the science of the mind. The Reviewer assumes it as a principle that mere observation never increases our power; and as he demies that the philosophy of the mind has any connexion with experiment, he accordingly draws the disparaging conclusion that, with regard to it, knowledge is not power.' Mr. Stewart coutends, as our readers have seen, that this science does admit of experimental aids; but admitting, he adds, that all the knowledge we possess of mind is derived from observation solely, it would not therefore follow, that the philosophy of the mind must necessarily yield to experimental philosophy in practical utility.' And in illustration of this, he successfully appeals to the practical uses to which the observation of the heavenly bodies was applied, long before any experiments were thought of to perfect the theory of the planetary system.

'It is an old, but very striking reflection,' he impressively observes, that the only accurate knowledge which man possesses of the surface of the earth, has been derived from the previous knowledge he had acquired of the phenomena of the stars. Is it possible to produce a more opposite, or a more undeniable proof of the universality of Bacon's maxim, that knowledge is power,' than a fact which demonstrates the essential aid which man has derived, in asserting his dominion over this lower world, from a branch of science which seems, at first view, fitted only to gratify a speculative curiosity; and which, in its infancy, served to amuse the leisure of the Chaldean shepherd? To those who have imbibed the spirit of Bacon's philosophy, it is superfluous to add, that it was in this refined and enlarged sense of his aphorism, far more than in its obvious and partial application to the new resources which experiments have occasionally lent to the mechanician, that Bacon himself wished to be understood, when he so often repeats it in the same words, with an air of triumph, in the course of his writings.'-Prel. Dissert. p. 39.

Mr. Stewart admits that our conclusions concerning the principles and laws of the human constitution differ, in many respects, from discoveries in physics; but this, he justly observes, ought not to lower our estimate of their practical value, or of the merits of the writers to whom we owe them. Among Bacon's aphorisms there is not,' he adds, 'one sentence which contains a discovery, as that word has been lately defined; but what discoveries cau vie with them in the accessions which they have brought to the happiness and to the power of the human race?'

No opinion was ever, we think, founded upon more limited or more erroneous views than that which represents all metaphysical speculation as terminating entirely in itself, and as affording no useful aids in any of our other pursuits.

It is evident, we think, that that science which teaches us how to trace error to its source, how, and within what limits, to conduct our inquiries, in order to conduct them with success, cannot, with

out great abuse of language, be said to be unproductive of utility or power. Now, it is the philosophy of the mind, and it alone, which teaches all this. It was the opinion of D'Alembert, who certainly cannot be accused of entertaining too lofty views of the importance of this science, that it furnishes the only means of correcting the errors to which we are liable in all our speculative inquiries; and he seems to have thought it indispensible to the philosophical character to view it in that light. A l'égard de la métaphysique, says he, il paroit que Newton ne l'avoit pas entièrement négligée. Il étoit trop grand philosophe pour ne pas sentir qu'elle est la base de nos connoissances, et qu'il faut chercher dans elle seule des notions nettes et exactes de tout.* If this account of metaphysical science be just, upon what ground can it be said that it is divested of practical utility? Is not the power which it furnishes of purifying the sources of reasoning, of correcting prejudice and error, a very useful, and noble, and extensive species of power? Do not the inquiries of the metaphysician enable him to regulate his own judgments, and to direct those of others? The effects which his speculations produce are often felt far more widely than any that can be produced by physical discovery. The Reviewer himself tells us, that the famous theory, which accounted for perception, and all our other intellectual operations, by means of ideas or images in the mind, led at length to the annihilating scepticism of Hume.' It is also his opinion, that Dr. Reid completely overthrew the hypothesis upon which, according to him, the portentous scepticism of Hume was founded. How then can he deny the character of utility-of power, to those metaphysical inquiries by which human reason was disentangled from the effects of such a system of scepticism? Dr. Reid's success was entirely owing to a more correct analysis of certain intellectual phenomena than had been accomplished before; and yet we are told that this sort of analysis cannot be applied to any practical purposes,--by a writer too who admits, that it took away the supports of a system of scepticism, eminently calculated to unhinge the opinions and principles of mankind. No one who is at all conversant in the history of philosophy can be ignorant of the famous hypothesis, of the real existence of abstract ideas, and the obstacles which it opposed to the progress of knowledge. That absurd hypothesis, as has been shown by Berkeley and, more largely, by Condillac, was the cause that all speculation, and all abstract science were long involved in error and mysticism. Its overthrow must, therefore, have proved a general benefit to philosophy; and this was accomplished by the accurate examination of the laws of the mind in the case of ab

straction. We have here, then, a proof that the philosophy of the mind exerts an influence over all the other sciences, and that they have all a near interest in its successful cultivation.

6

a

We are told by Locke in the simple but instructive account which he gives of the origin of his immortal work, that upon an occasion when he was engaged in a philosophical discussion with some of his friends, 'they all at once came to a stand, from the difficulties which rose on every side. At last, says he, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course, and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine what objects our understandings were and were not fitted to deal with." It is impossible we think to know any thing of the history of the manifold errors which have arisen from wrong course' of inquiry, and from not knowing what things the understanding was and was not fitted to deal with,' without perceiving the vast importance of the philosophy of the mind. The whole system of philosophical knowledge remained corrupt for ages, from the ignorance in which men were of the limits of the understanding, and of the rules which its laws enjoin them invariably to follow in the search of truth. What errors, what waste of ingenious labour, in physics, has not the attempt to discover the causes or necessary connexions of natural events produced ! The whole history of that science is full of hypotheses, which arose from the misconceptions of philosophers regarding physical causes or connexions. The vain pursuit of these has therefore operated as a material obstruction to the progress of genuine science. Now if it be indisputable, as it unquestionably is, that metaphysical analysis has at length demonstrated the folly of such pursuits, and fixed the true course and boundaries of physical inquiry; how short-sighted must not that view of the philosophy of the mind appear, which represents it as without influence upon the other sciences, and entirely destitute of the character of practical utility!

