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ming) “the great objections which the court of Petersburgh made to us in the laft war, when we reclaimed the Casus Fæderis; and your Excellency will also remember the answer which their Mi. nisters gave us, when we were pressed to accede to the treaty of Petersburgh, of 1746, and we dhewed our willingness to do it upon condition, " that we should not appear upon the stage, till şi after the King of Pruslia should be attacked, and his forces
divided, that we might not, from the ficuation of our country, “ hazard our falling the first sacrifice.” Of the Sieur Funck it is said, “ that having had the question put to him at Petersburgh, $o whether his court would not take up arms, in case of a war “ with Pruffia; and having replied, that the situation of Saxony “ did not permit it to enter the lists, till its powerful neighbour “ Nould be beat out of the field, he was arlwered, That he was " in the right, that the Saxons ought to wait till the Knight was 's thrown out of the saddle.” The use made of these passages is, firit, to thew what the Saxon system really was; and secondly, to establish a belief, (for such premises will hardly enforce conviction) that the allies of Saxony did at length come into it: af. ter which follows a general inference from all the proofs which had been produced, That the court of Saxony, without having acceded to the treaty of Petersburgh in form, was not the less accomplice in the dangerous designs founded upon it; and that the said formality having been dispensed with, they had only waited for the moment, when, without running too great a risk, they might concur in effect, and share the spoils of their neighþour : in expectation of which event, it is farther afferted, that the Austrian and Saxon Ministers laboured underhand, in concert, with the more ardor to prepare the means of bringing the case of the said secret article to exilt: and the means they fo prepared, were to embroil the King irreconcileably with the Empress of Rusia, by falsely and opprobriously laying to his Majesty's charge all sorts of designs, now against Russia, and even the Empress's
own person; then upon Poland ; and, to crown all, againit Swe19. den.--Several pages are then taken up in manifesting the truth
of this fact, by a series of evidence, drawn both from the Saxon and Austrian di parches, most of which are to be found entire in the documen's : and the fruit of all is said to have been, first, a resolution of the Senate of Ruffia, of the 14th and 15th of May, 1743, in which it was laid down as a fundamental maxim of the empire, to oppose every farther aggrandisement of the King of Prullia, and to crush him by a superior force, as fçon as a favourable opportunity should occur of reducing the House of Prussia to its primitive ltate of mediocrity and secondly, a revival of this resolution in a great council Ireld in October, 1755. with this addition, To attack the King of Prusia without a!y farther discuffion, whether inat Prince thould happen to attack any of the allies of Russia, or any one of the Rufian allies should begin with him. Which advices, it is proved, were received at Drof.
den with a joy suitable to the harvest the Saxon court expected to reap in consequence of them. 101101233771
Onun But this joy, we are next given to understand, was soon damped, by the convention of a neutrality in Germany, figned
at London, Jan, 16, which, it is said, filenced Count Bruhl's calumnies, and shook his iniquitous fyftem. Fearing, however, that this blow would be followed by a worse, a reconciliation between the courts of Berlin and Petersburgh, he redoubled his efforts to prevent it; and by the laudable concurrence of the court of Vienna, with such perfect success, that the faid court, imagining, in consequence of the new connections they had entered into this year, (with France, mult be understood they had caught the opportunity to recover Silesia without obftraction, lost no time in crowding troops into Bohemia and Moravia, forming
camps, and filling magazines; while Ruffia, ar'the fame time, kept the same pace, step by step, in making valt armaments, both by sea and land, without any apparent object; the court of England, which they were pleased to make ufe of as a pretence,
not having required any fuccours. To prove, that these military s preparations were the result of a secret concert between the two
courts, formed against che Prufian dominions, which was afterwards, for certain reasons, put off till next year, a series of advices out of the dispatches of the Saxon ministers, ftutioned at Vierna and Petersburgh, are next inferted; which, it is said, go. near to a demonstration of it - But the two firft from the Sicur
Pralse, Secretary to the Saxon Embassy at Petríbuigh, prove - rather a practice of the Russian Minilters on their own Sove
reign, in order to cheat her into such a concert, than any pre" determination of hers to enter into it?" they are addressed to to
Count Bruhl. In the former, dated April 28, 1756. he fays, bow It is much desired, that, in order to favour certain vietves you 16" would be pleased to get the following intelligence conveyed to
