Increasing excitement in Italy. The embarrassing difficulty which Austria encountered in Hungary infused new heart into the Italians. They had seen with regret the conclusion of an armistice; they saw with dismay that the terms of the armistice were not observed by the combatants. Austria, complaining that the Piedmontese fleet had not retired from the Adriatic, refused to give up the military armaments which had been ceded to her at Peschiera.1 Radetzky, dominant at Milan, imposed a fine of millions of livres on the chief inhabitants of the town. These occurrences increased the prevailing bitterness. Italians in every province longed for a renewal of the struggle. The Romans, finding that the Pope was reluctant to move, rose against their rulers, struck Rossi, his minister, dead on the steps of the Cancelleria,3 and forced the Pope to fly to Gaeta. The armistice still continued ; Brussels even was appointed as a trysting-place for the Conference; but the negotiations for which the armistice had been concluded, and for which the Conference had been arranged, were perpetually postponed. Delays of this kind were advantageous to Aústria, and therefore irritating to Italy. The war party in Piedmont constantly acquired greater importance, and the king found it necessary to adapt his phrases to its aspirations. In opening the Chamber, on the 1st of February 1849, he talked of the confidence which animated a reorganised army, of the prospect of resuming the war with firm hopes of victory, and of the sacrifices which the nation was still prepared to make. His speech was answered by the Chamber in a still more warlike address; and the deputies, forgetting the responsibilities of their position, clamoured for immediate war. These utterances on the part of monarch and Chamber 1 Parl. Papers relating to Italy, Part iii. p. 490. The war resumed, 2 Ibid., pp. 592, 634. 3 Ibid., p. 607; cf. Guizot, vol. viii. p. 407. Guizot has left a beautiful character of Rossi, in which he applies to him Villars' words on Marshal Berwick's death at Philipsbourg: "J'avais toujours bien dit que cet homme-là était plus heureux que moi. La mort de M. Rossi peut inspirer la même envie, et il était digne du même bonheur." Guizot, vol. viii. p. 415. For Rossi, see also Hansard, vol. cv. 370; and Pasolini's Memoirs. made the preservation of peace almost impossible. The sole chance of preserving it lay in the immediate commencement of the Conference at Brussels; and Austria showed no signs of appointing an envoy to represent her. She was at last persuaded to send a diplomatist, Count Colloredo, to London, to discuss the possibilities of the negotiation. But Colloredo, instead of entering on the discussion, presented an angry remonstrance on the tone of the Royal Speech at Turin, and made a new declaration that Austria would not enter the Conference at all until she was assured that no cession of territory would be required of her. This threat made it perhaps impossible for the King of Sardinia to rein in his eager subjects. In an evil hour for Italy and himself, on the 12th of March, he gave notice of the conclusion of the armistice. On the 20th, when the required eight days' notice had expired, he moved out of his lines at Novara, and crossed the Ticino. He had not even attended to the gospel precept of weighing his own strength and that of his enemy. Radetzky at once pierced his lines, forced him to retreat, and defeated him at Novara. Monarch and nation were both prostrated by the blow. Charles Albert abdicated. His son, Victor Emmanuel, concluded peace on the terms dictated to him by his enemy;1 and for another ten years Italy was at the mercy of Austria. Throughout these occurrences Britain, with Palmerston as Foreign Minister, had pursued a remarkable policy. He had never concealed his sympathy with the Italians, and his sense of the justice and the hopefulness of their Italian policy. cause. When Radetzky was beaten, he had urged Austria to cede Venice. When Radetzky was victorious, he had done his best to procure the cession of Lombardy. Even after Novara, he endeavoured to moderate the demands of Austria. The attitude which he thus assumed undoubtedly encouraged Piedmont to persevere in a struggle when she had better have made terms; and his support, therefore, in one sense, did Italy more harm than good. Yet, in a higher and terminated. Palmerston's 1 For authority for these statements, see Parl. Papers relating to Italy, Part iv. pp. 108, 138, 178, 199, 226, 227, 229. a