the fide of the father and mother. If there be no relations on the father's fide, the part that would belong to them,` accrues to the Fifk. The like for want of relations on the mother's fide.

These reflections on pecuniary compofitions, naturally bring our Author to what he calls the laft and most shining period of the Criminal Law: in which he unfolds the means, by which criminal Jurifdiction, or the right of punishment, was transferred from private hands to the Magiftrate. In the infancy of fociety, he obferves, the idea of a Public is fo faint and obfcure, that public crimes, where no individual is hurt, pafs unregarded: but when Government, in its natural growth, hath advanced to fome degree of maturity, the public intereft is then recognized, and the name of a crime against the Public understood.

It cannot be doubted, he fays, that the compofitions for crimes established by Law, paved the way to thefe improved The Magiftrate having acquired notions of Government. fuch influence in private punishment, proceeded naturally to affume the privilege of avenging wrongs done to the Public merely, where no individual was hurt. It being once eftablifhed that there is a Public, that this Public is a politic body, which, like a real perfon, may fue and defend, it was an eafy step to intereft the Public even in private crimes, by imagining every atrocious crime to be a public as well as private injury. In the oldeft compofitions for crimes, there is not a word of the Public: in the Salic Laws, there is a long lift of crimes, and of their converfion in money, without fine to the Public *. At length, however, a fine or any Fredum was fuperadded to the King.

In process of time, as mankind were more enlightned, certain crimes were reckoned too flagrant to admit of a pecuniary converfion and compofitions established in the days of poverty, bore no proportion to crimes, when nations became rich and powerful. It was not difficult to provide a remedy for this evil: it having been long established, that the perfon injured had no claim but for the compofition, however difproportioned to the crime, this afforded the chief Ma

Though there was no direct fine to the Public in the old compofitions, yet it is too much to fay, that there is not a word about the Public. For we find by the Salic Law, that for want of relations on the father or mother's fide, the part that would belong to them, accrued to the Fifk. So that we find the idea of a Public began to gain ground at that time.

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giftrate a fair opportunity to interpofe, and decree an adequate punishment. The firft inftances of this kind, had probably the confent of the party injured and it was not difficult to perfuade any man of fpirit, that it was more for his honour to fee his enemy condignly punished, than to put up with a trifling compenfation in money. However this be, the new method gained credit, and paffed into a Law.

After this Revolution in Government, our Author continues, we find the first punishments extremely moderate, not only because they were directed chiefly to gratify the perfons injured, but becaufe; till authority was fufficiently eftablish-. ed, great feverities are beyond the ftrength of a Legislature. But when authority is firmly rooted in the minds of the people, more rigorous punifhments may be ventured upon. At laft, when people are become altogether tame and submissive, punishments being lefs and lefs neceffary, are generally mild, and ought always' to be fo.

To this, he adds another remark, connected with the former, that it is not the only or chief view of a wife Legiflature, to preserve a ftrict proportion between a crime and its punishment. The purposes of human punishments are, firft, to add weight to thofe which Nature has provided; and next, to enforce municipal regulations intended for the good of Society. Whence,' he concludes, that in regulating the punishment of crimes, two circumstances ought to weigh, viz. the immorality of the action, and its bad tendency, of which the latter appears to be the capital circumftance; for this evident reafon, that the peace of Society is an object of much greater importance, than the 6 peace, or even life of individuals.'

This doctrine, however, ought furely to be promulged with the greatest caution and referve. It tends greatly to weaken the principles of Virtue, when men are made fenfible, that political convenience, and moral goodness, are independent confiderations, and that the latter is poftponed to the former. Inftead of establishing this dangerous diftinction, our Author should rather have applied himself to prove, that confidered in a legiflative view, every act against the peace of Society, includes in it a strong degree of moral turpitude. The Morality or Immorality of our actions, bear refpect to the Qua Animo: but human Laws must neceffarily prefume, that every bad act, that is, every act against the order of Society, is guided by a bad intent, and confequently immoral. Where avourable circumftances appear in behalf of particular delin-`

quents

e

quents, to induce a contrary conclufion, there is in moft states a dernier refort, where a power is lodged of moderating the Law. The Legislature, however, 'cannot provide against particular contingencies, but is governed by general principles, which lead to conclude, that every action against the peace of Society, is directed by an evil intention: and thus our Author's diftinction vanishes.

The Writer, as he proceeds, takes occafion to pay great commendation to the Egyptian Laws, which, he obferves, have the following peculiar character, that they effectually anfwer their end, with lefs harfhnefs and feverity, than is found in the Laws of any other nation ancient or modern. Thus, fays he, those who revealed the fecrets of the army to the enemy, had their tongues cut out. Those who coined falfe money, or contrived falfe weights, or forged deeds, or razed public records, were condemned to lose both their hands.

We cannot, however, concur with the Author in his encomiums on these Laws. The mutilations they directed, at the fame time that they punished the delinquent, punished the State, by rendering him lefs capable of being ferviceable. A man without hands, is a kind of dead weight to Society;" and it cannot effectually answer the end of punishment, to difable the criminal.