** Petersburgh, through different channels, viz. That the King of 2000
**Prussia, under pretence of trade, 4645 fending officers and engi- Swastai
into the Ukraine, to reconnoitre the country, and ffir up a oftules rebellion. That this intelligence must not come from the court *** of Saxony, nor from Mr. Gross, the Resfian Envoy, but from Floo third hands, to the end, that this concert
' may not be perceived —And that the same commission had been given to other * Ministers, in order that this piece of news might come from 15 ** several quarters. — I have been also required to write upon this
* head, to Baron Sack in Sweden, which I Mall nor fail to do. 11.0" ---And they have affured me, that the fervice of our court was
equally concerned therein.--Adding, that the King of Pruslia, ** had given Saxony a blow, which they would feel for fifty
years; but that he should foon receive one, which he would
« feel for a hundred years.” The memorial hereto adds. That 2 Count Bruhl, who was always ready to act again!t the King, and not over nice in his choice of the means of doingis, 'promised, in
his letter of June 2, (inserted in the documents) to execute this commission : So that here the presence of a rupture was ready found. The faine Secretary Praffe also, in the second Letter, of June 2, says,
"Upon my visiting a certain Minifter, he told me, that “ he waited with impatience for the effect of the fuggested in
telligence; and he gave me to undertand, That they would not hesitate long about beginning a war against the King of
Prussia, in order to set the bonnds of the power of fo trouble“ fome a neighbour. I took the liberty to say, that I did not ** see in what ally's favour they meant to make fo great a di
version, especially after the Convention of Neutrality, figned “ between the Kings of Pruffia and England. - To which I was
answered ; Thele engagements do not concern us in the least ;
we go on our own way, in keepicg to the sense of the subg"diary treaty. The Einpress having charged the Grand Coun"cil with the care of executing this treaty, it has been thought
proper to take such measures as might be most conducive to " the glory of the Crown, and the security of our allies. He " added, That the Empress having given the Grand Council an ** unlimitted power, to act according as conjunctures should re" quire, he had made use of ir, to fasten che bell to the beast. « This was his expresiion."
And there is a third Letter, of June 21, in which the intelligence " is, That if he might judge by the preferit fituation of affairs at the court of Russia, chey would very much approve of the
of Vienna's new connections with France. - That they ** might even extend their engagements with the court of Vi
enna, so far as to support it in its attempts againit Pruflia, * which were publicly talked of at Petersburgh."
The Letters (or rather parts of letters, for they are no more) from Count Flemming, are two : both of an imperfect nature, as containing nothing but matter of inférence ; none that will, ever lo remotely, agree with so strong a term as Demonstration. The fi: ft dated. June 12, we are told, runs in these terms.
Having insensibly brought the thread of my discourse with " Count Kaunitz to the armaments of Russia. I asked him the o reason of them? And tho' this Minister did not explain him, * self upon them, yet he did not contradict me when I told “ him, that those great preparations feemed to be rather making
against the King of Prussia, than with a view to fulfill their
engagements with England. And upon this I hinted to Count “ Kauniiz, That I did not well fee how Ruffia could maintain “ such great armies out of their own treasures, if the subsidies s from England should cease, and that, therefore, the Empress
Queen must intend to make them good. Upon which he an, ** fwered me, That the money would not be grudged, provided
they knew how to make a right use of it. These were his own words And when I oblerved to him, that it was to be
&*" feared, that if that crafty and sharp-fighted Prince, fhould
happen to discover such a concert with this court, he might all of a sudden fall upons
them, he replied, that he was not very uneasy about it; that he would meet with his match; and Sady" that they were prepared at all events."
qui £«And in the second, dated July 4, he expresies himself thus: PS Count Kayserling has received a letter froin a certain Russian de Minister, which is so obscurely writien, that it is difficult to 90% judge of the sentiments of his court, as to the resolution they joa 9. will chuse to take in she present crisis. That letter is dated - " June 15, and contains in fubllance, That he would not have bon failed to let him into the connection of the present affairs, if
4. she great fecrecy, which it was agreed to observe, had not of prevented it, and laid him under a neceflity of using a file as 1. laconic as mysterious. That he did noe wonder, that he,
“ Kayferling, law before his eyes a chaos which he could not is clear up. That, for the present, he could only refer him to out the saying, fapienti fat; hoping. that, in time, both be and
“ Kaunitz might put an end to their reserve. That the treaty
between England, and Prulla had made a great alteration in .97" affairs; and that as the correspondence between England and de Pruffia still continued, he must be upon his guard with Mr.
