in the first congress to exert all their influence to obtain a ratification of these amendments, in the manner provided by the constitution; and in all congressional acts to conform, as far as practicable, to the spirit of them.

A majority of the convention of New York, which met on the 17th of June, were strongly opposed to the new system of government. Mr. Jay, Mr. Hamilton, and Chancellor Livingston, were its principal advocates, and governor Clinton, Mr. Yates, Mr. Lansing, Mr. Duane, and Melancthon Smith, were most distinguished in the opposition. The latter gentlemen had great influence in the state; and the accession of Virginia disappointed their expectations. Ten states had now united, and the constitution must necessarily go into operation-no alternative was, therefore, left for New York, but to unite or secede. The southern district of that state gave strong intimations of a determination to continue a part of the union. Under these circumstances, a small majority concurred with Virginia, in adopting the system, and recommending amendments. This majority was only five, and after a bill of rights and numerous amendments were agreed to, it was moved, "that there should be reserved to the state of New York, a right to withdraw herself from the union, after a certain number of years, unless the amendments proposed, should previously be submitted to a general convention." This motion, however, was negatived. The amendments of New York, were more numerous as well as more radical, than those of any other state. In addition to most of the Massachusetts amendments, she proposed, among others of less importance, that no persons, except natural born citizens, or such as were citizens on or before the 4th of July, 1776, or held commissions under the United States during the war, and had since July 4th, 1776, become citizens of some one of the states, should be eligible to the places of president, vice-president, or members of congress-that no standing army be kept up in time of peace, without the assent of two thirds of both houses-that congress should not declare war without the same majority—that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended for a lon VOL. II.

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ger term than six months-that no capitation tax should ever be laid--that no person be eligible as a senator for more than six years in any term of twelve years; and that the state legislatures might recall their senators-that no member of congress be appointed to any office under the authority of the United States-that the power of congress to pass laws of bankruptcy, should only extend to merchants and other traders-that no person be eligible to the office of president a third time-that the president should not command an army in the field without the previous desire of congress-that congress should not constitute any tribunals or inferior courts, with any other than appellate jurisdiction, except in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and in all other cases, to which the judicial power of the United States extended, and in which the supreme court had not original jurisdiction, the causes should be heard in the state courts, with right of appeal to the supreme or other courts of the United States-that the court for the trial of impeachments should consist of the senate, the judges of the supreme court of the United States, and the senior judge of the highest court in each state-that persons aggrieved by any judgment of the supreme court in any case in which that court had original jurisdiction, should be entitled to a review of the same by commissioners not exceeding seven, to be appointed by the president and senate-that the judicial power should extend to no controversies respecting land, unless relating to claims of territory or jurisdiction between states, or between individuals, or between states and individuals under grants of different states that the militia should not be compelled to serve without the limits of the state for a longer term than six weeks, without the consent of the legislature thereof-and that congress should not impose any excise on any article, (ardent spirits excepted,) of the growth, production, or manufacture of the United States, or any of them.

To obtain these and other amendments, the convention addressed a circular letter to the governors of all the states, requesting their concurrence in calling another convention. Referring

to the new system, they observed," several articles in it, appear so exceptionable to a majority of us, that nothing but the fullest confidence of obtaining a revision of them by a general convention, and an invincible reluctance to separating from our sister states, have prevailed upon a sufficient number of us, to ratify it, without stipulating for previous amendments."

The convention of North Carolina was in session at the same time with that of New York, and on the first of August refused their assent, until a declaration of rights, with amendments to the most ambiguous and exceptionable parts of the constitution, should be laid before congress or a convention of the states, that might be called for the purpose of amending it, for their consideration.

