Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to TodayHarvard University Press, 2009 M06 30 - 407 páginas This book examines the development of the theory and practice of constitutionalism, defined as a political system in which the coercive power of the state is controlled through a pluralistic distribution of political power. It explores the main venues of constitutional practice in ancient Athens, Republican Rome, Renaissance Venice, the Dutch Republic, seventeenth-century England, and eighteenth-century America. From its beginning in Polybius' interpretation of the classical concept of mixed government, the author traces the theory of constitutionalism through its late medieval appearance in the Conciliar Movement of church reform and in the Huguenot defense of minority rights. After noting its suppression with the emergence of the nation-state and the Bodinian doctrine of sovereignty, the author describes how constitutionalism was revived in the English conflict between king and Parliament in the early Stuart era, and how it has developed since then into the modern concept of constitutional democracy. |
Contenido
1 | |
19 | |
2 Athenian Democracy | 60 |
3 The Roman Republic | 86 |
4 Countervailance Theory in Medieval Law Catholic Ecclesiology and Huguenot Political Theory | 116 |
5 The Republic of Venice | 129 |
6 The Dutch Republic | 166 |
7 The Development of Constitutional Government and Countervailance Theory in SeventeenthCentury England | 223 |
8 American Constitutionalism | 284 |
9 Modern Britain | 327 |
Epilogue | 358 |
References | 363 |
Index | 387 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today Scott Gordon Vista de fragmentos - 1999 |
Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today Scott Gordon Sin vista previa disponible - 2002 |
Términos y frases comunes
American appears Assembly Athenian attention authority became become body British called central century checks and balances church citizens civil claim colonial Commons concept constitutional construed contends continued Council countervailance courts democracy described determine discussion doctrine dominant Dutch early effect elected England English established Europe executive exercise expressed fact freedom functions historians House idea important independent influence institutions interests issue Italy king later legislative liberty literature Lords majority matters means monarch nature notion organization Parliament period political power political system political theory popular practice prince principle proposed provinces referred regarded religious representatives Republic republican role Roman Rome rule Senate separation serve significant social society sovereign sovereignty specific status structure thought towns United Venetian Venice writes
Pasajes populares
Página 311 - The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society ; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.
Página 313 - By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
Página 9 - Power" (Macht) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.
Página 313 - Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents.
Página 30 - That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them.
Página iv - In all governments, there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or secret, between AUTHORITY and LIBERTY; and neither of them can ever absolutely prevail in the contest. A great sacrifice of liberty must necessarily be made in every government; yet even the authority, which confines liberty, can never, and perhaps ought never, in any constitution, to become quite entire and uncontrollable.
Página 289 - Taxation is no part of the governing or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone.
Página 10 - Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.
Referencias a este libro
Investment Banking:Institutions, Politics, and Law: Institutions, Politics ... Alan D. Morrison,William J. Wilhelm, Jr. Sin vista previa disponible - 2007 |
Freedom Or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers ... Michael Freeman Sin vista previa disponible - 2003 |