eigners may be interested, in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any act or ordinance of congress for the regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal revenue. That none of the judiciary officers shall, during the time they remain in office, be capable of receiving or holding any other office or appointment during their term of service, or for

thereafter.

"6. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers within the several states, ought to be bound, by oath, to support the articles of union.

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7. Resolved, That all acts of the United States, in congress assembled, made by virtue and in pursuance of the powers hereby vested in them, and by the articles of the confederation, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective states, as far as those acts and treaties shall relate to the said states, or their citizens; and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary notwithstanding. And if any state, or any body of men in any state, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the powers of the confederated states, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel obedience to such acts, or an observance of such treaties.

"8. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission of new states into the union.

"9. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for hearing and deciding upon all disputes arising between the United States and an individual state, respecting territory.

"10. Resolved, That the rule for naturalizations ought to be the same in every state.

"11. Resolved, That a citizen of one state, committing an offense in another state, shall be deemed guilty of the same offense as if it had been committed by a citizen of the state in which the offense was committed."

These propositions, called the Jersey plan, no doubt embraced the general views of those in the convention, who wished merely to amend the articles of confederation. They were debated until the 19th of June, and were rejected by seven states against three, and one divided. New York, New Jersey and Delaware were in favor of them, and all the other states against them, except Maryland, whose members were equally divided.

The question being thus definitely settled against amending the articles of confederation, the convention resumed the resolutions of Mr. Randolph, and they were the subject of debate and amendment until the 4th of July, when, with the exception of those relating to the executive, they were referred to a commit tee consisting of Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Ellsworth, and Mr. Wilson, for the purpose of reducing them to the form of a constitution. On the 26th of the same month, those relating to the executive having been adopted, they with various other propositions submitted by individuals, were referred to the same committee, and the convention adjourned to the 6th of August, when the committee reported a draft of a constitution. This was under debate until the 8th of September, and underwent many material alterations. A committee, consisting of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hamilton, G. Morriss, Mr. Madison, and Mr. King, was then selected, " to revise the style and arrange the articles." The manner in which these eminent scholars, and statesmen, performed the duty assigned them, appears, from the great precision and accuracy of the language of the constitution, as well as the happy arrangement of its various articles.

The report of this committee was made on the 12th and on the 17th of September, after a session of about four months, the constitution was finally adopted and signed by all the members then present.

Having determined to form a new system of government, the states were nearly unanimous, that it should consist of "a supreme legislative, executive and judiciary." Equal unanimity, however, did not prevail as to the mode of forming those three

great co-ordinate departments, the relative weight of the states in these departments, and the powers with which each should be invested. All the states, with the exception of Pennsylvania, were in favor of dividing the legislature into two branches, to be styled a house of representatives and senate. A question then arose, as to the votes of the states in these branches. This was a ques

tion between the great and small states; and it created long and violent debates, particularly with respect to the representation or vote of the states in the senate, or second legislative branch. The small states, after some debate, consented that the right of suffrage in the house, should be in proportion to the whole number of white or other free citizens in each, including those bound to service for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons. While they yielded this point, they insisted on an equal vote in the senate.

To this the large states were unwilling to assent; and on this question the states remained, for a time, about equally divid ed. On the first trial, in committee of the whole, six states against five, decided that the right of suffrage in the senate should be the same as in the house; the states of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia being in the affirmative, and Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland in the negative.

This question was again brought up, on a motion of Mr. Ellsworth, on the 29th of June, "that in the second branch, each state should have an equal vote." This produced a long and warm debate. In support of his motion Mr. Ellsworth said, “I confess that the effect of this motion is, to make the general government partly federal and partly national. This will secure tranquillity, and still make it effectual; and it will meet the objections of the larger states. In taxes they will have a proportional weight in the first branch of the general legislature. If the great states refuse this plan, we shall be forever separated. Even in the executive the larger states have ever had great influence. The provinces of Holland ever had it. If all the states are to exist, they must necessarily have an equal vote in the genVOL. II.

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eral government. Small communities, when associating with greater, can only be supported by an equality of votes. I have always found in my reading and experience, that in all societies the governors are ever rising into power. The large states, though they may not have a common interest for combination, yet they may be partially attached to each other for mutual support and advancement. This can be more easily effected than the union of the remaining small states to check it; and ought we not to regard antecedent plighted faith to the confederation already entered into, and by the terms of it declared to be perpetual? And it is not obvious to me that the states will depart from this ground. When in the hour of common danger we united as equals, shall it now be urged by some that we must depart from this principle when danger is over? Will the world say that this is just? We then associated as free and independent states, and were well satisfied. To perpetuate that independence, I wish to establish a national legislative, executive and judiciary; for under these we shall, I doubt not, preserve peace and harmony-nor should I be surprised (although we made the general government the most perfect in our opinion) that it should hereafter require amendment. But at present, this is as far as I possibly can go. If this convention only chalks out lines of a good government, we shall do well."

Mr. Baldwin of Georgia said, "it appears to be agreed that the government we should adopt ought to be energetic and formidable, yet I would guard against the danger of becoming too formidable. The second branch ought not to be elected as the first. Suppose we take the example of the constitution of Massachusetts, as it is commended for its goodness: There the first branch represents the people, and the second its property."

"I would always exclude," said Mr. Madison, "inconsistent principles in framing a system of government. The difficulty of getting its defects amended are great and sometimes insurmountable. The Virginia government was the first which was made, and though its defects are evident to every person, we cannot get it amended. The Dutch have made four attempts to amend

their system without success. The few alterations made in it were by tumult and faction, and for the worse. If there were real danger, I would give the small states the defensive weapon. But there is none from that quarter. The great danger to our general government is the great southern and northern interests of this continent, being opposed to each other. Look to the votes in congress, and most of them stand divided by the geography of the country, not according to the size of the states.

"Suppose the first branch granted money, may not the second branch, from state views, counteract the first? In congress, the single state of Delaware prevented an embargo, at the time all the other states thought it absolutely necessary for the support of the army. Other powers, and those very essential, besides the legislative, will be given to the second branch-such as the negativing all state laws. I would compromise on this question, if I could do it on correct principles, but otherwise not-if the old fabric of the confederation must be the ground-work of the new, we must fail."

The debate on this motion was renewed the next day, by Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania, who commenced by saying"The question now before us is of so much consequence, that I cannot give it a silent vote-gentlemen have said, that if this amendment is not agreed to, a separation to the north of Pennsylvania may be the consequence. This neither staggers me in my sentiments or my duty. If a minority should refuse their assent to the new plan of a general government, and if they will have their own will, and without it, separate the union, let it be done; but we shall stand supported by stronger and better principles. The opposition to this plan is as twenty two to ninety, in the general scale-not quite a fourth part of the union. Shall three fourths of the union surrender their rights for the support of that artificial being, called state interest? If we must join issue I am willing, I cannot consent that one fourth shall controul the power of three fourths.

"If the motion is adopted, seven states will controul the whole, and the lesser seven compose twenty four out of ninety. One