In December the intelligence from Spain was such that a mobilisation of the fleet was ordered, and seems to have been completed in less than one week. Lord Howard of Effingham was commissioned as commander-in-chief, and Drake was given an independent squadron. Diplomatic difficulties and peace overtures led to indecision and delay. The crews of many ships were reduced to one-half. It was not until February that Howard joined the squadron in the Downs, and a plan of campaign was formulated. The plan of the Council was to divide the fleet, and to form an eastern squadron in the Straits of Dover and a western in the Chops of the Channel; while Drake was to make a diversion to the Azores against the Indian fleets, and another expedition was to be sent to Portugal. This frittering away of force was indefensible, and shows how reasonable was the fear that the fleet might not be properly used. It was permissible and necessary to keep in the narrow seas a force sufficient to prevent Parma crossing, but to divide the capital ships in the manner proposed was to invite defeat.

The manœuvres during recent years have furnished instances of the dispersion of capital ships, which show that in questions of strategy we are not more advanced than were our Elizabethan forefathers, and that the risk of a mistaken use

one.

Hawkyns was as little alive to the great principle of war that the true objective is the enemy's main fleet, which should be struck at with all available force. He was for sending a squadron to prey on the trade on the Spanish coast, while the main fleet remained in home waters. Drake alone possessed the true strategic insight. He pointed out that the "groundwork" of the invasion was the force coming from Spain: if that were stopped the Duke of Parma would be equally kept back. Hence he held that the Western squadron should be made as strong as convenient, with a view to striking the first blow, and "putting into her Majesty and her people courage and boldness not to fear any invasion in her own country, but to seek God's enemies and her Majesty's where they may be found." Again he counsels an active offensive, by the words, "for that with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more good upon their own coasts than a great many more will do here at home; and the sooner we are gone the better we shall be able to impeach them."

Drake was not allowed to sail, but the Queen asked him, "How the forces now in Lisbon might best be distressed?" He replied that the question could not yet be answered, because the intelligence was uncertain, and the resolution of his own people could not be properly understood before

going to sea; but that if he were allowed to sail and the enemy came out of Lisbon, they "shall be fought with in such sort as shall hinder his quiet passage to England." When asked what the strength of the fleet should be, he answered, "God increase your most Excellent Majesty's forces both by sea and land daily." Thus he was clearly in favour of an army as well as a navy for preventing an invasion.

Drake's plan gradually prevailed, inasmuch that on April 17 Howard received orders to proceed to Plymouth with the principal ships, and on May 10 the council resolved that the Western fleet should "be employed as by his Lordship shall be thought meet upon such intelligence as he shall receive from time to time; having care as much as lies in him to impeach any attempt in Ireland, in Scotland, and England." In pursuance of these orders Lord Henry Seymour was left with forty sail, aided by a Dutch squadron, to watch the Duke of Parma. The remainder, under Howard, joined Drake off Plymouth on May 23. The combined fleet, now under the command of the Lord Admiral, with Drake as his chief adviser, consisted of about one hundred sail, and was manned by perhaps ten thousand men.

At this time the English leaders knew that the Spanish fleet was ready to leave Lisbon. They had now to decide on the movements of their own fleet. Drake was for carrying the whole force to the coast of Spain, and at the council of

war held on May 25 it was decided to adopt this course at the earliest possible moment. Owing to stress of weather Howard could not sail until May 30, when he put to sea, but, unable to face the westerly gales, returned on June 6. On the 13th he learnt that the Spanish fleet had left Lisbon on May 20. on May 20. On the 14th he wrote that the bad weather had prevented him sailing, and that Drake, Hawkyns, Frobisher, and others of greatest judgment and experience, concurred with him that "the surest way to meet the Spanish fleet is upon their own coast or in any harbour of their own and there to defeat them." He continued that as they had put to sea more than three weeks since and had not appeared, he was persuaded that they intended to linger on their own coast. But on the following day he received a despatch from Walsyngham, dated June 9, which, human nature being what it is, may be taken as typical of the sort of letter which an admiral may expect to receive under such circumstances. The letter ran thus:

"Her Majesty, perceiving by your Lordship's late letters to me that you were minded to repair to the Isles of Bayona [near Vigo on north-west coast of Spain] if the wind serve, there to abide the Spanish fleet or to discover what course they meant to Lordship should put over so far, the take, doubting that in case your said fleet may take some other way, whereby they may escape your Lordship, as by bending their course to the westward to the latitude of 50 this realm, hath therefore willed me degrees, and then to shoot over to to let your Lordship understand that

she thinketh it not convenient that

your Lordship should go so far to the south as the said Isles of Bayona, but to ply up and down in some indifferent place between the coast of Spain and this realm, so as you may be able to answer any attempt that the said

fleet shall make against this realm,

Ireland, or Scotland."

