of the immortality of the soul, the Theaetetus of the nature of knowledge, the Meno of virtue, the Symposium of love, the Philebus of pleasure. These are but a few of Plato's dialogues, but they are some of the best known, and for the most part are concerned with a definite subject. Some of the others could not be so shortly described.

The style of Plato has been described by Aristotle as "midway between poetry and prose." This need not refer merely to the language, but probably alludes, in part at least, to the nature of the dialogues themselves, many of which for their dramatic force may well rank as excellent works of fiction; and Aristotle would have called fiction poetry.

The language itself is often poetical, but not more so than we consider allowable for prose. As Greek it is of course beyond praise, though a beginner might sometimes wish the sentences to be a little less long, and the constructions a little more free from colloquial irregularities.

The Laches is one of the earlier or Socratic dia logues of Plato; it is very dramatic. The characters of the dialogue are Lysimachus, son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, son of Pericles' rival Thucydides; their two friends Nicias and Laches, Socrates (who is apparently represented as being quite a young man), and two boys, the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias, named respectively Aristides and Thucydides after their grandfathers.

The scene is a palaestra. Nicias and Laches have been with the two fathers to see a 'master of arms,'

named Stesilaus, fighting in heavy armour, and are to give their opinion on the performance. Lysimachus and Melesias want to know whether this exercise would be a suitable accomplishment for their sons, whom they wish to educate as well as possible. Nicias professes his readiness to give advice, but Laches suggests that the opinion of Socrates should be asked, as he is a man who is constantly considering the question of the education of the young. This makes Lysimachus think that this Socrates, the son of his old friend Sophroniscus, may be the man whom he has often heard the boys praising. One of them tells him that he is right in his conjecture, and, after a testimony from Laches to Socrates' good conduct in the retreat from Delium, Lysimachus presses Socrates for his opinion on the subject of "fighting in armour." Socrates modestly says that Nicias and Laches ought to speak first, and accordingly they give their opinions, Nicias in favour of the exercise as an useful addition to the art of warfare, Laches against it as an unprofitable innovation. Lysimachus is sorry to find that they differ, and an appeal is made to Socrates to settle the question by his casting vote. This Socrates will not do, "for," he says, "the question is not what do the majority think, but is there any among us who really knows about the matter we are considering, and if so, what is his opinion? The matter we are really considering is what are the requirements of the soul; and if any of us has scientific knowledge of the treatment proper for the soul, his opinion will be valuable; but to have it he must have studied the subject under

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good masters; if not, it is very unlikely that he will have any skill in the matter, and we shall not believe him, if he says that he has such skill, unless he can show us some practical results of it in the shape of the improvement of his fellow-men. I could not afford masters, and I have not been able to acquire the skill. But let us inquire if Nicias and Laches have it."

Nicias and Laches agree, but the question is not pursued any further in this form, Socrates suggesting that they shall substitute for the inquiry, "Do we know how to improve the soul?" the inquiry, "Do we know the nature of that which is best for the soul, namely, virtue?" And he further suggests that it will be enough for the present purpose to take one part of virtue, namely, courage, and see if they know what that is.

Laches thinks the question an easy one, and defines courage thus: "A man who was ready to keep his place in the rank and resist the enemy, and not run away, would be courageous" (190 E).

Socrates objects that this is at best only a definition of a hoplite's courage, and he explains that he wants a definition of courage in a much wider sense. Accordingly Laches now explains it as "an endurance (or resistance) of the soul." Socrates suggests that such endurance or resistance will be noble only when combined with prudence or wisdom; otherwise it will be harmful; and that as courage is noble, it will be only sensible endurance that can be called courage. Laches agrees (192 D). "Yet," says Socrates, "a man who is resolute in spending sensibly, or resolute

in refusing unsuitable food to an invalid, is not therefore called brave, nor is a man who resists in war thought more brave when all the advantage is on his side, and he knows it. Nay, when the advantage is on his opponent's side, and he knows it, then is he rather called brave for resisting. And in many like instances we find the greatest courage is the resistance which is combined with a want of prudence. Here, then, we have a contradiction, but we must not give up because of the check. So we will ask Nicias to help in the chase."

Nicias (194 C-D) says that avopeía had better be defined as a sort of wisdom, and suggests that this will be in accordance with Socrates' usual teaching. "What wisdom?" he is asked. He answers, "The wisdom to understand things to be dreaded and things not to be dreaded, both in war and in all other circumstances."

Laches objects that we do not call husbandmen brave for knowing about things to be dreaded in agriculture, or doctors brave for knowing about things to be dreaded in disease.

Nicias answers that doctors, as such, know only about health and disease. They may know whether their patient will recover or not, but their professional knowledge does not tell them which is most terrible to him, recovery or death.

"Oh," says Laches, "then your brave man is simply a prophet?"

"No," Nicias replies. "A prophet knows merely what will happen, not whether the future will be terrible or not."

Laches calls this shuffling, but Socrates is inclined to think there may be something in what Nicias says, and so proceeds to question him. "You think that no one can be brave without this knowledge ?"

Nicias assents, and says that beasts and children may be fearless (äpoßa), but cannot be brave (avspeîa). Laches calls this sophistry; but Socrates still keeps up his judicial attitude. He proceeds:

Soc. Nicias, you call 'courage' a part of virtue, I suppose

?

NIC. Yes.

Soc. What then are things to be dreaded, and the reverse? future evils and goods?

NIC. Yes.

Soc. Courage, then, is the knowledge or science of good and evil in the future. But can any science be of the future only? Must it not be just as much concerned with the present and the past?

NIC. It must.

Soc. Then courage will be the science of good and evil whether past, present, or future, and will therefore be the whole of virtue, and not a part only. So our definition was wrong after all, and we must go to school with the boys to learn.

Thus we have no definite answer given to the question, "What is courage?" Yet an answer is suggested in the conversation, which contains besides many points of interest and instruction. Attention will be called to these in the Notes; and the reader is referred to the Appendix for further remarks on the subject of the dialogue.