ture in the formation of volitions. Man is fast arriving at that proud period in his history when his volitions and consequent actions will be so many points in which his different natures will harmonize with themselves, and also with the constitution of all things around them; when all the relations will be pro-> perly preserved, all the desires gratified, and all the impulses to action obeyed, under the guidance and direction of the high moral and religious sentiments enlightened by intellect. It follows, as the most important consequence from this doctrine, that the moral accountability of man embraces the action of his entire mind, intellectual and affective, and nothing beyond that. It seems to be universally conceded that moral accountability is based on our volitions. We feel this within us, and we recognise it as the language of every thing without us, of all our customs, of all our laws, of all the institutions that bind together the fabric of society. As the elements that compose the will are all the faculties of mind, both intellectual and affective, accountability must be co-extensive with their entire operation. It is certainly a great desideratum to establish the true limits of moral accountability, to determine its extent and boundaries,-to understand precisely what it embraces and where it ends. It is productive of consequences equally injurious to extend it beyond what it embraces, as to stop short of its true limits. Moral accountability has been made by some to embrace the judgments we form, the opinions we entertain, and all the different modes of belief known and acted upon by our intellectual nature. This is erroneous. Judgment, opinion, and belief are intellectual operations. The affective faculties have not necessarily any agency in their formation. They are not therefore acts of the whole mind, and for that reason at least, differ essentially from volitions. In their formation, the intellectual faculties act in obedience to laws imposed upon them, not created by them. For the right or wrong operation of those laws we cannot be made responsible. We believe not according as we will, but according to the evidence furnished us. On that evidence our faculties are framed to act, and to believe or disbelieve according to its strength or weakness. We can no more resist a conclusion when the evidence is sufficient, than we can, with our eyes open at mid-day, resist the seeing of objects. We shall find sufficient in ourselves to which the high attribute of accountability must necessarily attach, without extending it to that over which we have no control, and for which, therefore, we are not accountable. I do not here refer to the opinions avowed. very different from those actually entertained. refer to those where our intellectual faculties are They may be Neither do I influenced by our volitions to seek, and, as far as possible, entertain, that evidence only which goes to substantiate one side or view of a question. This is doing violence to our intellectual nature. It implies an unconquerable desire to believe in one side, but at the same time a suspicion, which perhaps would often fall but little short of belief, that the other is the true one. Neither are those wandering thoughts or impulses to act, or occasional feelings, wishes, or desires, that are of spontaneous growth, within the great pale of accountability. The propensities were created to furnish impulses, and the sentiments to feel emotions, and the intellect to perceive, know, and reason. In fulfilling the great design of their creation, they are no more accountable than is the heart in the circulation of the blood, or the stomach in the digestion of aliments. But while I deny that moral accountability embraces any operations of the intellect merely, or that it extends to the functional action of any faculty, I would not limit it to individual actions. Human laws can only render man accountable for his acts, not merely because they are the only sufficient evidences of volitions, but because it is from them alone that the community generally receives any detriment. It is rather with the consequences of such actions as were free to have been done or omitted that human laws deal, than with the actions themselves. The principle is the amendment of the criminal, and self-protection to be accomplished by the prevention of acts attended with similar pernicious consequences. Beyond these human power and agency cannot reach. Moral accountability to the Creator is based on a different principle. The act is not there required as the evidence of the volition. Neither are its consequences considered beyond their moral influence upon the individual. It is for the mere volition, the decision of the whole mind upon the whole matter, and for that only, that man is morally accountable to his God. For the evidence of this truth we need not travel beyond ourselves. The faithful sentinel which the Creator has located in every bosom, in the shape of a warning conscience, addresses us on this subject in a language we could not disregard if we would, and should not if we could. Man is not then accountable for the modes of his intellectual action, for his judgments, opinions, or belief; neither is he accountable for the mere functional action of any of his faculties, whether it results in wandering thoughts, impulses, feelings, wishes, or desires. But he is morally accountable for his volitions, to his fellow-man, so far as they are evidenced by actions, and to his Creator, so far as they are perfect volitions, whether evidenced by actions or not. Will, as I have been considering it, harmonizes the entire action of mind with human rights, duties, obligations, and responsibilities. It is the common ground where the intellectual, affective, moral, and religious natures of man all meet, modify, and correct each other. It constitutes (and so it will continue to do through all the modifications of its whole existence) that same inscrutable I that thinks and feels, and wills and acts with entire freedom, subject only to the conditions imposed by its Creator, and to the great laws and governing principles that preside over and regulate the functional action of all its elementary faculties. A. D. ALBANY, NEW YORK, U. S. A. ARTICLE II. DR VIMONT ON THE ORGAN OF ATTACHMENT FOR LIFE OR MARRIAGE. In our last number we gave a translation of the seventh section of the second volume of Dr Vimont's Traité