On the 15th Howard replied that the proposal to proceed to the coast of Spain was debated and decided by Drake, Hawkyns, Frobisher, and Fenner, men of the greatest experience he hopes "her Majesty will not think that we went so rashly to work, or without a principal and choice care and respect of the safety of this realm." He explains the extreme difficulty of covering Scotland, Ireland, and the Channel from a position midway between England and Spain, and the comparative ease of doing so if the fleet were on the Spanish coast: he indicates his intention of attacking the enemy if they are found at Corunna or other port in Northern Spain.

On June 19 Howard put to sea, but two days later bad weather again drove him into Plymouth. On the 22nd he received a letter from the Council cancelling the orders of June 9, which forbade the fleet moving to the coast of Spain. On the same day the Queen's ships, which had then food for only three days, completed with provisions to July 20. It is to be noted that during the whole of these operations food played the same part as does coal in the present day. The victuallers were as anxiously looked for then as the colliers are

now. The ships never had on board provisions for more than one month, and usually for a that much shorter time, so the movements of the fleet were largely dependent upon this question. Having received intelligence that enemy ships had been seen between Ushant and the Scilly Islands, Howard and Drake put to sea with their whole force on the 24th, and, after a fruitless search, finally took up a position in mid-channel, with Drake and Hawkyns in charge of squadrons towards Ushant and Scilly respectively. This vicious arrangement, which exposed the detached squadrons to be beaten in detail, was maintained until July 4, when Drake again pressed that the fleet should go to the coast of Spain, where, he argued, the Spanish fleet must then be. His reasoning was correct. The Spanish fleet, under Medina Sidonia, had left Lisbon on May 20 for a general rendezvous off the Scilly Islands. Head-winds had much impeded them, manned as they were with raw crews and with ships badly found. On June 9 stress of weather forced them into Corunna, where the bulk of them arrived much demoralised, and with crews weakened by sickness due to bad provisions and scarcity of water. Some of the ships, not being warned, held on for the rendezvous, near which they were sighted, as before related. These would probably have been captured if the English fleet had been properly provisioned and able to get to sea in time to catch

them before they rejoined their admiral.

For nearly a month the Spanish fleet had been lying in Corunna exposed to attack, when, on July 7, Drake at last overcame all opposition to his proposal. Taking advantage of a northerly wind, the whole fleet bore up for the coast of Spain. It was a great resolve; for at this time the ships had nominally provisions for only thirteen days, which meant that, if supplies could not be wrung out of hostile Spain, the risk of starvation would be serious. It was as if, under similar circumstances, ships of the present day were to start with coal for perhaps five days. The wind held favourable for two days and carried them nearly to the Spanish coast, but unfortunately then failed and chopped round to southwest. It is almost certain that had the fleet been able to stand on and make the attack, the Spanish expedition would have been annihilated. Being short of provisions, this was not possible. They were compelled to bear up for Plymouth, where the fleet arrived on the 12th-the very day on which the Armada left Corunna.

Favoured by a south-west wind, the advanced Spanish ships were off the Lizard on Friday the 19th. The news reached Plymouth the same afternoon and was quite unexpected, as no warning reports had been received from the pinnaces left on the coast of Spain or detached to get intelligence. The English fleet were shipping provisions and water, and were completely

surprised. They were as much exposed to attack as had been the Spaniards at Corunna, and if Medina Sidonia had been a seaman endowed with the insight and fiery zeal of Drake or Nelson, matters would have gone hard with them. It was as if a modern fleet had been caught in the act of coaling. The event showed the folly of surrendering the offensive-of not following the advice of Drake and attacking the enemy on his own coasts. Fortunately the English leaders fully appreciated the dangers of the situation. The ships immediately began to warp out of port, and working throughout the night the bulk of them were beating out of the Sound in the morning against the southwest wind. By noon the leading ships were near the Eddystone, and shortly sighted the enemy to the westward. By the following morning they had gained the weather-gauge.

The two fleets now in sight of each other were nearly equal in the number of fighting ships. The Spaniards were judged by Drake " to be above a hundred, many great ships, but truly, I think, not half of them menof-war." The remainder were transports and store ships, which were an impediment to manoeuvring and added to their difficulties. The English numbered from eighty to ninety sail, of which from thirty-five to forty were pinnaces and small crafts. In actual tonnage the ships of the two fleets did not differ greatly, but the English were lower in the water, more weatherly, faster, and better sea boats.