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the paffion which the first excites is naturally fo weak, in comparison with that violent emotion which the fecond is ⚫apt to give occafion to, that the one could never be any balance to the other, unless it was fupported by the fenfe of propriety, by the conscioufnefs that we merited the esteem and approbation of every body, by acting in the one way, and that we became the proper objects of their contempt ⚫ and derifion by behaving in the other.'

Our Author now goes on, in the fifth part of his Theory, to confider the influence of custom and fashion upon the fentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation.-As our fentiments concerning beauty of every kind, are fo much influenced by cuftom and fashion, it cannot be expected, he says, that thofe, concerning the beauty of conduct, fhould be entirely exempted from the dominion of those principles. Their influence here, however, he observes, feems to be much less than it is every where elfe. There is no form of external objects, perhaps, how abfurd and fantastical foever, to which custom will not reconcile us, or which fafhion will not render even agreeable. But the characters and conduct of a Nero or a Claudius, are what no custom will ever reconcile us to, what no fashion will ever render agreeable; but the one will always be the object of dread and hatred, the other of fcorn and derifion. The principles of the imagination, upon which our fenfe of beauty depends, are of a very nice and delicate nature, and may easily be altered by habit and education: but the fentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation, are founded on the strongest and most vigorous paffions of human nature; and though they may be fomewhat warpt, cannot be entirely perverted.

"But though the influence of cuftom and fashion upon moral fentiments, fays he, is not altogether fo great, it is, however, perfectly fimilar to what it is every where else. When cuftom and fashion coincide with the natural principles of right and wrong, they heighten the delicacy of our ⚫ fentiments, and increase our abhorrence for every thing ⚫ that approaches to evil. Thofe who have been educated in what is really good company, not in what is commonly called fuch, who have been accustomed to fee nothing in the perfons whom they esteemed and lived with, but juftice, modefty, humanity, and good order; are more fhocked with whatever feems to be inconfiftent with the rules which thofe virtues prescribe. Those on the contrary, who have ⚫ had the misfortune to be brought up amidst violence, licentioufnefs, falfhood and injuftice; lofe, though not all fenfe

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of the impropriety of fuch conduct, yet all fenfe of its dread ful enormity, and of the vengeance and punishment that is • due to it. They have been familiarized with it from their infancy, cuftom has rendered it habitual to them, and they are very apt to regard it as what is called the way of the world, fomething which either may or must be practifed to 'hinder us from being the dupes of our own integrity.

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Fafhion too, will fometimes give reputation to a certain • degree of diforder, and on the contrary, difcountenance qualities which deferve esteem. In the reign of Charles II, a degree of licentiousness was deemed the characteristic of a liberal education. It was connected, according to the no⚫tions of those times, with generofity, fincerity, magnanimity, loyalty, and proved that the person who acted in this manner, was a gentleman, and not a puritan; feverity of manners, and regularity of conduct, on the other hand, ' were altogether unfashionable, and were connected, in the imagination of that age, with cant, cunning, hypocrify, and low manners. To fuperficial minds, the vices of the great feem at all times agreeable. They connect them, not only with the fplendor of fortune, but with many fuperior 'virtues, which they afcribe to their fuperiors; with the fpi• rit of freedom and independency, with frankness, generofity, • humanity, and politenefs. The virtues of the inferior ranks of people, on the contrary, their parfimonious frugality, ⚫ their painful industry, and rigid adherence to rules, seem to • them mean and difagreeable. They connect them, both with the meanness of the ftation to which thofe qualities commonly belong, and with many great vices, which, they suppose, ufually accompany them; fuch as an abject, cowardly, ill-natured, lying, pilfering difpofition.

• The objects with which men in the different profeffions and ftates of life are converfant, being very different, and ⚫ habituating them to very different paffions, naturally form in them very different characters and manners. We expect in each rank and profeffion, a degree of thofe manners, which, experience has taught us, belong to it. But as in • each species of things, we are particularly pleased with the middle conformation, which in every part and feature agrees moft exactly with the general ftandard that nature seems to have established for things of that kind; fo in each rank, or, if I may fay fo, in each fpecies of men, we are particularly pleafed, if they have neither too much, nor too little of the character which usually accompanies their particular condition and fituation. A man, we fay, fhould

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⚫ look like his trade and profeffion; yet the pedantry of every ⚫ profeffion is disagreeable. The different periods of life have, for the fame reason, different manners affigned to them. • We expect in old age, that gravity and fedatenefs which its infirmities, its long experience, and its worn out sensi⚫bility feem to render both natural and respectable; and we ⚫lay our account to find in youth that fenfibility, that gaiety • and sprightly vivacity which experience teaches us to expect from the lively impreffions that all interefting objects are • apt to make upon the tender and unpracticed fenfes of that carly period of life. Each of thofe two ages, however, may eafily have too much of the peculiarities which belong to it. The flirting levity of youth, and the immovable infenfibility of old age, are equally difagreeable. The young, according to the common faying, are most agreeable when in their behaviour there is fomething of the manners of the • old, and the old, when they retain fomething of the gaiety ⚫ of the young. Either of them, however, may easily have too much of the manners of the other. The extreme ⚫ coldness, and dull formality, which are pardoned in old age, • make youth ridiculous. The levity, the carelessness, and the vanity, which are indulged in youth, render old age ⚫ contemptible.

