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ming) "the great objections which the court of Peterburgh made to us in the laft war, when we reclaimed the Cafus Fæderis; and your Excellency will alfo remember the anfwer which their Mito accede to the treaty of nifters gave us, when we were preffed to Peterburgh, of 1746, and we fhewed our willingness to do it upon condition, that we should not appear upon the stage, till
after the King of Pruffia fhould be attacked, and his forces divided, that we might not, from the fituation of our country, "hazard our falling the first facrifice." Of the Sieur Funck it is faid, "that having had the queftion put to him at Petersburgh, "whether his court would not take up arms, in cafe of a war "with Pruffia; and having replied, that the fituation of Saxony "did not permit it to enter the lifts, till its powerful neighbour "fhould be beat out of the field, he was arfwered, That he was "in the right, that the Saxons ought to wait till the Knight was "thrown out of the faddle." The ufe made of thefe paffages is, first, to fhew what the Saxon fyftem really was; and fecondly, to establish a belief, (for fuch premifes will hardly enforce conviction) that the allies of Saxony did at length come into it: after which follows a general inference from all the proofs which had been produced, That the court of Saxony, without having acceded to the treaty of Petersburgh in form, was not the lefs an accomplice in the dangerous defigns founded upon it; and that the faid formality having been difpenfed with, they had only waited for the moment, when, without running too great a rifk, they might concur in effect, and fhare the fpoils of their neighbour in expectation of which event, it is farther afferted, that the Auftrian and Saxon Ministers laboured underhand, in concert, with the more ardor to prepare the means of bringing the cafe of the faid fecret article to exift: and the means they fo prepared, were to embroil the King irreconcileably with the Emprefs of Ruffia, by falfely and opprobrioufly laying to his Majefty's charge all forts of defigns, now against Ruffia, and even the Emprefs's own perfon; then upon Poland; and, to crown all, against Sweden. Several pages are then taken up in manifefting the truth of this fact, by a feries of evidence, drawn both from the Saxon and Austrian dispatches, moft of which are to be found entire in the documents: and the fruit of all is faid to have been, firft, a refolution of the Senate of Ruffia, of the 14th and 15th of May, 1743, in which it was laid down as a fundamental maxim of the empire, to oppofe every farther aggrandifement of the King of Pruffia, and to crush him by a fuperior force, as foon as a favourable opportunity fhould occur of reducing the Houfe of Pruffia to its primitive fate of mediocrity and fecondly, a revival of this refolution in a great council held in October, 1755. with this addition, To attack the King of Prufia without any farther difcuffion, whether that Prince thould happen to attack any of the allies of Ruffia, or any one of the Ruffian allies fhould begin with him. Which advices, it is proved, were received at Dref
den with a joy fuitable to the harveft the Saxon court expected to reap in confequence of them.
But this joy, we are next given to understand, was soon damped, by the convention of a neutrality in Germany, figned at London, Jan. 16, which, it is faid, filenced Count Bruhl's calumnies, and fhook his iniquitous fyftem. Fearing, however, that this blow would be followed by a worse, a reconciliation between the courts of Berlin and Petersburgh, he redoubled his efforts to prevent it; and by the laudable concurrence of the court of Vienna, with fuch perfect fuccefs, that the faid court, imagining, in confequence of the new connections they had entered into this year, [with France, muit be underflood] they had caught the opportunity to recover Silefia without obftruction, loft no time in crowding troops into Bohemia and Moravia, forming camps, and filling magazinės; while Ruffia, at the fame time, kept the fame pace, ftep by step, in making vaft armaments, both by fea and land, without any apparent object; the court of England, which they were pleafed to make ufe of as a pretence, not having required any fuccours. To prove, that thefe military preparations were the refult of a fecret concert between the two courts, formed against the Pruffian dominions, which was afterwards, for certain reafons, put off till next year, a series of advices out of the difpatches of the Saxon minifters, ftitioned at Vienna and Petersburgh, are next inferted; which, it is faid, go. near to a demonstration of it -But the two firft from the Sicur Praffe, Secretary to the Saxon Embaffy at Petersburgh, prove rather a practice of the Ruffian Minitters on their own Sovereign, in order to cheat her into fuch a concert, than any predetermination of hers to enter into it: they are addreffed to Count Bruhl. In the former, dated April 28, 1756. he fays, It is much defired, that, in order to favour certain views, you would be pleafed to get the following intelligence conveyed to Peterburgh, through different channels, viz. That the King of Prufia, under pretence of trade, as fending officers and engineers into the Ukraine, to reconnoitre the country, and fir up a rebellion. That this intelligence mult not come from the court "of Saxony, nor from Mr. Grofs, the Ruffian Envoy, but from
