memorable debates on questions arising out of the treaty with Great Britain, known as Jay's Treaty ;-first, on a motion to request of the President (Washington) a copy of the instructions given to the minister by whom the treaty was negotiated, and of all the correspondence and documents in relation to it; and afterwards on the expediency of legislation to carry the treaty into effect. In both those debates, and especially in the second, Mr. Hillhouse had a conspicuous part.

At the opening of the next session, which began at Philadelphia, Dec. 5, 1796, he entered the Senate, having been chosen to complete the unexpired term of Oliver Ellsworth, who had resigned his seat in the Senate for the seat of Chief Justice in the Supreme Court of the United States. At the inauguration of President John Adams, March 4, 1797, he presented the credentials of his re-election for the full term of six years then commencing. When Mr. Jefferson, after being elected President, withdrew from the presidency of the Senate, Mr. Hillhouse was made President pro tempore of that body. He was duly re-elected for another term commencing in March, 1803, and for yet another commencing with the first inauguration of President Madison, in 1809. He and his colleague, Uriah Tracy, who entered the Senate with him, as successor of Jonathan Trumbull for an unexpired term, are the only senators four times elected to that place by the State of Connecticut. Hillhouse and Tracy were colleagues in the Senate till the death of the latter in 1807, just at the commencement of his fourth term of service. In the party divisions of that period, Mr. Hillhouse ranked with the Federalists. He had supported the administration of Washington and the elder Adams, and he was in the opposition under the administration of Jefferson. Yet his speeches show that he was by no means a mere partizan, and that on great questions of statesmanship, he ordinarily rose to views above the range of party interests. Thus in the debate of November, 1803, on that amendment to the Constitution by which the present mode of electing President and Vice President was introduced, we find him saying—

Though it is impossible to prevent party altogether, much more when population and luxury increase, and corruption and vice with them, it is prudent to preserve as many checks against it as are practicable. I have been long in Congress, and have seen the conflicting interests of large and small States operate. The time may not be remote when party will adopt new designations. Federal and Republican parties have had their day; their designations will not last long, and the ground of difference between parties will not be the same that it has been; new names and new views will be taken; it has been the course in all nations. * * * A fanciful difference in politics is the bugbear of party now, because no other, no real cause of difference has subsisted.

Federalist as he was, his theory of the Federal government, even while the party with which he acted was ascendant in the Union, abhorred the idea of centralized and consolidated power. He regarded the State governments as the great conservative force in our political system, the guardians of liberty against power, the depositaries of all the most important public trusts, and the ultimate security, under God, for the efficiency and permanence of republican principles. He opposed whatever tended to magnify with factitious honors and means of influence the functionaries of the Federal power. The Presidency of the United States, with its great and ever growing accumulation of power, and with the excitements and perils of the quadrennial election, was to his view the point of peril in our system. He sometimes said among his friends, that the Presidency was made for Washington; that the Convention in defining the powers of that office, and the States, in accepting the constitution as it was, had Washington only in their thoughts; and that the powers of that office were too great to be committed to any other man. Such considerations, long cherished, led him to propose, in April, 1808, certain amendments to the constitution, aiming at a radical reformation of what he considered as the dangerous tendencies in the system of our Federal government. That proposal has been so often associated with his name by those who know little of what it was, or of what he was, that the readers of this memoir will reasonably expect to find here his own statement and explanation of his views. The lapse of more than half a century since his speech in the Senate explaining his proposed amendments, has added as much to the strength of the Union as it has added to our territorial dimensions and to our imperial wealth and greatness; but it has not invigorated the sentiment of State sovereignty; nor has it diminished the power of the President or the excitements that attend a Presidential election. Those who have already forgotten what threats were gravely made by the gravest sort of men while the last election was in progress, and what schemes were projected by fiery and dangerous men to dissolve the Union by violence in the event of the success of the candidate whom they opposed-those who do not know that the business of making Presidents has become the absorbing and all-subordinating business of our national politics; nor that the salaries, jobs, and perquisites, directly or indirectly at the disposal of the President, are claimed and acknowledged as due to the party workers who have helped him to his place of power-may

smile at the fear which so old-fashioned a patriot as James Hillhouse could not but feel for the future of his country.*

*The resolution in which Mr. Hillhouse presented his proposed amendments to the Senate, was as follows:

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, (two-thirds of both Houses concurring,) That the following articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, as amendments to the Constitution of the United States; all or any of which articles, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and purpo ses as part of the said Constitution, viz:

ARTICLES in addition to, and amendment of, the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth article of the original Constitution. I. After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every year by the people of the several States: their electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature; and their term of service shall expire on the first Tuesday of April in each year.

II. After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, the Senators of the United States shall be chosen for three years, and their term of service shall expire on the first Tuesday of April.

Immediately after they shall be assembled, in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be, into three classes. The seats of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the first year; of the second class at the expiration of the second year; and of the third class, at the expiration of the third year: so that one third may be chosen every year. Vacancies to be filled as already provided.