In this conflict of opinions respecting the new system of government, the views entertained of it by such statesmen as Mr. Adams and Mr. Jefferson, both of whom were in Europe at the time of its formation and adoption, could not fail to have had influence, nor can they now be uninteresting. The views of the latter were disclosed in his letters to his friends, written when the subject was before the state conventions. Some of these have lately been given to the public. He approved the general organization of the government, its division into three branches, and of the powers granted to each. He was particularly pleased with "the compromise of the opposite claims of the great and little states; and of the mode of voting by persons, instead of states." He also liked the negative given to the executive "conjointly with a third of either house;" though he would have preferred to have had the judiciary associated for this purpose, or invested with separate powers.* His great objections were, the want of a bill of rights, and the re-eligibility of the president. To secure amendments calculated to remove these objections, his first wish was that nine states should adopt it, and four refuse their assent, until they were obtained. He afterwards, however, gave a decided preference to the mode adopted by Massachusetts. the 28th of May, 1788, he wrote from Paris to colonel Edward

On

Biography of Mr. Jefferson, vol. 7. Signers of the Declaration of Independence,

pp. 69, 70.

Carrington-" My first wish was, that nine states would adopt it in order to ensure what was good in it, and that the others might by holding off, produce the necessary amendments. But the plan of Massachusetts is far preferable, and will, I hope, be followed by those who are yet to decide. There are two amendments only, which I am anxious for. First, a bill of rights, which it is so much the interest of all to have, that I conceive it must be yielded. The first amendment proposed by Massachusetts will in some degree answer this end, but not so well, it will do much in some instances, and too little in others; it will cripple the federal gov ernment in some cases where it ought to be free, and not restrain it where restraint would be right. The second amendment which appears to me essential, is the restoring the principle of necessary rotation, particularly to the senate and presidency; but most of all to the last. Re-eligibility makes him an officer for life, and the disasters inseparable from an elective monarchy render it preferable, if we cannot tread back that step, that we should go forward and take refuge in an hereditary one."

In another of the 8th of July, he says, "the glorious example of Massachusetts, of accepting unconditionally, and pressing for future amendments will, I hope, reconcile all parties. The argument is unanswerable, that it will be easier to obtain amendments from nine states, under the new constitution, than from thirteen after rejecting it."*

While the Americans were about revising their forms of gov ernment, Mr. Adams, then in England, wrote his able defense of the constitutions of his country.

His principal object was to refute the erroneous opinions of Turgot and other learned men in Europe, respecting them; particularly on the subject of the division of the powers of government. Mr. Turgot, in speaking of the new American constitutions, had declared, "that by most of them the customs of England were imitated, without any particular motive. Instead of collecting," he observed, " all authority into one center, that of the nation, they have established different bodies, a body of rep

* North American Review for October, 1827, p. 269.

resentatives, a council, and a governor, because there is in England a house of commons, a house of lords and a king." These opinions Mr. Adams combatted with success. The Americans had indeed in their colonial state been accustomed to a division of the powers of government; and the general principle, that the legislative, executive and judicial powers should be kept distinct, had now become a part of their political creed. In framing their constitutions, however, questions arose, how far the executive power might in particular cases be controled by a body, constituting a part of the legislature; and on these some of the wisest politicians entertained different opinions.

Whether the senate should have a negative on presidential appointments, was a question on which the members of the general convention were much divided. This power in that body did not accord with Mr. Adams' ideas of a well balanced gov

ernment.

In this he differed from some of his old friends and compatriots, whom he met in the first congress at New York, under the new constitution, in the summer of 1789. On this point as well as some others, a correspondence at that time took place between him and his friend Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who had been long engaged in political life, was one of the committee that prepared the articles of confederation, and also a member of the general convention.

The following extracts from this correspondence, showing not only the opinions of these experienced statesmen, but also, in some degree, the views of the convention on this important part of the constitution, will not, we trust, be unacceptable in this place.

To some general observations of Mr. Sherman in favor of this power in the senate, Mr. Adams made the following objections. "The negative of the senate upon appointments," he said, "is liable to the following objections.

"1. It takes away, or at least it lessens the responsibility of the executive-our constitution obliges me to say, that it lessens the responsibility of the president. The blame of an hasty, inju