presence at one time and at another. It is difficult to answer the query as to physical sensations. The whole accompanying sensations are unpleasant on account of the supernatural condition, as it were, of sounds of usual actual magnitude proceeding from objects in such apparent extreme distance. That the senses do not rectify each other, is, by the way, well proved from the fact, that, though I take an object in my hand, and perceive by touch its actual dimensions, my visual perception remains unaltered, and it is impossible for me to reason myself into seeing objects of their real size. Though perfectly aware of the falsity of the perception at the time, the phenomena are all equally manifest, as if the perception were correct; that is, I perfectly recall in memory, and at this moment see mentally, before me, the objects of this diminutive size. Distant objects, such as an extensive prospect, appear as if viewed in an exceedingly minute camera obscura. As to my digestion, it requires some care to preserve it good, but I am not aware that the affection accompanies any peculiar condition of digestive functions; and, certainly, irregularity in those functions is not accompanied in general by that affection. I am, &c. JS. TOULMIN SMITH. Remarks by George Combe. In my System of Phrenology I have hazarded the opinion, that the organ of Size is that which perceives distance and perspective; and this appears to have been a peculiar affection of that organ, the precise nature of which it is difficult to explain. Dr Vimont admits the organ of Size, and agrees with Dr Spurzheim, and phrenologists in general, in regard to its situation at the internal angles of the orbits of the eyes; but he conceives that he has discovered a separate organ for taking cognizance of distance, situated between Size and Weight. He divides the old organ of Size into two, and calls the portion next the nose the organ of Size, and that next to Weight the organ of Distance. The facts detailed by Mr Smith seem to shew, that the same organ takes cognizance, both of size and distance. The size of an object is estimated by the distance between the lines formed by its different surfaces; and the distance between two objects is estimated by the extent of space intervening between the nearest boundaries of each. We call our perceptions size, when our attention is directed to the distance between the surfaces of a whole figure; and Distance, when it is directed to the space intervening between two objects. In both instances, however, we estimate the distance between points or lines; and the mental perceptions are fundamentally the same. Mr Smith's case remains a problem for solution. ARTICLE XVII. SHORT COMMUNICATIONS. Perception, Conception, Imagination, and Memory.—In treating of the modes of activity of the intellectual organs, Mr Combe writes; "Thus Perception is the lowest degree of activity of any of these faculties excited by an external object; and Conception and Imagination are higher degrees of activity, depending on internal causes, and without the interference of an external object. This is the view commonly received by phrenologists, and it seems to be correct in respect to what is said about an external object; but the varied condition of mind should perhaps be regarded as a difference in kind, not in degree merely. If a man use his legs successively in walking, running, hopping, and leaping, such are variations in the kind of motion, not in the degree of it. The same appears to hold good in the different kinds of mental activity mentioned. If Imagination were only a higher degree of activity, it would seem very like a necessary implication, that one able easily to imagine things should also be particularly well able to perceive them, and that the same circumstances which excite imagination should also render perception much more complete. Yet is not the reverse of this the fact? Some writers of fiction readily imagining scenes or things that never existed, are by no means accurate in their perception of realities, and some of our most exact observers of reality are little prone to imagination. Stimulating drinks and the febrile state of body attending catarrhs or other complaints, also often increase the force of imagination, while they blunt or derange that of perception. And (which is deserving of notice) our perceptions are usually most exact in the morning, while imagination is decidedly most energetic towards night. For the present, therefore, would it not be more advisable to avoid reference to degrees of activity, in attempting definitions of these mental states or processes, and to consider perception (or, more generally, sensation) merely as a state of mind supposed to depend on activity of brain induced by something affecting the nerves of the senses; and conception, imagination, and memory, as states of mind supposed to depend on some action of the brain induced by an internal condition yet unknown? Conception and Imagination are frequently used as equivalent terms, but there seems to be a distinctness in their proper significations. Imagination implies the creation of ideas altogether self-derived. Conception is the creation of ideas supposed to represent those of another person, Thus, we perceive a scene which is before our eyes; we conceive one which is described to us; and we imagine a new one which neither we ourselves nor any one else ever did perceive, Memory, as defined by Mr Combe, implies a renewal of "impressions previously received, attended with the idea of past time, and consciousness of their former existence." Probably this is as good a definition of memory as can be given at present; yet there is a difficulty in accounting for the “idea of past time," since this would imply that the activity of the organ of Time was a requisite for memory in any other organ. I suspect that memory ought not to be mixed up with the other three modes of manifestation here spoken of; but that it is much more closely allied to consciousness and the sense of resemblance. Some injuries and diseased states appear very materially to derange consciousness, memory, and the sense of resemblance; while the powers of perception, conception and imagination are comparatively intact, or, at least, not affected in equal degree.-H. C. WATSON. [Mr Chenevix has thrown out some suggestions on some of the foregoing points, in the Foreign Quarterly Review, No. III. p. 45. -ED.] Letter from C. T. Wood, Esq.