h L N. fel. ho. hac and Can the they the i The fied w collect: to 150 Colonel Van Re boats de shores of luckily, tl. anchored was press.. command his orders. citizen was fire, towed i over the Fa made the preservation of peace almost impossible. The sole chance of preserving it lay in the immediate commencement of the Conference at Brussels; and Austria showed no signs of appointing an envoy to represent her. She was at last persuaded to send a diplomatist, Count Colloredo, to London, to discuss the possibilities of the negotiation. But Colloredo, instead of entering on the discussion, presented an angry remonstrance on the tone of the Royal Speech at Turin, and made a new declaration that Austria would not enter the Conference at all until she was assured that no cession of territory would be required of her. This threat made it perhaps impossible for the King of Sardinia to rein in his eager subjects. In an evil hour for Italy and himself, on the 12th of March, he gave notice of the conclusion of the armistice. On the 20th, when the required eight days' notice had expired, he moved out of his lines at Novara, and crossed the Ticino. He had not even attended to the gospel precept of weighing his own strength and that of his enemy. Radetzky at once pierced his lines, forced him to retreat, and defeated him at Novara. Monarch and nation were both prostrated by the blow. Charles and terAlbert abdicated. His son, Victor Emmanuel, concluded peace on the terms dictated to him by his enemy;1 and for another ten years Italy was at the mercy of Austria. minated. Palmerston's Throughout these occurrences Britain, with Palmerston as Foreign Minister, had pursued a remarkable policy. He had never concealed his sympathy with the Italians, and his sense of the justice and the hopefulness of their Italian cause. When Radetzky was beaten, he had urged policy. Austria to cede Venice. When Radetzky was victorious, he had done his best to procure the cession of Lombardy. Even after Novara, he endeavoured to moderate the demands of Austria. The attitude which he thus assumed undoubtedly encouraged Piedmont to persevere in a struggle when she had better have made terms; and his support, therefore, in one sense, did Italy more harm than good. Yet, in a higher 1 For authority for these statements, see Parl. Papers relating to Italy, Part iv. pp. 108, 138, 178, 199, 226, 227, 229. sense, the contest of 1848, though it ended in disaster and failure, did more for Italy than any compromise; since it won for her the respect and sympathy of Europe. For autocracy the decisive victory did not come one moment too soon. Almost at the time at which the news reached Hungary. Russia Vienna that the Italian uprising was practically crushed, intelligence arrived of the defeat of the Russians and Austrians in Transylvania. It was apparent that Austria, though she had crushed Italy, could not hope to secure the restoration of her authority in Hungary, and, in her distress, she turned to Russia for further assistance. She did not turn in vain. Russia knew that Polish troops were fighting in the ranks of the insurgents; she saw that the chief Hungarian successes had been won by a general of Polish birth. She identified the cause of Hungary with that of Poland, and feared that Hungarian successes would lead to a fresh insurrection in her own territory. Russia, therefore, was ready to place Paskievitsch, the most famous of her generals, and 120,000 of her troops at the disposal of the autocrat at Vienna. She was prepared to anticipate a fresh insurrection in Poland by the old familiar remedy of stamping out revolution in Hungary.1 2 Russian help gave a new character to the struggle. Kossuth, indeed, persuaded the Hungarian Diet to denounce the House of Hapsburg as perjured in the sight of God and man, and to decree its deposition; and the Hungarians thenceforward fought not for their rights under the House of Austria, but for their separation from the Empire. The contest, however, was from the first hopeless. The victory of Radetzky and the Russian advance had combined to secure success for the new Austrian Emperor. The Hungarians had the satisfaction of maintaining a gallant struggle for several months. An outbreak of cholera in the Russo-Austrian army 3 increased to a ceriain extent the difficulties of the allies. But the unequal contest could not long The Hungarians defeated. 1 Parl. Papers relating to Hungary, pp. 169, 185, 192, 194 2 Ibid., pp. 193, 256, 264. Ibid., p. 253. |