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him, if poflible :

-Intimates, that if the Empire were to lose in him the most powerful Protestant Prince, and the firmeft support of the German Liberries, the project would be revived which gave occasion to the thirty years war ; the undertakers of which would promise themselves so much the more easily to fubdue the German Empire: in which cafe, all the laws, civil and ecclefiaftical, which the States had purchased with their lives and for. tunes, would be trampled under foot. Lastly, the King endeavours to induce them to make his case their own ; to convince them, that their ruin is included in his; and to animate them to become his auxiliaries : promising thein, upon all occasions, an effectual aflittance for the support of their liberty, and every right lawfully obtained, which the Aulic Council, too often, tròd under foot.-- Protesting next, in the frongeft and most folemn manner, against every thing contained in the said Commisforial Decree, injurious to him; and finally reserving to himself, in like manner, his rights and liberties, as well as the just satisfac. tion which a Crowned Head, and an eminent Elector of the Empire, was entitled to demand, according to the Law of Na'ions, and the fundamental Constitutions of the Empire, from a Council which has shewn so little regard for his dignity, at the Diet of Ratisbon.

The third and fourth Parts of this state-collection are of a pature and tendency fo fimilar to each other, that both might very easily have been run into one: and, indeed, if one general face had been deduced from the whole, the whole would have been more perspicuous, and the process more fatisfactory ; the repetitions they now abound with, lerving as mucn to perplex fome Readers, as to inform others; and having an obvious tendency to disguft, in some degree, all. It is true, the cabinets of . Princes are very rarely thus exposed; so that a very small degree of curiosity, will bring numbers to inspect the contents, and to far, at leaft, the Pruffian cause will be undoubtedly served by any Exposition, of any kind. But, if the public, from this fpecimen, should happen to infer, that all cabinets, as well as all families, may possibly have their secrets, which would as ill bear day light; the reputation of Kings and Ministers, and the reverence to be observed with regard to the mysteries of State, will be but little advanced by it. Leaving, however, to Sove. reigns, those considerations which properly belong to them, we shall content ourselves, with treating thefe other two papers in tuch a way as appears to us leaft open to the objections which lie against the papers themselves.

The first is called, A Memorial in vindication of the King of Pruffia's conduft, from the false imputations of the Court of Saxony.

And the last, A Memorial, setting forth the conluet of the Courts of Vienna and Saxony torwards the King of Prussia, and their dan. gerous designs against him; rogether with the original documents in proof of them. Rsv. Dec. 1756. Tt


The introductory paragraph to the first of these, maintains, “That the King of Pruffia's motives of action were not of such a nature as required darkness rather than light; but that his Majesty, in tenderneis to a Prince, whom he did not defire to treat as an enemy, had only hinted these motives in the declaration he publithed upon his entrance into Saxony : flattering himself, that by reCalling the remembrance of pall times, and insinuating his apprehenfions for the su ure, the Saxon. court would have perceived of itself, that his Majetty was well iníormed of all its fecret machinations; consequently, inilead of oppofing his measures, would rather have found it their wifeit courte jo have endeavoured to co nperate with him in carrying them into execution :--Adding, that the resistance of that court, the ladie colours they had laid

on his conduct, and the calumnies they had raised, had obliged i him to enter into details he would have been glad to suppress,

for the sake of convincing all Europe, he had done nothing buc what found policy, reason, and justice itself had dictated.'

This icrves to account, in fome weasure, for the dead filence observed in the exposition of his Ni jelly's motives with regard to Saxony; and to obviare a doubt which might otherwise have arisen, that his Majelly had tiruck his bluw fist, and had afterwards, by the dint of iearch and re-fearch, discovered the Saxon provocations.

What immediately follows, is a charge of ingratitude against the court of Saxony, før having so foon forgot the obligations they acknowleged in the trčaty of Dzelden ; a repetition of that other charge, already recited, concerning the concert for dividing the Pruffian dominions, together with a se specification of what was to be the Saxon share of tliein ; a pretty Itrong invective against Count Brubl, for proposing it as ihe price of his master's friendShip to every power that made application for it; a reference to a lecter from Count Rutowi:i to alarshal Brown, relatiog to the prefent circumliances, which accidentally fell into the King's hands ; Count Fleming's negotiations at Vienna, as proofs that a secret concert was forming between the two courts : assertion

upon affertion, that the King was able to support all he had alleged by au hentic vouchers, then in his hands; and an appeal to the impartial world, whether his Majesty, thus provoked and endangered, could, or ought to, have done les for his own preservation.-So far, then, it must be underttood, the memorial turns upon what preceded his Majelly's entrance into Saxony; ard if he had fulficient reasons, to warrant that ttep before he rook it, it is farther said, that he met with abundant corroboratives afterwards--Such as the magazines which had been long forming, and by which the Saxon troops were then subfilted; the resolution taken by the King of Poland to put himself at the head of his army, and to post himself in such a manner as might belt facilitate his junction with the Auftrian army; and the discovery of a road laiely cut through the mountains of Bohe


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mia, and marked at certain distances with posts, bearing this remarkable inscription, The Military Road.

The remaining topics are all, or most of them, such as have been touched upon before. ---As, the insufficience and infecu. rity of the Saxon offer of neutrality; the neceflity of difarming so determined and so insidious an enemy; his Majesty's extreme

sensibility of the King of Poland's situation; afcriptions of it to the is pernicious councils of Count Bruh!; the faldhood of the reports

Ipread by that Minister concerning the excelles committed by the Pruffians; "the sufferings of the Saxons; the indignities said to be offered to the Queen ; the removal of the Archives, &c. And in the close, the King avows, That he has no defign againit the King of Poland, or his dominions; that he lays no claims, pretends to no acquisitions, no, not of an inch of ground there; and that tho' it be true, that the proceedings of the Saxon court gave his Majesty an indisputable right to deal quite otherwise with him, he would, nevertheless, perfil firmly in his resolution of restoring the King of Poland to the full and peaceable posielsion of all his dominions, as soon as it could be done without endangering his own.

