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democracy; for the reflexions we have made before fufficiently evince the inconveniencies which would result from this.

• Let us therefore conclude, from this examination of the different forms of government, that the best are either a limited monarchy, or an aristocracy tempered with democracy, by fome privileges in favour of the body of the people.

'Tis true, in reality, there are always fome deductions to be made from the advantages which we have afcribed to thefe governments: but this is the fault of men, and not of the establishments. The conftitution is the moft perfect that can be imagined; and if men fpoil it by their vices and follies, this is the nature of all human affairs ; and, fince a choice must be made, the best is always that which is attended with the feweft inconveniencies.

In a word, if it fhould be asked, which government is beft? I would anfwer, that all good governments are not. equally proper for all nations, and that, in this point, we muft have a regard to the humour and character of the people, and to the extent of the states.

Great ftates can hardly admit of republican governments: hence a monarchy, wifely limited, fuits them better. But, as to ftates of an ordinary extent, the most advantageous government for them, is, an elective aristocracy, tempered with some reserves in favour of the body of the people.'

In the third and fourth chapters he treats of the different ways of acquiring and lofing fovereignty; and, in the subfequent chapters of the fecond part, of the inviolable rights of fovereignty, of tyranny, and of the duty of fovereigns,

In the third part he enters into a more particular examication of the different rights of the fovereign, with respect to the internal adminiftration of the ftate; fuch as the legislative power, the fupreme power in matters of religion, the right of inflicting punishments, and that which the fovereign has over the bona reipublicae. This part is divided into five chapters in the first of which he examines the nature and extent of the legislative power in fociety, and that of the civil laws and decrees of the foverign, which are derived from thence.

Among the effential parts of fovereignty, our author comprehends the right of judging of the doctrines taught in the state, and particularly of every thing relating to reli

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gion. This, he tells us, is one of the most confiderable rights belonging to the fovereign; and accordingly he endeavours, in the second chapter, to fhew the neceffity of it, to establifh the foundations of it, and to point out its extent and boundaries. The first duty of the fovereign, fays he, ought to be to take all poffible care to form the hearts and minds of his people. In vain would it be for him to eftablish the best laws, and to prefcribe rules of conduct in every thing that any way relates to the good of fociety, if he did not moreover take proper measures to convince his people of the juftice and neceffity of these rules, and of the advantages which naturally arife from the ftrict obfervance of them.

And indeed, fince the principle of all human actions is the will, and the acts of the will depend on the ideas we form of good and evil, as well as of the rewards and punishments which must follow the commiffion of a thing; fo that every one is determined by his own judgment of the matter: 'tis evident that the fovereign ought principally to take care that his fubjects be properly inftructed, from their infancy, in all thofe principles which can form them to an honeft and fober life, and in fuch doctrines as are agreeable to the end and advantage of fociety. This is the moft effectual means of inducing men to a ready and fure obedience, and of forming their manners infenfibly. Without this the laws would not have a fufficient force to restrain the fubjects within the bounds of their duty. As long as men do not obey the laws from principle, their obedience is precarious, and uncertain; and they will always be ready to withdraw from their duty, when they think they can do it with impunity.


If therefore people's manner of thinking, or the ideas and opinions commonly received, and to which they are accuftomed, have fo much influence on their conduct, and fo ftrongly contribute either to the good or evil of the ftate and if it is the duty of the fovereign to attend to this article, and to beftow all his care upon it; he ought to neglect nothing that can contribute to the education of youth, the advancement of the fciences, and the progrefs of truth. If this be the cafe, we muft needs grant him a right of judging of the doctrines publicly taught, and of profcribing all thofe which of themfelyes may be oppofite to the public good and tranquility.

It belongs therefore to the fovereign alone to establish academies and public fchools of all kinds and to authorize


the refpective profeffors. 'Tis his bufinefs to take care that nothing be taught in them, under any pretext, contrary to the fundamental maxims of natural law, to the principles of religion or good politics; in a word, nothing capable of producing impreffions prejudicial to the happiness of the ftate.

But fovereigns ought to be particularly delicate as to the manner of ufing this right, and not to push it beyond its true bounds, but to use it only according to the rules of justice and prudence, otherwife great abufes may arife from hence; either because a thing is prepofteroufly confidered as detrimental to the ftate, which, in the main, no way prejudices, but rather may be advantageous to fociety; or because, under this pretext, princes, whether of themfelves, or at the inftigation of wicked perfons, erect inquifitions with respect to the moft indifferent and innocent, nay even the trueft opinions, especially in matters of religion.

• Supreme rulers cannot therefore be too much on their guard, against suffering themselves to be impofed on by wicked and envious men, who, under a pretext of public good and tranquillity, feek only their own private interests, and who use their utmoft efforts to render certain opinions fufpected only with a view to ruin honefter men than themfelves.