de Phrenologie. We now proceed to section VIII., entitled "Organe de l'attachement à vie, ou mariage." "Is there," asks Dr Vimont, "a special faculty for attachment for life, or marriage? Is it only the result of the action of several faculties, or the modification of one only-that of Adhesiveness for example-of which I shall speak hereafter? A more profound study of the organisation of the nervous system of animals and of their habits, can alone throw light on this question. If we watch closely the conduct of wild animals, we shall find that amongst some species, the males after having satisfied the desire for sexual intercourse, separate themselves from their females, either to go to impregnate others, to live in a state of solitude, or to unite themselves to several individuals of the same species and of the same sex. Such we see is the case among wild boars, wolves, and stags. Other species again live constantly with their females (dans l'état de mariage)-for instance the fox, the marten, the roebuck, amongst quadrupeds; and the raven, the jay, the magpie, the swallow, the sparrow, amongst birds. Gall, though seemingly disposed to believe that attachment for life depended on a particular organisation, has not cleared up the subject by instances drawn from comparative anatomy. Nor has he been more explicit with regard to man. Spurzheim thinks that marriage is but a modification of the faculty of Adhesiveness; that the instinct of living in society, and that of living in family, are only particular modifications peculiar in their nature,-just as the taste for vegetable or animal food is a modification of smell and of taste in herbivorous and carnivorous animals. These observations of Spurzheim are but specious, and are overturned by studying the habits of certain species. I do not think that union for life is merely a modification of Adhesiveness-it appears to me to possess all the characters of a fundamental faculty. To me it is sufficiently proved that an animal may have great Adhesiveness and yet not live in company with its female. The dog is a striking instance in support of my assertion. Wolves live often in large bodies, but do not remain in a state of union with their females. Stags act in a similar manner. The fox, though brought up very young, does not attach himself to any one, but unites himelf to his female for life. It is not then true that where this union for life exists, we find adhesiveness; which, however, ought to be the case if it were, as Spurzheim affirms, only a modification of that faculty. Gall has not, in my opinion, given a more satisfactory solution of this question, when he says, "If I could place full confidence in my knowledge of natural history, I would offer an opinion of my own. It appears to me that in all those species where the male and female mutually assist in taking care of the young, there is union for life; but in those species, on the contrary, in which the male contents himself with procreating young without assisting in any way in bringing them up, that the first female met with serves to satisfy his desires, and that the main design of nature is accomplished without the bond of union for life." This observation of Gall in nowise settles the question. At the very outset, it is not the fact, as he states, that in those species where the female gives her attention to the young conjointly with the male, there is constantly union for life. The roebuck, which is attached to its female for life, does not in any way occupy itself in the care of the young. Gall says that this animal defends its family against their enemies. I do not deny the fact, but I do not think that we must necessarily attribute this conduct to the faculty of attachment to its young. posing even,-which however is not proved,-that in certain species where this union for life exists, the male and female give themselves by turns to the care of their young,—that does not by any means prove that the two faculties are not distinct : the one appears to me totally different from the other, since its action continues long after the young are separated from their parents. The explanation of Gall, then, is none at all. Spurzheim believes that it is attachment and friendship which the male and female feel for each other which determines them not Sup to separate after the instinct of propagation is satisfied, and to remain united even beyond the season of desire. Is this not in other words saying that there exists in certain species a sort of attachment which induces them to remain united for life, and after the observations which have been made, are we not compelled to admit that it is not to adhesiveness, properly speaking, that we ought to attribute such conduct? Gall does not appear disposed to consider as a faculty belonging to man, that of union for life; or at least he seems to view it as a modification of the organ of Adhesiveness, and not as a special fundamental faculty. There are, says he, men and women who, without any outward adventitious cause, have an aversion for marriage. If we could read the bottom of their hearts, we might there find the solution of the enigma. Are such persons incapable of attachment or friendship? Do they dread the charge which a family imposes? It will be seen that this language of Gall is exceedingly vague, and that it is only presented to us under the form of a doubt. The more I have studied the conduct of men and the habits of many species of animals, the more satisfied have I remained that the feeling which leads to attachment to one companion for life, is the result of a fundamental faculty. Some observations which I have made on the human species, and many more which I have collected, amongst animals, have enabled me to fix the situation of the organ in man and animals. Before pointing out upon the brain and skull the place where it is to be found, I must enter into some anatomical details. The first appears to me to be the seat of the organ of Philoprogenitiveness, the other that of attachment for life or marriage. I have already found this latter region well developed in two persons who had very early manifested the desire of being united to each other, and without being induced to do so by other motives than such as lead to four-fifths of marriages. I have found on the other hand the same region but little developed in persons who had naturally a repugnance for marriage. As a few observations |