“ Count Flemming's dispatches, continues the Memorial, are
filled with a great number of fuch passages ;-among others, he et relates that Count Kayserling had received orders, to spare neipass ther pains nor money, in order to get an exact knowlege of the Ci state of the revenues of the court of Vieona; and he assures,
that this court had remitted a million of Florins to Petersburgh.
He very often expresses his own persuasion of an etablished conare cert between the two courts of Vienna and Russia. That the < 11 latter, in order the betçer to disguise the true reasons of their wis w armaments, made them under the apparent pretence of being Quia thereby in a condition to fulfil the engagements they had con
tracted with England; and that when all the preparations Tould Now be finished, they were to fall unexpectedly upon the King of
Here is muft again be observed, that none of these dispatches Sis are given entire among the documents, and that for the regriz markable particular of the remittance from the court of Vienna, it to that of Petersburgh, no better authority is to be found than anas' the following clause, in the dispatch of M. Flemming's, next to muss be treated of, viz. "A friend of mine, who pretends to have his quibuce information from one of the Clerks of the Treasury, assures
got me, that chis court has remitted, &c. cui i Wbat enfues next in the Memorial, is, an endeavour to derive krivo that measure of proof from all circumttances combined, which
not be derived from any in one particular. And then recurs! O ring to the explanations which his Pruffian Majefty had so often
tho' in vain, laboured to extort from the court of Vienna, another dispatch of M. Flemming's, of the 28th of July, is made use of, to set the incentions of that court, with regard to Prussia, in open day-light. This dispatch, which is inserted at large in the documents, opens with a recital of M.Klinggrafe's application to Count Kaunitz, for a special audience of the Empress ; and of the address made use of by that Minister, to worm out of him, what the subject-matter of it was to be, in order to prepare her Majesty properly for it, as also to get sime fufficient to prepare a suitable answer; and then proceeds in the following terms:
" That Minister (Kaunitz) told me farther, that having set
out immediately after [his conference with Klinggrafe, that • is to fay] for Schoenbrun, he had, in bis way thither, turni« ed it in his thoughts, what answer he should advise his Sove
reign to return to M. Klinggrafe ; and that having, as he
thought, perceived, that the King of Pruilia had two objects " in view, which they meant here equally to evade, viz. To “ bring on conferences, and explanations, which might imme“ diately occafon a suspension of those measures which it was
thought neceffary to continue with vigour; aud, fecondly, "' to bring things further, and to other more effential proposals " and engagements; he had judged that the answer ought to “ be of such a nature, as entirely to elude the King of Prussia's “ demand ; and, without leaving any room for further explana" tions, should, at the same time, be firm and civil, without
being susceptible either of a finiller, or a favourable construction. Thas, agreeable to this idea, he thought it would fuf
fice, that the Empress should ansiver fimply, That in the vio" lene general crisis Europe was in, both her duty, and the dig
nity of her crown, called upon her to take sufficient measures “ for her own security, as well as for that of her friends and “ allies.”
So far the dispatch; and the inference drawn from it, in the Memorial, which is fair and warrantable, is as follows.
It plainly appears by this, that by dictating the above-mentioned answer to his Sovereign, Count Kaunitz proposed to • fhur the door against all means of explaining and conciliating
matters, and, at the same time, to pursue the preparations of • his dangerous designs, in the expectation that the King would 'be fo far provoked, as to take tome lep, which might serve
to make him pafs for the aggreffor.'
After chis, the conduct of Saxony is again resumed; and from the Saxon dispatches, it is farther manifested, that, tho' the court of Dresden had not as yet entered into the suppoled concert of Petersburgh and Vienna, they, nevertheless, put themfelves in a forwardness co fish in troubled waters. To Count Bruhl's instructions (two months before the march of the Prufians) to Count Flemming; so propose to the court of Vienna,