The great father of experimental philosophy thought more justly of this important science. He points out the study of the powers and faculties of the mind, as that which furnishes the keys of all other knowledge.* As the hand,' says he, 'is instrumental to all other instruments, so is the knowledge of the mind instrumental to all other knowledge.' And no observation can appear more just, when we consider that it was from this source that he derived his great organon of discovery. To his just and profound views of the laws of the human understanding, we are indebted for that inductive logic, which has exercised so vast and so beneficial an influence on the progress of human knowledge. What indeed is the inductive * De Augmen. Scient. Lib. 5. Cap. 1. 3

VOL. VI. NO. XI.

philosophy of Bacon, but that branch of the philosophy of the mind, which teaches us how to apply our faculties with success in the discovery of truth? When, therefore, the Reviewer talks of the absolute nothingness of the effects which have been produced by the study of the mind,' he does not seem to have duly attended to the fact, that the whole of philosophy has been purified of fundamental errors, and misconceptions by the lights reflected from this very study; and that it was these lights which pointed out the road to physical truth, and traced the legitimate boundaries of physical science. The utility of the philosophy of the mind must appear, we think, very obvious to every one who recollects, that it forms the groundwork of all the moral and political sciences. They are in fact only dependent provinces of this capital and centre,' as Mr. Hume calls it, of human knowledge. If we would know their foundations and springs, we must trace them to the powers, and principles, and feelings, of our intellectual constitution. There can be no scientific reasoning in regard to them that is not bottomed upon that foundation. All their fundamental ideas and principles derive their explanation and their authority from the laws of the mind. The analysis of its various powers and principles seems, as Mr. Bentham has remarked in one of his profound works upon the subject of legislation, to be as necessary to the science in question, as the anatomy of the body is to the other branches of medical knowledge. These views have, we may add, the invaluable sanction of Bacon's authority; for he distinctly points out the analytical examination of the principles and affections of the human mind as the nourishing source of all civil and political philosophy.* We must here terminate these imperfect remarks with the following impressive passage, which forms the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's eloquent dissertation.

I have only to repeat once more before the close of this Dissertation, that the correction of one single prejudice has often been attended with consequences more important and extensive than could be produced by any positive accession to the stock of our scientific information. Such is the condition of man, that a great part of a philosopher's life must necessarily be speut, not in enlarging the circle of his knowledge, but in unlearning the errors of the crowd, and the pretended wisdom of the schools; and that the most substantial benefit he can bestow on his fellow-creatures, as well as the noblest species of power to which he can aspire, is to impart to others the lights he has struck out by his meditations, and to encourage human reason, by his example, to assert its liberty. To what did the discoveries made by Luther amount, but to a detection of the impostures of the Romish church, and of absurdities sanctioned by the authority of Aristotle? Yet, how vast the space which is filled by his name in the subsequent history of Europe! and

Nov. Organ. Aph. 80. Lib. 1.

how proud his rank among the benefactors of mankind! I am doubtful if Bacon himself did so much by the logical rules he gave for guiding the inquiries of his followers, as by the resolution with which he inspired them to abandon the beaten path of their predecessors, and to make excursions into regions untrodden before; or if any of his suggestions concerning the plan of experimenting, can be compared in value to his classification and illustration of the various prejudices or idols which mislead us from the pure worship of truth. If the ambition of Aristotle has been compared, in the vastness of its aim, and the plenitude of its success, (and who can say that it has been compared unjustly?) to that of his Royal Pupil who conquered the world; why undervalue the efforts of those who first raised the standard of revolt against his universal and undisputed despotism? Speedily after the death of Alexander, the Macedonian empire was dismembered among his principal officers. The empire founded by the philosopher continued one and undivided for the period of two thousand years.In consequence of this slow and gradual emancipation of the mind, the means by which the final result has been accomplished, attract the notice only of the reflecting inquirer; resembling in their silent, but irresistible operation, the latent and imperceptible influence of the roots, which, by insinuating themselves into the crevices of an ancient edifice, prepare its infallible ruin, ages before its fall; or that of the apparently inert moisture, which is concealed in the fissures of a rock, when enabled, by the expansive force of congelation, to rend asunder its mass, or to heave it from its basis.

As it is seldom, in such instances, easy to trace to particular individuals what has resulted from their exertions, with the same precision with which, in physics or mechanics, we refer to their respective inventors the steam-engine or the thunder-rod, it is not surprising, that the attention of the multitude should be so little attracted to the intellectual dominion of superior minds over the moral world; but the observer must be blind indeed, who does not perceive the vastness of the scale on which speculative principles, both right and wrong, have operated on the present condition of mankind; or who does not now feel and acknowledge, how deeply the morals and the happiness of private life, as well as the order of political society, are involved in the final issue of the contest between true and false philosophy.'-Prel. Disert. pp. lxxii, lxxiii, lxxiv.

It is proper for us now to mention, what we could not so well have done before, that the Preliminary Dissertation contains some admirable remarks on the scope and spirit of Bacon's philosophy. The erroneous views of it which have been lately held forth to the world, render it the more necessary that we should direct the attention of our readers to Mr. Stewart's animadversions. These were occasioned by an opinion pretty confidently delivered by the Reviewer, that Bacon meditated nothing farther in his Novum Organum, than the advancement of inquiries relating to