she has ever had any intention of accepting mediation." -Reuter's St. Petersburg telegram, Morning Papers, Dec. 31st, 1877. [At the sitting of the Berlin Conference of July 12th, Carathéodory Pasha, referring to the 24th Article of the Treaty (which relates to the rectification of the frontiers of Greece, and the eventual mediation of the Powers), desired that the word "mediation" might be replaced by "good offices." The Count de Laurnay (Italy) declared that the substitution would diminish the meaning and bearing of the proposition of the Plenipotentiaries of France and Italy, and the decision taken by the High Assembly (Turkey, XXXIX., 1878; Inclosure 2 in No. xl., p. 276.) Many writers appear to identify "mediation" with "good offices," and use the word " arbitration" to mark the case of an authoritative third party. Mediation, whereby a third Power interposes its good offices to bring about the peaceable settlement of a matter which is in dispute between two Powers differs from arbitration in this respect, that the decision of an arbiter is obligatory, whilst a mediator merely gives counsel and advice. It is perfectly lawful 1 Wheaton, p. 495, Lawrence's note. for an independent Power to offer to mediate between other independent Powers which are either preparing for or actually engaged in war, and to suggest to them a compromise. . . or to advise that a reasonable satisfaction . . . should be offered and accepted.-Twiss, Law of Nations, Time of War. Possibly it may be convenient in diplomacy to have words which may serve as the velvet glove to the iron hand, but the great preponderance of authority seems to be against any such restriction of the use of the word "mediation" as that contended for by those who would make it something more stringent than "good offices." And hence the view preponderates that it is not only the right but the duty of neutral Powers (so far as concerns quarrels between States as distinguished from an intestine disturbance) to mediate when there is any prospect of a good result. 1 But Mediation is where a common friend interposes his good offices to bring the contending parties to a mutual understanding . . . The task is a very delicate one. . . . Hübner deems it incumbent upon neutrals generally to act the part of mediators, in order to prevent, if possible, the breaking out of war. Galiani is of opinion that, although the post of mediator may be accepted, the office is rather to be avoided than sought, on account of the danger to the mediator of compromising his neutrality. Phillimore 2 prefers the Christian principle of Hübner to the more safe expediency of Galiani.-Halleck, Baker's edition, p. 415. If we desire to preserve the various distinctions which have been adverted to, perhaps the words "isolation" and "participation" may serve to denote respectively a complete holding aloof from the affairs of other nations, and the contrary. Adopting these we may take "intermeddling" to indicate participation in the internal affairs of another State, "interference " to indicate forcible participation (that is, "by force, or with force as the known ultimate sanction," 3) and "intercession" for pacific participation. Then the phrases "forcible intermeddling" and "interposition" will serve for the two species into which "interference" may be divided, according as the occasion of the interference is the domestic matters of a foreign State, or a matter 1 The Times Paris correspondent, discussing the relations of France and China, distinguishes two kinds of mediation-platonic and imperative-the former being the mediation of powers which have no coercive influence to bear on either party (probably meaning cases in which it is understood from the beginning that all such influence is disclaimed).-T., Nov. 1, 1884. The reference is to Phillimore's International Law, vol. iii. § 4. It is not The word "intermeddling" is taken as the best that suggests itself. thoroughly satisfactory, as it has a slightly bad connotation, which is here not intended. I between independent foreign States. Classifying "intercession" in a similar way according to the occasion, we have “pacific (or nonforcible) intermeddling" for cases where the domestic affairs of a foreign State are in question, but there seems no word specially appropriate to intercession between independent foreign States, as such terms as "mediation," "arbitration," "good offices," appear to refer rather to the manner and form of the intercession than to the occasion of it. The word "intervention" is not made use of in this suggested nomenclature, and it may be conveniently used in the popular sense for participation generally, or for the particular species of it denoted by the context. But when the diplomatic doctrine of non-intervention is spoken of, this should be restricted to the maxim which forbids forcible, and according to some authorities non-forcible, intermeddling. The distinctions here drawn are exhibited