-" In a review of Mr Watson's Statistics of Phrenology in Tait's Magazine, the reviewer asks, "What periodical troubles itself with Phrenology?" I should answer, there are many favourable to it, and give phrenological notices from time to time; among these are the Mechanics' Register, the Anthropological Magazine, the Analyst, and the Spectator. There are also many newspapers favourable to the chief of sciences, at the head of which may be mentioned the Scotsman; but what I now wish to call the more immediate attention of your readers to, is the following notice in the Spectator, the soundest, most consistent, liberal, and influential political journal in the island. The article is headed— "PEEL'S BUMPS." "Dr Epps, in a phrenological view of the progress of criminal legislation, to be found in the Christian Physician for the current month, has this passage on the great Tory charlatan of Tamworth :- Sir Robert Peel has taken much credit to himself for amending and ameliorating the criminal law; and, in reference to some of the offences already referred to, the following were some of these much praised emendations:-Stealing to the value of 40s. was punishable with death, he made it to the amount of L.5: which actually is a sum, compared with the value of 40s. in the time of Queen Anne, less in value, and, therefore, instead of increasing the value of a man's life, he diminished it. He perpetuated the punishment of death as applicable to forgeries. Punishment of death is barbarous, and wholly unjustifiable under any circumstances.] An examination of Sir Robert Peel's organization will explain all this. The, speech Sir Robert Peel delivered at his installation as Lord Rector of the Glasgow University, affords one of the best illustrations of the nature of that organization.' We are curious to see a phrenological estimate of the character of Sir Robert Plausible. The phrenologists would advance their science in popular estimation, and afford amusement as well as instruction, by gauging the capacities of some of our legislators, sounding the depths and shallows of their understandings. Expert practitioners of Phrenology, we understand, do not need actually to feel the protuberances of the cranium, or measure the skull; they carry the callipers in their eye, and can penetrate through the thickest crop of hair, and any wig but a judge's or a bishop's. "The gallery of the House of the Commons would be a capital place for surveying the skulls of senators when they doff their hats to address the House, and a clew might thus be got to the occasionally inexplicable freaks of some few well-meaning men. The thing has been done already, we believe, in a few individual cases; but Dr Epps, who illustrates his lectures on Phrenology with living examples in public men. should follow out the exhibition regularly on a large scale. Who knows, but at some future time, not very distant, a candidate for the suffrages of a constituency may be required to append to his address, a phrenological testimonial of his capabilities for performing his senatorial duties. The state of the poll would then be the true index of the characters of the candidates."-No. 442, p. 109. This is a pretty good proof of the growing popularity of the science, which, like every other truth, is gradually winning its way into general esteem and admiration, notwithstanding the opposition of enemies and the still more detrimental indiscretion or ignorance of friends. Such a book as Mr Scott's late extraordinary and disgraceful attack on Combe's Constitution of Man, would do more to bring odium on the phrenologists than all the pert chirping of the poor benighted opponents of the science. Mr Watson would be doing a great service to the cause by exposing piecemeal the blunders of Mr Scott, whether arising from ignorance or from something worse. C. T. WOOD." [Note.-The Spectator appears to us to write in this instance in ridicule of Phrenology, and we do not consider it benefited by notices of such a character as this. There is more sober truth in the idea itself thrown out by him, however, than he is aware of; but Phrenology must be much more extensively known before it can become practically useful in this and many other ways.-ED. Phren. Jour.] "London Popular Educational Association, formed for the purpose of assisting Mutual Instruction Societies, and other popular Educational Institutions. J. J. Hawkins, Esq. president. The want of some association of this kind has been long felt by the members of these Societies, and it is therefore unneces sary to urge any thing in its favour, in order to recommend it to the notice of those for whose benefit it has been formed. The objects it will endeavour to accomplish, are as follows:— 1st, To form a collection of books of reference, apparatus, and diagrams, for the use of the members of the association. 2dly, To procure lecturers for societies that may require them; and 3dly, To collect information of the best plan for conducting popular educational societies. Persons wishing to join the society, and associations requiring assistance, are requested to apply by letter (post paid) to the secretary. G. H. Lewes, hon. secretary, 7, Edward Street, Hampstead-road. "This association appears to be formed on the model of the Society for aiding the general Diffusion of Science,” established in Edinburgh on 21st December 1835, but which was attacked so fiercely by the directors of the Philosophical Association, that its members dropt their scheme, and Scotland has, in consequence, been left without any central body for facilitating the arrangements between country audiences and qualified lecturers on science. We are happy to see that the plan has been adopted in London, and hope that no senseless ebullition of jealousy, from any quarter, will obstruct its usefulness in the sister kingdom. The following passage in Owen Feltham's Funebre Venetianum (Lusoria, 1677), is interesting, from its recognising the brain as the organ of the mind, and the impossibility of attaining direct information on the subject by dissection. "As well we may Trace yonder fish, which way she swam at sea, W. B. H. Suggestions as to observing Development.-To the Editor of the Phrenological Journal.-Sir, As the study of Phrenology is one of the most interesting and important duties of man, its practice cannot be too much improved or simplified. To give any just decision as to the character of an individual by manipulation and inspection, requires a lengthened course of observation, and an amount of time, which can be afforded but by few. If any means could be devised to ascertain the size of the organs by a practical and easy method, much extension would be given to the science.-I believe, too often in estimating development by the present method, that the length of cerebral fibre or prominence of an organ, is stated to be a large development, when, in fact, it is not so; and the extension of fibre, or extent of surface of an organ, estimated of a non-development, when, in fact, it is a development. As frequently the extension of an organ counterbalances one apparently more prominent. |