third hands, to the end, that this concert may not be perceiv"ed —And that the fame commiffion had been given to other "Minifters, in order that this piece of news might come from
feveral quarters.-I have been alfo required to write upon head, to Baron Sack in Sweden, which I shall not fail to do. "And they have affured me, that the fervice of our court was equally concerned therein.-Adding, that the King of Pruffia, **had given Saxony a blow, which they would feel for fifty years; but that he should foon receive one, which he would feel for a hundred years." The memorial bereto adds. That Count Bruhl, who was always ready to act against the King, and 'not over nice in his choice of the means of doing it, promiled, in
his letter of June 2, (inferted in the documents) to execute this commiffion: So that here the pretence of a rupture was ready found. The fame Secretary Praffe alfo, in the fecond Letter, of June 2, fays,
"Upon my vifiting a certain Minifter, he told me, that "he waited with impatience for the effect of the fuggefted intelligence; and he gave me to understand, That they would not hefitate long about beginning a war against the King of "Pruffia, in order to fet the bounds of the power of fo trouble"fome a neighbour. I took the liberty to fay, that I did not fee in what ally's favour they meant to make fo great a diverfion, especially after the Convention of Neutrality, figned "between the Kings of Pruffia and England.To which I was anfwered; Thele engagements do not concern us in the leaft; we go on our own way, in keeping to the fenfe of the fubfi"diary treaty. The Emprefs having charged the Grand Council with the care of executing this treaty, it has been thought proper to take fuch meafures as might be moft conducive to "the glory of the Crown, and the fecurity of our allies." He "added, That the Emprefs having given the Grand Council an unlimitted power, to act according as conjunctures fhould re"quire, he had made ufe of it, to faften the bell to the beast. "This was his expreffion.'
And there is a third Letter, of June 21, in which the intelligence is, That if he might judge by the prefent fituation of affairs at the court of Ruffia, they would very much approve of the court of Vienna's new connections with France. That they .. might even extend their engagements with the court of Vienna, fo far as to fupport it in its attempts against Prussia, "which were publicly talked of at Petersburgh."
The Letters (or rather parts of letters, for they are no more) from Count Flemming, are two: both of an imperfect nature, as containing nothing but matter of inference; none that will, ever fo remotely, agree with fo ftrong a term as Demonstration. The fift dated June 12, we are told, runs in these terms.
Having infenfibly brought the thread of my difcourfe with "Count Kaunitz to the armaments of Ruffia. I asked him the " reason of them? And tho' this Minifter did not explain himfelf upon them, yet he did not contradict me when I told him, that thofe great preparations feemed to be rather making against the King of Pruffia, than with a view to fulfill their engagements with England. And upon this I hinted to Count Kaunitz, That I did not well fee how Ruffia could maintain fuch great armies out of their own treasures, if the fubfidies from England fhould ceafe; and that, therefore, the Empress"Queen muft intend to make them good. Upon which he anfwered me, That the money would not be grudged, provided they knew how to make a right ufe of it. Thefe were his own words. And when I oblerved to him, that it was to be "fear
feared, that if that crafty and fharp-fighted Prince, fhould happen to difcover fuch a concert with this court, he might all of a fudden fall them; he replied, that he was not very uneafy about it; that he would meet with his match; and "that they were prepared at all events."
- E-And in the fecond, dated July 4, he expreffes himself thus: Count Kayferling has received a letter from a certain Ruffian Minifter, which is fo obfcurely written, that it is difficult to judge of the fentiments of his court, as to the refolution they Jon will chufe to take in the prefent crifi. That letter is dated th June 15, and contains in fubilance, That he would not have bo "failed to let him into the connection of the prefent affairs, if zw the great fecrecy, which it was agreed to obferve, had not prevented it, and laid him under a neceflity of ufing a file as laconic as myfterious.-That he did not wonder, that he, "Kayferling, faw before his eyes a chaos which he could not clear up. That, for the prefent, he could only refer him to the faying, fapienti fat; hoping, that, in time, both he and "Kaunitz might put an end to their referve. That the treaty " between England, and Pruffia had made a great alteration in 9. affairs; and that as the correfpondence between England and Pruffia ftill continued, he must be upon his guard with Mr.