in the following table. S B. Legalistic Non-Intervention. The second legalistic notion was the contention that no European Power had any right to intervene on behalf of the Provincials, and this on the ground that the Provincials were the subjects of an independent State; not on the ground of any impropriety in taking part, even forcibly if need be, in the affairs of Europe. It may be asked, "Why should International Law especially frown on this particular sort of interference, namely, between a Government and its subjects?" The books say that the doctrine which forbids intermeddling is a corollary from a fundamental principle the sovereignty of States. But as a practical working rule, the doctrine of non-intervention seems to be based on the assumptions that on the whole, and as a general rule, each nation understands its own wants best, and will, if left alone, work out for itself the form of government best suited to its circumstances; moreover that in struggles between rulers and people no third party is disinterested enough, or wise enough, to be trusted to decide ex cathedra, which is the cause of good government, and which of liberty, and to be allowed, on the strength of its own judgment, to set up, or to pull down. However that may be, as a matter of fact, the maxim is at the present day a part of the practical recognised code of European public law, and that it is so, is owing in great measure to the stand England made in the early part of the present century against the pretensions of the Holy Alliance to regulate, in the interests of pure morality as they said, the relations of subjects and their rulers all over the world. Hence the association of the doctrine of non-intervention with the name of Canning. Non-intervention as a legalistic notion, then, means the application to the case in hand of the doctrine of International Law which goes by that name, as a reason why there should be no intermeddling, or at all events no forcible intermeddling, by any Power in the affairs of the Porte and the Christian subjects. To deprecate interference in the condition of Turkey, to allow Turkey and its subjects in the course of time to find out that condition which suited both of them best, seemed to us a policy which was desirable. Therefore we hesitated very much about joining the English consul to the others in the delegation to the insurgents which failed.-Disraeli, H. of C. July 31st, 1876. The collective duty of Europe is non-interference; England has insisted upon the collective observance of treaties. Turkey and its subjects must in course of time find out for themselves that condition of things which suited both of them best.-Blackwood's Mag. Sept. 1876. To treat the doctrine of non-intervention as having any applicability to the case in hand, involved the assumption that, if left alone, the Porte and the Christian subjects would work out the form of government best suited to them. It is the negation of the notions expressed in the phrase "The Turk cannot reform." Hence the relevancy of Mr. Freeman's position, that the state of things in Turkey was not a case of government in the ordinary sense at all, but a case of an invading horde encamped in Europe. As long as the rulers refuse to govern with due regard to the subjects' theory of life and of morality, so long as there is a hard and fast line between the rulers and the ruled, and the rulers govern simply for the sake of getting what advantage they can, so long it is a case of two diametrically opposed interests, in which the weaker will be remorselessly sacrificed. No homogeneous state will be formed; the subjects and the rulers will remain face to face as two foreign bodies, and if then interference does take place, it will really be more akin to interposition than to intermeddling. We have seen that the maxim of non-intervention has been attacked as an immoral doctrine; and we have also seen that it directly contradicts the humane impulse, which would see in the bare fact that people are oppressed by their rulers enough to warrant interference on their behalf.1 The books which lay down the rule of non-intervention, also lay down that it is subject to exceptions. The attempt to formulate the occasions which justify a departure from the rule are perhaps not entirely satisfactory. Perhaps it would be better to treat it as a provisional working rule for ordinary circumstances, and to say frankly that it does not apply in extreme cases. This indeed seems to be the line taken in state papers as distinguished from text books. The maxim may be regarded as a rule of the European and civilised world, to the benefit of which no State is entitled which does not conform to the civilised code. The great example of an exception to the rule is the interference in favour of Greece in 1827, and it is worth noticing that this exception as well as the rule itself is connected with the name of Canning. 1 See "Anti-Turkism," §§ c and E. |