III. On the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, the President of the United States shall be appointed, and shall hold his office until the expiration of the first Tuesday of April, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen. And on the first Tuesday of April, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, and on the first Tuesday of April, in each succeeding year, the President shall be appointed, to hold his office during the term of one year. The mode of appointment shall be as follows:

In presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, each Senator belonging to the class whose term of service will first expire, and constitutionally eligible to the office of President, of which the House of Representatives shall be the sole judges, and shall decide without debate, shall, beginning with the first on the alphabet, and in their alphabetical order, draw a ball out of a box containing the same number of uniform balls as there shall be Senators present and eligible, one of which balls shall be colored, the others white. The Senator who shall draw the colored ball shall be President. A Committee of the House of Representatives, to consist of a member from each State, to be appointed in such manner as the House shall direct, shall place the balls in the box, shall shake the same so as to intermix them, and shall superintend the drawing thereof. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties thereof, if Congress be then in session, or if not, as soon as they shall be in session, the President shall, in the manner before mentioned, be appointed for the residue of the term. And until the disability be removed, or a President be appointed, the Speaker of the Senate shall act as President. And Congress may, by law, provide for the case of removal by death,

The entire speech in which Mr. Hillhouse explained to the Senate his proposals for amendments to the constitution, is too long to be transcribed in this place. A condensed abstract, with a few selected passages, may serve to exhibit the mind and spirit of the man. Having referred, in his exordium, to the circumstances in which the constitution was formed and adopted, he said:

Before I proceed with my explanatory remarks, I must take the liberty of stating that in using the terms 'monarchy,' 'aristocracy,' and 'democracy,' I do not use them as the cant words of party; I use them in their fair genuThe terms Federalist' and 'Republican,' I do not use by way of commendation or reproach, but merely by way of description, as the first names of individuals to distinguish them from others of the same family

ine sense.

name.

resignation, or inability of the President, and vacancy in the office, or inability of the Speaker of the Senate; and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability of the President be removed, or another be appointed.

The seat of a Senator who shall be appointed as President, shall thereby be vacated.

IV. After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, the compensation of the President shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars a year. V. After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, the office of Vice-President shall cease. And the Senate, on the same day in each year, when the President shall be annually appointed, shall choose a Speaker; and in the absence of the Speaker, or when he shall exercise the office of President, the Senate shall choose a Speaker pro tempore.

VI. After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, the President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law. But Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such officers as they think proper. in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and of the inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. But no law vesting the power of appointment shall be for a longer term than two years. All proceedings on nominations shall be with closed doors, and without debate; but information of the character and qualifications of the person nominated shall be received.

VII. After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, the President shall have power to fill all vacancies that may happen during the recess of Congress, by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of their next session. No removal from office shall take place without the consent of the Senate and House of Representatives. But Congress may, by law, authorize the removal, by the same power as may, by law, be authorized to make the appointment. But in every case of misconduct in office, where the consent of the Senate, or of the Senate and House of Representatives, shall be necessary to a removal, the President, during the recess of Congress, may suspend the officer, and make a temporary appointment of a person to exercise the office, until the next meeting of Congress, and until a decision can be had by the Senate, or by the Senate and House of Representatives, as the case may be, on a question for the removal of the officer suspended. All proceedings respecting removal from office shall be had without debate, upon the information and reasons which shall be communicated by the President, and with closed doors.

Federalists and Republicans never divided upon the elementary principles of government. There are very few Americans who are not in principle attached to a free republican government; though they may differ on minor points, and about the best mode of organizing it. Persons attached to monarchy or aristocracy are few indeed, they are but as the dust in the balance. No one in his sober senses can believe it practicable, or politic if practicable to use either. If ever introduced, which God forbid, it must be done at the point of the bayonet.

He referred to the origin of parties under the constitution, and to the names of the parties then existing, and said-" The supposed differences are more imaginary than real. Names may, and sometimes do, deceive ignorant, uninformed individuals, but these names now scarcely do that."

Some of the important features of our constitution were borrowed from a model which did not very well suit our condition. I mean the constitution and government of England, a mixed monarchy, in which monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are so combined as to form a check on each other. One important and indispensable requisite of such a government is, that the two first branches should be hereditary, and that the monarch should be the fountain of honor and source of power. In the United States, the people are the source of all power.

Placing in the hands of the Chief Magistrate, who depends on a popular election, prerogatives and powers in many respects equal to-in some, exceeding in practice those exercised by the King of Great Britain, is one of the errors of the constitution. This error can be corrected only in one of two ways; either the office must be stripped of those high prerogatives and powers, and the term of holding the office shortened, or some other mode devised than a popular election, for appointing a President; otherwise our country must perpetually groan under the scourge of party rage and violence; and be continually exposed to that worst of all calamities, civil war.

He was well aware that he had engaged in a difficult undertaking, but after speaking briefly of the prejudices and interests which were in his way, and courteously claiming for his propo. sals a deliberate and candid hearing, he proceeded :

A prominent feature of the amendments is, to shorten the term of service of the President, Senators, and Representatives. Observation and experi ence having convinced me that in an elective government, long terms of office and high compensations do not tend to make independent public servants, while they produce an anxious solicitude in the incumbents to keep their places, and render seekers of office more eager to obtain them, and more regardless of the means.

My first amendment goes to reduce the term of service of the members of the House of Representatives to one year.

No inconvenience can arise from this arrangement, because there is a constitutional provision that Congress shall assemble once in every year. That body, composed of the immediate representatives of the people, ought to exhibit a fair representation of their sentiments and will; and coming fresh from the people to the Congress of each year, will, it may be presumed, fairly express such sentiments and will. And if, in an interval from one session of Congress to another, there be a real change of public sentiment, why should not that change be expressed? Will an attempt in their representatives to resist it tend to tranquillize the public mind? or will it not, like persecution in religion, tend to make proselytes to their sentiments?

Constitutions, except so far as they are necessary to organize the several departments of government, and bring the public functionaries into a situation to deliberate and act-and in the General government to draw the line