on the brink of war. Whether Palmerston's despatch of the 19th of July, on the subject of the Queen of Spain's marriage, was or was not responsible for this result is a point on which a difference of opinion may fairly exist. But there is no doubt that the despatch itself was written by the minister without consulting his colleagues. In the following year he took the extreme course of threatening to suspend diplomatic relations with France, without informing either the Prime Minister or any other member of the Cabinet. In 1848 he went a step farther. A despatch to Bulwer, the British Minister at Madrid, which led to Bulwer's dismissal from Spain, was written not only without the knowledge, but in defiance of the orders, of the Prime Minister.3

These instances, which could be easily multiplied, will perhaps be sufficient to illustrate the contemptuous indif ference with which Palmerston treated his colleagues. He was probably encouraged in his conduct by observing that, however greatly they disapproved his procedure, they did not control him. There was, however, one other person in the State who was not prepared to submit with equal patience to

1 See a very curious story on this subject in Greville, second series, vol. iii. p. 298. 2 Ibid., vol. iii. p. 62. 3 On the 16th of March 1848 Palmerston addressed a despatch to Bulwer at Madrid, reconimending the adoption of a legal and constitutional course of government and the enlarging of the basis of the government. Bulwer communicated the despatch to the Spanish Government, and the latter took the extreme step not merely of protesting against it, but of returning it. There. upon Palmerston addressed two other despatches to Buiwer, on the 19th and 20th of April-one approving what Bulwer had done, the other strongly commenting on the conduct of Spain. Upon these, the Spanish Government sent Bulwer his passports and crdered him to leave Spain. For these events, see Parl. Papers, Sess. 1848-(1) Correspondence between the British Government and the Government of Spain; (2) Appendix to ditto; (3) Despatch from Sir H. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston, dated London, May 30, 1848; and cf. Life of Prince Consort, vol. ii. p. 66. It has lately transpired that Palmerston wrote one of the despatches not merely without the knowledge of his colleagues, but in opposition to the directions of the Prime Minister. Greville, Memoirs, Part ii. vol. iii. p. 169. For some severe but just strictures on Bulwer's conduct, see ibid., p. 181. Bulwer wanted Palmerston to send a fleet to Cadiz, demanding instant satisfaction; and Palmerston himself proposed prompt and decisive measures. Happily, the Cabinet was firm and refused to sanction this course. Bulwer's Life of Palmerston, vol. iii. ch. vii.

disliked by the queen.

the minister's independence. The policy which Palmerston pursued towards Germany, towards Italy, and towards other countries was not always acceptable to the queen; and her Majesty, like her ministers, not merely disliked the policy of the Foreign Secretary-she resented also, like them, his manner of conducting it.

Many of the questions with which diplomacy was occupied during the Russell Administration had a special interest for the British Court. One of the candidates for the hand of the Queen of Spain was nearly related to the queen's husband; another prince of the House of Saxe-Coburg was husband to the Queen of Portugal; intervention in Cracow raised incidentally various subjects connected with the future of Germany; while the Revolution of 1848 shook Prussia to its centre, and raised issues on which a German prince could not help feeling a warm interest and desiring to influence foreign policy.

The rela tions of the Crown with

Minister,

Precedent and practice, moreover, seemed to justify the interference of the Court on questions of foreign policy. Less than a century and a half before the reign of Victoria, an English sovereign had been his own the Foreign Foreign Minister; and, though no other king had ventured to imitate the example of William III, many subsequent sovereigns had exercised a control over foreign policy different from that which they had exerted over domestic policy. The practice of the departments seemed to justify their interference. Despatches from abroad were forwarded to the Crown so soon as they were received. Despatches to foreign Courts were submitted to the Crown before they were signed. The sovereign of the day occasionally altered and frequently criticised these documents. He naturally assumed that a policy thus conducted was his own policy.

This impression was increased by the language of society, of Parliament, and of the Statute Book. The army of Britain is her Majesty's army; the navy, her Majesty's navy; the public men, who owe their place to the confidence of the

House of Commons, are her Majesty's ministers; their subordinates are her Majesty's Civil Service; the representatives of Britain abroad are her Majesty's ambassadors. An able and industrious sovereign, sincerely anxious to promote the happiness of his subjects and the weal of his country, may easily imagine that he has a right to influence a policy dictated by his own servants at home to his own servants abroad, and enforced by his own troops and his own vessels.

modified

The opinion, however, which a well-intentioned sovereign was likely to entertain was being gradually affected by the In modern England power is gradually progress of events. passing from the sovereign to the people. The after the change, indeed, is being much more slowly effected Reform Act. in foreign than in domestic affairs. The members of the House of Commons, as a body, have no acquaintance with the business of other nations, and have no patience to address themselves to the task of mastering its details. Except in crises of national importance, they are content to leave the negotiations with other Powers in the hands of the Foreign Minister. When crises, however, of national importance occur, the reformed House of Commons shows an increasing disposition to interfere. Before 1832, when questions of foreign policy arose, the House used usually to wait till the negotiations were complete, and then either approve or condemn the course which the ministry had followed. A reformed House of Commons is perpetually insisting on being made acquainted with the progress of events. It requires to have every despatch, every telegram, communicated to it almost as soon as it is received.

