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As Russia was the great Power which was seeking to alter the status quo, the notion which saw in the status quo the only safeguard against European anarchy naturally tended towards the anti-Russian view.

Of course, this conclusion was based on the assumption that no change was possible in the direction of withdrawing the Christian populations from the hand of the Porte without at the same time altering the map and infringing on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Hence the importance attached, on the other hand, to schemes whereby the provincials, while secured practical independence or some form of autonomy, should still remain united to the Porte by some nominal tie, so that technically these territories might remain within the ambit of the Ottoman Empire. The Times (September 5th, 1876) denounced as an insidious fallacy the failure to distinguish between the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the independence of the Porte. In the phrase "The Integrity of Turkey," as thus understood, the word "Turkey" becomes a geographical expression, comprising what Mr. Freeman preferred to call "South-Eastern Christendom." The force of the word "integrity" is rather negative than positive. It implied that no part of the territory called Turkey should be detached and handed over to any European Power, and that no portion should be converted into a sovereign State capable of entering into international relations.

Of these two phrases, "integrity" and "independence," the bearing is perfectly distinct. The first is negative, the second positive. The integrity of Turkey will be maintained by a titular sovereignty, verified, as it were, through a moderate payment of tribute, in order that the Ottoman sovereignty may serve the purpose of shutting out from the present limits of the Turkish Empire any other sovereignty, or any exercise, in whole or in part, of sovereign rights by any other Power, whether it be Russia on the Euxine, or Austria on the Danube, or France or England on the Nile and the Red Sea. The independence of the Ottoman Empire is a very different thing. It meant at the time of the Crimean War, and it means now, that, apart from Roumania and Servia, where Europe is already formally concerned, and apart from any arrangement self-made with a vassal State like Egypt, which can hold its own against Constantinople, the Porte is to be left in the actual, daily and free administration of all the provinces of its vast dominions. Now, as regards the territorial integrity of Turkey, I for one am still desirous to see it upheld, though I do not say that that desire should be treated as a thing paramount to still higher objects of policy. For of all the objects of policy, in my conviction, humanity, rationally understood, and

in due relation to justice, is the first and highest. My belief is, that this great aim need not be compromised, and that other important objects would be gained by maintaining the territorial integrity of Turkey. There is no reason to suppose that, at the present moment, any of the Continental Powers are governed by selfish or aggressive views in their Eastern policy. [A reference follows to the debate of July 31st, 1876, when the Prime Minister spoke of Mr. Gladstone as having recommended the reestablishment of the status quo.] Across the table I at once threw the interjection "not status quo but territorial integrity." The Prime Minister promptly replied that territorial integrity would be found virtually to mean the status quo. Now the territorial integrity means the retention of a titular supremacy, which serves the purpose of warding off foreign aggression. The status quo means the maintenance of Turkish administrative authority in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Territorial integrity shuts out the foreign State; the status quo shuts out the inhabitants of the country, and keeps (I fear) everything to the Turk, with his airy promises, his disembodied reforms, his ferocious passions, and his daily, gross and incurable misgovernment.-Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors.1

In your paper of yesterday you speak of "the territorial integrity of Turkey" as "a principle the value of which not only Mr. Gladstone but Mr. Freeman has defended." Now, I have never defended the territorial integrity of Turkey as a principle. I have never in any way recognised "Turkey" at all. I never even use the word "Turkey" if I can help it. In what is called "Turkey" I see only South-Eastern Christendom, Greek, Sclavonic and Rouman, held down for five hundred years by a gang of Turkish robbers. That I care nothing for territorial integrity, I have shown by constantly arguing that the right thing for Bosnia, in the interest of its large Mussulman minority, is annexation to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. If the Apostolic King will not have it, it is no fault of mine. But setting aside this special case, I do hold that it is most important that all the States in that part of the world should be bound together by some common tie to their natural centre at the New Rome. As long as the Turk abides in the New Rome, the only possible tie is that of the tributary relation to him. When he his got rid of, the tributary relation may be exchanged for a Federal one."-E. A. Freeman, in D. N. Sept. 15, 1876.

In the belief in the tremendous dimensions of a war in the East, if it once broke out, we meet again with the enormous importance attached to Constantinople. The sense of the magnitude of the prize raises in men's minds the idea of a conflict which daunts them.

1 See post, part iii. e.g. chap. xi. § 4, as to the dissatisfaction expressed at Mr. Gladstone's having declared for the "Integrity of Turkey" until he made the distinction plain.

Sc.-Apprehended Danger to France.

The conception of the unstable equilibrium of Europe appears in another aspect. A theory was broached, for which no foundation in fact is apparent, but which seems to have been caught at as a possible explanation why excessive care to avoid this particular war was being exhibited by the English Ministry. It is just worth mentioning, though it was very ephemeral and very limited in its spread. It was, that Germany was only waiting the opportunity which would be afforded by the other Powers being involved in war to attack France,1

§ D.-Fear of a Jehad.

Besides the fear of inviting a European scramble, the danger of exciting Mahometan fanaticism was urged as a reason against violently disturbing the status quo.

The Pall Mall Gazette was one of the great exponents of this notion, which first appeared prominently in an article entitled 'What the Turk can do." 2

A time came when for a moment people began to consider what a fearful element in Europe a victorious Turkey would be; but meanwhile the notion was for the most part combated on the ground that the fear was chimerical.