"Count Flemming's difpatches, continues the Memorial, are CT filled with a great number of fuch paffages-among others, he Sit relates that Count Kayferling had received orders, to fpare neiYother pains nor money, in order to get an exact knowlege of the ftate of the revenues of the court of Vienna; and he affures, that this court had remitted a million of Florins to Petersburgh. He very often expreffes his own perfuafion of an established confore, cert between the two courts of Vienna and Ruffia. That the latter, in order the better to difguife the true reafons of their armaments, made them under the apparent pretence of being thereby in a condition to fulfil the engagements they had contracted with England; and that when all the preparations should w be finished, they were to fall unexpectedly upon the King of 91 Pruffia "
Here it muft be obferved, that none of these dispatches 5 Tare given entire among the documents; and that for the regrimarkable particular of the remittance from the court of Vienna, to that of Petersburgh, no better authority is to be found than anas the following claufe, in the difpatch of M. Flemming's, next to MILJE be treated of, viz. "A friend of mine, who pretends to have his paibide information from one of the Clerks of the Treasury, affures mangat me, that this court has remitted," &c.
What enfues next in the Memorial, is, an endeavour to derive babve that meafure of proof from all circumstances combined, which could not be derived from any in one particular. And then recurof aring to the explanations which his Pruffian Majefty had fo often
tho' in vain, laboured to extort from the court of Vienna, another difpatch of M. Flemming's, of the 28th of July, is made ufe of, to fet the intentions of that court, with regard to Pruffia, in open day-light. This difpatch, which is inferted at large in the documents, opens with a recital of M. Klinggrafe's application to Count Kaunitz, for a fpecial audience of the Emprefs; and of the addrefs made ufe of by that Minifter, to worm out of him, what the fubject-matter of it was to be, in order to prepare her Majefty properly for it, as alfo to get time fufficient to prepare a fuitable anfwer; and then proceeds in the following
"That Minifter (Kaunitz) told me farther, that having fet "out immediately after [his conference with Klinggrafe, that is to fay] for Schoenbrun, he had, in his way thither, turn"ed it in his thoughts, what answer he should advife his Sovereign to return to M. Klinggrafe; and that having, as he thought, perceived, that the King of Pruffia had two objects "in view, which they meant here equally to evade, viz. To "bring on conferences, and explanations, which might immediately occafion a fufpenfion of those measures which it was "thought neceffary to continue with vigour; aud, fecondly,
to bring things further, and to other more effential proposals "and engagements; he had judged that the anfwer ought to "be of fuch a nature, as entirely to elude the King of Pruffia's "demand; and, without leaving any room for further explana"tions, fhould, at the fame time, be firm and civil, without being fufceptible either of a finifter, or a favourable conftrucThat, agreeable to this idea, he thought it would fuffice, that the Empress should anfwer fimply, That in the vio"lent general crifis Europe was in, both her duty, and the dig
nity of her crown, called upon her to take fufficient meafures "for her own fecurity, as well as for that of her friends and "allies."
So far the difpatch; and the inference drawn from it, in the Memorial, which is fair and warrantable, is as follows.
It plainly appears by this, that by dictating the above-men⚫tioned answer to his Sovereign, Count Kaunitz proposed to fhut the door against all means of explaining and conciliating matters, and, at the fame time, to purfue the preparations of ⚫ his dangerous defigns, in the expectation that the King would ⚫ be fo far provoked, as to take fome ftep, which might ferve to make him pafs for the aggreffor."
After this, the conduct of Saxony is again refumed; and from the Saxon dispatches, it is farther manifefted, that, tho' the court of Drefden had not as yet entered into the supposed concert of Petersburgh and Vienna, they, nevertheless, put themfelves in a forwardnefs to fish in troubled waters. To prove this, Count Bruhl's inftructions (two months before the march of the Prafians) to Count Flemming, to propofe to the court of Vienna,