This Tract concludes with fome very ingenious remarks on the privilege of profecuting public crimes; and takes no"tice of various regulations which have fubfifted in different countries, with refpect to the perfons authorized for this purpofe. Here, however, our Author has fallen into a miftake with refpect to the Law of England, where he says, • No

criminal trial, in name of the Crown, can proceed, till "first the matter be examined by the Grand Jury of the country.' It has probably escaped the Writer's notice, or recollection, that, by means of an Information, a criminal trial may proceed, without any previous examination by a Grand Jury. But in a work of fuch confpicuous merit, more numerous and confiderable errors might claim indulgence.

The Works of W. Hawkins, M. A. late Poetry Profeffor in the University of Oxford, and Fellow of Pembroke College. 8vo. 3 vols. 15s. Dodfley, &c.

IN

N the first volume of the publication before us, Mr. Hawkins makes his appearance as a polemical Divine; a character which, in our opinion, does not fit very easy on him;

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nor does his prowefs in the fields of Controverfy entitle him to much honour.

In his first tract, entitled, A rational Enquiry into the Speculative and Practical Opinions of the Chriftian Religion, he attacks the Sceptics and Unbelievers all round; among whom he not only includes profeffed Atheifts and Deifts, but the Socinians, Arians, Roman-catholics, and, indeed, almoft every sect that differ in opinion from himself. Unhappily for him, however, we find him here engaged in an undertaking far beyond his ftrength; being frequently bewildered in attempting the folution of theological difficulties, on the principles of human reafon, independent on the Scriptures. On this occafion, alfo, we cannot help expreffing our concern, to find Proteftant Divines fo ready to lay afide their Bible, in their polemical writings; as if they had no ufe for it, in defence of thofe truths the holy Scriptures were exprefsly given us to teach, and which are by them only to be defended. In their controverfies, indeed, with Infidels, who deny the authority of the Scripture, they may plead a neceffity of having recourse to mere Philofophy: but in this cafe, we think, Prudence might dictate. There are certain points which they fhould never conteft with fuch men at all. They may as well difpute about colours with the blind, as with men who who reject the authority of the Scriptures, concerning fome articles of the Chriftian Faith.

In every cafe, however, where they pretend to rely folely on reafon, they fhould remember, they engage the adversary at his own weapons, and fhould be watchful to give him no cause of triumph, in the weaknefs of their argument, We fhall give an inftance or two of the ftrength of our Author's.

In difproving the theory of the fuppofed Atheists, who deny the certainty of our knowlege of the moral attributes of the Deity, he fays; There is really no diftinction of natural and moral in the Divine Being: for though the bare idea of power, as fuch,' does not neceffarily convey to us that of juftice, or goodnefs, yet when applied to God, it evidently fuppofes the concurrence of both: unless we can imagine the divine power to have been exerted in a mechanical, or arbitrary manner, which is at once recurring to abfolute Atheifm.Granting this, yet the Theorift is already fuppofed to be an Atheift; and is he likely to become less fo, merely by our Author's proving him to be

fuch

uch?

-

But

But it may be faid, perhaps, that even this argument proves no fuch thing; fince his atheistical antagonist might reply, that merely to imagine the divine power exerted in an arbitrary manner, is not to deny, that juftice and goodness, even as we understand them, may be juftly attributed to the Deity: nor is it fo atheiftic as to fuppofe, on the contrary, that it is not exerted arbitrarily, but is fubjected to any rule of justice or goodness: for furely, might he fay, to imagine the divine power always fpontaneously exerted in the modes of juftice and goodness, is to have a much nobler, and fublimer idea of the Divine Being, than to imagine juftice and goodness any effential qualities in the DIVINE NATURE, according to which it is neceffitated to act, and on account of which it cannot act otherwise. This, he might fay, would be to ftrip the Deity of his chief attribute, Free-will, and make him act mechanically, indeed.

Hence, it appears how cautiously our philofophical Divines fhould proceed, in reasoning on matters of Theology.

Our Author might be extremely puzzled, alfo, were he required to give a philofophical explanation of what he means by faying, that God exifts according to our idea of exist-, ' <ence.' We might ask him, if he has any idea of existence in the abstract, and how he will exprefs that idea? The human mind is, doubtlefs, confcious of its own existence; but, however new this piece of information may appear to him, he will find, on entering deeply into the matter, that it is a consciousness of fomething, of which we have no idea. The mind is confcious of its own exiftence, in and of itself, and doubtless would be fo whether united to an organized body or not; but, without its being united to fuch a body, it is evident, it could have no ideas, because all our ideas depend originally on the organs of perception. All the exiltence of which we have an idea, is confined to time and place; which the Deity confeffedly is not: fo that, philofophically fpeaking, the Deity does not exift according to our ideas of exiftence, altho' it may be faid to exift as the human mind exifts; but of the nature of this exiftence we have no idea.

Again, our Author's proofs of the certainty of a Future State, we fear, will little avail him, in contending with Unbelievers fince his general affertion may be disputed, viz. that it is a truth as capable of demonftration as any propofition in Euclid, That the good and evil things of this life are not always diftributed according to the exact proportions of merit and demerit in mankind.'. We can very

readily