Singularly enough, these changes, which are tending to deprive the sovereign of authority, are increasing the power of the ministry. It has been stated in a previous chapter of this work that a Liberal Ministry in a reformed Parliament ventured on asking for and succeeded in obtaining measures of repression for Ireland which Liverpool or Castlereagh would not have thought of demanding. There was no ob jection-so ran the usual apology-to entrust unconstitutional

powers to a constitutional ministry. But the same circumstances which thus tended to increase the power of the Executive at home tended to raise the influence of the Foreign Office abroad. The Foreign Minister who felt that the Cabinet of which he was a member represented the people was in a different position from the sovereign who represented nothing but the principle of primogeniture. He spoke with more power, he acted with more independence, than any sovereign would have ventured on doing.

Palmerston's

of control.

The change which was thus being effected was quickened by the temperament of the Liberal Foreign Minister. Palmerston was one of those men who derive pleasure impatience from work and acquire confidence from responsibility. He was always at his best when he was supreme; and he was much better fitted by nature to devise and carry out a policy of his own, than to aim at a policy of compromise by consulting other people. Master of his own department, he knew that no other person had so much information as himself; confident in his own judgment, he did not care for the advice of others. Counsel, too, was attended with this inconvenience-it involved delay; and Palmerston always preferred the certainty of to-day to the uncertainty of to-morrow. Even the references which it was the custom of his department to make to the sovereign were attended with the same disadvantage. They occupied time when despatch was essential. The old idea of asking instructions from a sovereign seemed inapplicable to a system in which the sovereign was bound to act on the advice of a minister.

1 Lord Palmerston's biographer declares that "during the discussion about the Spanish marriages, Lord Palmerston lost three weeks in answering a communication from Guizot by having to send drafts backwards and forwards while the Court was moving about in a cruise on the western coast. Guizot, in his subsequent notes and despatches, was always throwing this delay in his face." Ashley's Palmerston, vol. ii. p. 195. The despatch in which the delay occurred is evidently that of the 22nd August 1846. Correspondence relating to Spanish Marriages, p. 12; and cf. Guizot's allusion to it as "plus d'un mois après ma proposition," &c., ibid., p. 44. The Court had passed much of the preceding month at Osborne, but it did not go on a yacht excursion till the 18th August, four days before the despatch was sent. Martin's Prince Consort, vol. i. p. 339.

ences between the

Foreign

Office and

the Court.

A close observer might possibly have seen indications of difference between minister and Court soon after the formation of the Russell Administration. On the first question of importance which arose, Court and minister held the same views and used the same language. But perhaps Palmerston The differsaw with impatience that even on this subject the Court had established a private communication with the mother of the young Queen of Spain. In the following year the Court showed an increasing disposition to act alone. The queen's husband and the British Foreign Minister were both agreed in desiring alliance with Germany. But the queen's husband, with the natural instinct of a German, desired to strengthen Germany by consolidating her commercial interest in a Zollverein or Customs Union. Palmerston, on the contrary, looked on the Zollverein with the prejudices of his countrymen, and regarded its development as injurious to British trade. Slight differences of this kind increased the indisposition of the minister to consult the prince, and of the prince to consult the minister.3 The prince thought Palmerston's policy in Spain and Portugal quite wrong. He disliked the matter, he disapproved the manner, of many of Palmerston's despatches.5

Relations between Court and minister were thus soon strained. The tension became much greater after the Revolu

1 The Edinburgh Review stated some years ago, and the statement has never been contradicted, "If our own information is correct, which we believe it to be (but this is unwritten history), a direct overture was made by the Queen of Spain to the Queen of England, to the effect that she was tired of the French intrigues, and that if England would promise to support her she would marry Prince Leopold out of hand, and send the French Ambassador about his business." Edinburgh Review, vol. cxli. p. 294. I have reason to believe that the communication came not from the Queen of Spain, but from the queen mother; but that the allegation is otherwise accurate.

3 During the Cracow difficulty the prince was anxious that the public should be adequately instructed on the subject, and asked a well-known literary man to undertake the task. The gentleman to whose hands the task was entrusted asked leave to consult Palmerston, and the prince replied that he did not see any necessity for consulting the Foreign Secretary, though he had no objection to his consulting the Prime Minister.

4 Martin's Prince Consort, vol. i, p. 425.

5 Ibid. vol. ii. fp. 63. 3c1.