If we are in earnest, it was urged, Turkey will yield, or at all events if Turkey resists, and fleets and armies have to be moved to coerce her, it will be not so much a case of war as a measure of police. Thus the fear now under consideration appears as the antithesis of the belief that the preservation of the European concert may provide an effectual remedy. It was asserted that the display of such an overmastering force as a thoroughly united Europe might bring to bear would secure, and was the only way

1 Post, chap. xv. § 3. See D. N., Feb. 26, and March 12 and 13, 1876; Fort. Rev., Nov. 1876, "Home and Foreign Affairs," pp. 684-5; a letter from Professor Beesley (Weekly Dispatch, March 17, 1877), where he says that, in view of the danger to Franc from Germany in case Russia should be involved, we now see the Government have been quite right in making the preservation of peace their first object. The West, he says, is of much more importance than the East.

2 Nov. 22, 1875. See post, part iii. chap. viii.

8 See Spec., Aug. 18 and Sept. 22, and T., Sept. 22, 1877.

4"Anti-Turkism," § G. The antithesis between the present notion and the notion that "the open sore must be healed ('Anti-Turkism,' § F) has been noticed already, and others might be pointed out.

of securing, the quiet submission of the Turks. This position was strongly enforced by the Opposition leaders in Parliament at the commencement of the session of 1877:—

Will any one tell me that if once the Turks got into their heads the belief that, not only England, but the whole of Europe, was absolutely in earnest on this matter, they would resist the united voice of Europe-Earl Granville, H. of L. Feb. 8, 1877.

What is there in the history of Turkey to lead us to suppose that a State which has never resisted any single Power whatever, unless supported directly or indirectly by some other Power, would dream of resisting the whole of Europe combined, when really in earnest, and coming forward with moderate proposals? When the noble Marquis (Salisbury) talks of the only means of coercing the Turks being the bombardment of Constantinople, I think that is a perfect chimera.—Earl Granville, H. of L. Feb. 20, 1877.

[Lord Hartington spoke to the same effect. See Spec., Feb. 10, 1877: "The Policy of the Opposition."]

To this was added the belief that, even if Turkey did resist, yet, owing to the crushing character of the force brought against her, the operations that would result would lack many of the most dreaded elements of war; something as in a case of cauterisation the hotter the iron the less the pain. From this follows a distinction between such applications of force and war—a distinction which might fail to satisfy the conscience of the holder of the 'Anti-War" doctrine, but which might calm many of the scrupies of the votary of" Order." On this distinction Mr. Gladstone insisted on a later occasion.

My honourable friend (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) says we are at war with Egypt. I do not admit that. I do not admit that we are at war with any one. (Laughter.) Hon. gentlemen seem to think that statement ridiculous. That is the position I hold and the position I am prepared to defend. Analogous cases have occurred within my own life, and within my political memory. [He refers to the battle of Navarino.]-H. of C. July 12, 1882.

It is a curious thing to notice that there appears to have been no suggestion of any dishonour, nor any sense of shame, in shrinking from a contest with Turkey on prudential grounds. A man would not feel ashamed at getting out of the way of a mad dog in the same way as he might, perhaps, feel ashamed at getting out of the way of an equal who challenged him to fight. The fact seems to be that European Powers do not regard non-European Powers as their equals in the sense that their military honour is involved by

shrinking from a conflict with them, if a conflict would be inconvenient or unpleasant. It is instructive to contrast the open, unblushing way in which the danger of a jehad was urged as a reason for letting Turkey alone, with the light hints one occasionally found of possible danger to England from a war with a European Power. It is pretty clear that the tendency of any suggestion that England had better not meddle with Russia for fear of consequences would have been to excite a very hot war spirit.

SE-Fear of a Massacre.

Near akin to the fear of a jehad is the notion that to excite Turkish fanaticism would bring greater evils on the Christian subjects themselves, and that therefore Turkey had best be let alone. This comes rather near the notion of propitiating the devil -or, at least, that it is best not to stir him up.

And here comes in what has been called the "massacre argument," of which a great deal has been made, and which is said not to have been without its effect on Sir Henry Elliot. It is asserted that if the Turks find they are being driven to the wallor, to put it less figuratively, driven out of Europe-they will turn again and will kill all the Christians before they go. "The Turks inay go, but going they will leave a desert, and that will be your work." I believe that this argument is of European concoction, and that, as far as the Turks use it, they have got it from the European papers. . . . I think we ought not to be, and I trust we shall not be, frightened by a scarecrow.-Campbell's Handybook on the Eastern Question.

It is all very well to tell the Sultan and his Muftis . . . to pack up their traps and be off out of Europe as an abomination and defilement unbearable any longer by civilised men, but would the Turk pack up and go?... Regarding the matter from even a philanthropic point of view, should we not gravely compromise the Christian population in Asiatic Turkey if we gave such an order? -G. Potter, Contemp. Rev. Oct. 1876.

The fear of Turkish barbarities thus to a certain extent operated politically as a pro-Turkish element, or rather, as a counter-weight to the anti-Turkish view. And it is worth noticing that the same cause operated to give Turkey a certain military advantage in her contest with Russia. This occurred in two ways. The Russian soldiers appear to have been to a certain extent daunted by the fear of being left wounded on the field and falling into the hands

See despatch from Sir Henry Elliot, Aug. 29, 1876, "Turkey, I." 1877, No. 172.

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