The advancement of the sciences, and the progress of truth, require, that a reasonable liberty fhould be granted to all those who busy themselves in such laudable pursuits, and that we should not condemn a man as criminal, purely becaufe in certain things he has ideas different from thofe commonly received. Befides, a different manner of thinking on the fame fubjects, and a diverfity of ideas and opinions, are fo far from obftructing, that they rather facilitate the progrefs of truth; provided, however, that fovereigns take proper measures to oblige men of letters to keep within the bounds of moderation, and that juft refpect which mankind owe to one another; and that for this effect they exert their authority in checking those who grow too warm in their disputes, and break thro' all rules of decency, so as to injure, calumniate, and render suspected every one that is not of their way of thinking. We muft lay down as an indubitable maxim, that truth is of itfelf very advantageous to men, and to fociety; that no true opinion is contrary to peace; and that all thofe, which, in their nature, are contrary to peace, muft certainly be falfe; otherwise we must

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affert, that peace and concord are repugnant to the laws of nature.'

In the third chapter our author endeavours to fhew, that the fupreme authority, in matters of religion, ought neceffarily to belong to the fovereign: what he advances under this head, we fhall give our readers in his own words. "If the intereft of fociety, fays he, requires that laws fhould be established in relation to human affairs, that is, to things which properly and directly intereft only our temporal happiness; this fame intereft cannot permit that we should altogether neglect our fpiritual concerns, or those which regard religion, and leave them without any regulation. This has been acknowledged in all ages, and among all nations; and this is the origin of the civil law properly fo called, and of the facred or ecclefiaftic law; all civilized nations have established these two forts of laws. But if matters of religion have, in feveral respects, need of human regulation, the right of finally determining them can only belong to the fovereign.

First proof. This is inconteftably proved by the very nature of fovereignty, which is no more than the right of determining finally in fociety, and which confequently fuffers nothing, not only above it, but even that is not subject to it; and embraces, in the extent of its jurifdiction, every thing that can intereft the happiness of the state, both facred and profane.

The nature of fovereignty cannot permit any thing, that is fufceptible of human direction, to be withdrawn from its authority; for, what is withdrawn from the authority of the fovereign, muft either be left independent, or fubjected to the authority of fome other perfon different from the fovereign himself.

Were no rule established in matters of religion, this would be throwing them into a confufion and diforder, quite oppofite to the good of the fociety, incompatible with the nature of religion, and directly contrary to the views of the Deity, who is the author of it. But, if we fubmit thefe matters to fome authority, independent of that of the fovereign, we fall into a new inconveniency; fince, by this means, we establish in the fame fociety two fovereign powers independent of each other, which is not only incompatible with the nature of fovereignty, but a contradiction in itself.

In fact, if there were feveral fovereigns in the fame fociety, they might alio give contrary orders. But who


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does not perceive, that oppofite orders, with refpect to the fame affair, are manifeftly repugnant to the nature of things, that they cannot have their effect, nor produce a real obligation. How would it be poffible, for inftance, that a man, who receives different orders at the fame time from two fuperiors, to repair to the camp, and to go to church, fhould be obliged to obey both? If it be faid, that he is not obliged to obey both, there must therefore be fome fubordination of the one to the other; the inferior will yield to the superior, and it will not be true that they are both fovereign and independent. We may here very properly apply the words of Jefus Chrift. No man can ferve two masters; and a kingdom divided against itself cannot Stand.


Second proof. I draw my fecond proof from the end of civil fociety, and of fovereignty. The end of fovereignty is certainly the happiness of the people, and the prefervation of the state. Now, as religion may feveral ways either injure or benefit the state, it follows, that the fovereign has a right over religion, at least as far as it can depend on human direction. He who has a right to the end, has, undoubtedly, a right also to the means that lead to it.

Now, that religion may feveral ways injure or benefit the ftate, we have already proved in the firft volume of this work. 1. All men have conftantly acknowledged, that the Deity makes his favours to a ftate depend principally on the care which the fovereign takes to induce his fubjects to honour and ferve him. 2. Religion can of itfelf contribute greatly to render men more obedient to the laws, more attached to their country, and more honest to one another. 3. The doctrines and ceremonies of religion have a confiderable influence on the morals of people, and on the public happiness. The ideas which men have imbibed of the Deity, have induced them to the most monftrous forms of worship, and even prompted them to facrifice human victims. They have even, from these false ideas, drawn arguments in juftification of vice, cruelty, and licentioufnels, as we may fee by reading the ancient poets. Since religion therefore has fo much influence over the happiness or mifery of fociety, who can doubt but it is fubject to the direction of the fovereign?

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Third proof. What we have been faying evinces, that it is incumbent on the fovereign, and one of his most efsential duties, to make religion, which includes the most


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