The peculiar character and manners which we are led by cuftom to appropriate to each rank and profeffion, have ⚫fometimes perhaps a propriety independent of custom; and are what we should approve of for their own fakes, if we ⚫ took into confideration all the different circumftances which • naturally affect thofe in each different ftate of life. The propriety of a person's behaviour, depends not upon its ⚫ fuitableness to any one circumftance of his fituation, but to ⚫ all the circumftances, which, when we bring his cafe home <to ourselves we feel, fhould naturally call upon his attention. If he appears to be fo much occupied by any one of them, as entirely to neglect the reft, we difapprove of his conduct, as fomething which we cannot entirely go along with, becaufe not perfectly adjusted to all the circumstances ⚫ of his fituation; yet, perhaps, the emotion he expreffes for the object which principally interefts him, does not exceed what we fhould entirely fympathize with, and approve of, in one whofe attention was not required by any other thing. A parent in private life might, upon the lofs of an only fon, exprefs without blame, a degree of grief and tenderness, which would be unpardonable in a general at the head of an army, when glory, and the public fafety, demanded fo great a part of his attention. As different objects ought,

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upon common occafions, to occupy the attention of men of different profeffions, fo different paffions ought naturally to ⚫ become habitual to them; and when we bring home to ourfelves their fituation in this particular refpect, we must be ⚫ fenfible, that every occurrence fhould naturally affect them more or lefs, according as the emotion which it exc tes, coincides or difagrees with the fixt habit and temper of their minds. We cannot expect the fame fenfibility to the gay pleasures and amufements of life in a clergyman which we ⚫lay our account with in an officer. The man, whofe peculiar occupation it is to keep the world in mind of that awful futurity which awaits them, who is to anounce what may be the fatal confequences of every deviation from the rules of duty, and who is himfelf to fet the example of the most exact conformity, is the meflenger of tidings, which cannot, in propriety, be delivered either with levity or indifference. His mind is continually occupied with what is too grand and folemn, to leave any room for the impreffions of those frivolous objects, which fill up the at*tention of the diffipated and the gay. We readily feel therefore, that, independent of cuftom, there is a propriety in the manners which cuftom has allotted to this profeffion; and that nothing can be more fuitable to the character of a clergyman, than that grave, that auftere and abftracted feverity, which we are habituated to expect in his behaviour. • Thefe reflections are so very obvious, that there is scarce any man fo inconfiderate, as not, at fome time, to have · made them, and to have accounted to himself in this manner for his approbation of the ufual character of this order.

Our author concludes his performance with fome reflections on fyftems of moral philofophy. In treating of the principles of morals, he fays, there are two questions to be confidered. First, wherein does virtue confift? or what is the tone of temper, and tenor of conduct, which conftitutes the excellent and praife-worthy character,-the character which is the natural object of esteem, honour, and approbation? Secondly, by what power or faculty in the mind is it, that this character, whatever it be, is recommended to us? We examine the firft queftion, when we confider whether virtue confifts in benevolence, as Dr. Hutchefon imagines; or in acting fuitably to the different relations we ftand in, as Dr. Clark fuppofes; or in the wife and prudent purfuit of our own real and folid happiness, as has been the opinion of others? We examine the fecond queftion, when we confi der, whether the virtuous character, whatever it confifts in, be recommended to us by felf-love, which makes us perceive REV. July 1759that

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that this character, both in ourselves and others, tends moft to promote our own private intereft; or by reafon, which points out to us the difference between one character and another, in the fame manner as it does that between truth and falfhood; or by a peculiar power of perception, called a moral fenfe, which this virtuous character gratifies and pleafes, as the contrary difgufts and difpleases it; or laft of all, by fome other principle in human nature, fuch as a modification of fympathy or the like. Our author begins with confidering the fyftems which have been formed concerning the first of these questions, and proceeds afterwards to examine those concerning the fecond.

Thus have we given a general view of what is contained in this Theory of moral Sentiments, rather than a regular abftract of what the truly ingenious author of it has advanced. We could have extended the article to a much greater length, with pleasure to ourselves, and entertainment to our readers; but as few perfons of real tafte will be fatisfied with the best abftract that could be given of fuch a performance as this, what we have faid is fully fufficient for our purpofe. The laft part of the Theory will be peculiarly agreeable to the learned reader, who will there find a clear and distinct view of the feveral systems of moral philofophy, which have gained any confiderable degree of reputation either in antient or modern times; with many pertinent and ingenious reflections upon them. The whole work, indeed, fhews a delicacy of fentiment, and acuteness of understanding, that are feldom to be met with; and what ought particularly to be mentioned, there is the ftricteft regard preferved, throughout, to the principles of religion, fo that the ferious reader will find nothing that can give him any just ground of offence. -In a word, without any partiality to the author, he is one of the most elegant and agreeable writers, upon morals, that we are acquainted with.

Mifcellaneous Pieces of M. de Secondat, Baron de Montefquieu. Tranflated from the new edition of his works in Quarto, printed at Paris. 8vo. 5s. Wilfon and Durham.

O add any eulogium to the many which have already been bestowed on Baron Montefquieu's works, in general, would be needlefs; and to intimate the leaft detraction from their acknowledged merit, might be thought to favour of malevolence; we fhall therefore do little more than

mention