We are now come to the fourth and last of these pieces, which,

it must be owned, belong rather to the political than the literary 3.1 province; but which muit, nevertheless, have a place in the read.

ing of the times.--And herein we are nct only furnished with the same course of facts, positions, arguments, and conclusions, made current through such a variety of channels before ; but also with a series of vouchers, drawn from originals, now refting in

his Prussian Majesty's custody, to support them; fo introduced, for arranged, and commented upon, at first, as may best serve the

Prussian cause; but afterwards annexed at large, for the common use of the common world.

The eventual treaty of partition between the courts of Vienna and Dresden, of May the 18th, 1745, is given as the basis of

the whole building ;--and it is said, the treaty of Dresden, of Dec. 525, the same year, was, perhaps, but a few days old, before the 1-4 court of Vienna made no scruple to propose to that of Saxony, a a new treaty of alliance, in which the contra&ing parties were likewise to renew the said treaty

of f eventual partition : which fact, it is also said, can be proved by the very draught of it then de: livered at Dresden ;--and this proposal, it seems, the Saxon ministry did not decline, but only demurred to; thinking it would better consolidate their plan, if they could act under the countenance of a defensive alliance between the two courts of Vienna and Petersburgh.--This, however, is no otherwise proved!, than by the specification of such a treaty, which did atually take place on the 22d of May, 1745, following. The body, or ostensible part of this creaty, is also admitted to be innocent enough for public inspection; being calculated only to serve as a fkreen for fix secret articles, of which the fourth was levelled fingly again Ti 2


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Prussia, as by the article itself, inserted among the vouchers or documents, is apparent for though the Empreis-Queen sets out with a protestation, that she will religiously observe che treaty of Dresderi, fie afterwards explains how little religion would serve for such a purpose, viz. -" If the King of Prutia should be the " first to depart from this peace, by attacking either her Majesty " the Empress Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, or her Majesty " the Empress of Ruflia, or even the republic of Poland, in all " which cafes the rights of her Majesty the Emprefs-Queen to Si. "lefia, and the county of Glatz, would again take place, and re

their full effe&, the two contracting parties shall mutually * aflilt each other, with a body of 60,000 men, to reconquer

Silesia, &c.” The observations made upon this article are, That there were the titles of which the Empress-Queen proposed to avail herself, for the recovery of Silesia :--that every war, in which Prussia could be concerned with Ruflia or Poland, was to be deemed an infraction of the treaty of Dresden, though neitherof those powers had any concern in that treaty; and though the latter was not even in alliance with the court of Vienna :--that by comparing the conduct of that court with this article, from jis date, it is very visible, she thought to attain her end, either by provoking the King to commence a war againIt her, or by kindling one between his Majesty, or one of the other two bé. fore mentioned powers, by her secret intrigues and machinations : and that, consequently, it was no wonder, that the treaty of Petersburgh has ever since been the hinge on which the Auftrian politics have turned; or that their negociations have been principally directed to ftrengthen it by the accession of other Powers.

The icts next advanced are, That the court of Saxony was the first power invited into it: that this invitation was made in the beginning of the year 1747, and that the said court eagerly accepted the invitatioa: as appeared by their furnishing Count de Vicedom, and the Sieur Pezold, their Ministers at Peterburgh, with the necessary full powers for that purpose; by ordering them to deciare, that their court was not only ready to accede to the treaty itself, but also to the secret article against Pruflia, and to join in the arrangement made by the two crowns; provided meaTures were better taken than before, as well for the security and defence of Saxony, as for its indemnification and recompence, in proportion to the effort and progress which hould be made by farther specifying, that if, upon any fresh attack from the King of Prusia, the Empress Queen should, by their affistance, happen not only to reconquer Silesia, and the county of Glatz, bat also reduce him within narrow bounds,--the King of Poland, as Elector of Saxony, wouid stand to the partition flipulated between his Polih Majesty and the Empress Queen, by the convention signed at Leipsic, May 18, 1745: and by charging Count Lofs, the Saxon Minister at Vienna, at the same time, to open a private negotiation for an eventual partition of the conquelts which should


be made on Prussia, by laying down, as the basis of it, the faid partition-treaty of Leipfic. The particulars of all which are to be seen in the documents annexed; that is to say, in the inttructions given, May 23, 1747, to the Saxon Ministers at Petersburgh; in the memorial accordingly delivered by those Ministers to the Russian court, Sept. 2j, 1747 ; and in the instructions given to Count Lors, at Vienna, Dec. 21, 2747.

The memorial then proceeds in these words : “ It has, indeed, .“ been affectedly fupposed, throughout this negotiation, that the “ King would be the aggreffor against the court of Vienna. But '" what right can the King of Poland draw from thence to make

conquetts upon the King? Or, if his Polith Majesty, in the *** quality of an auxiliary, will also become a belligerant party, ** it cannot be taken amiss, that his Majesty should treat him ac

cordingly, and regulate his conduct by that of Saxony. This >s is a truth which has been acknowleged even by the King of * Poland's own privy council, in the opinion they gave when " consulted upon the acccllion to the treaty of Petersburgh ; wit. "ness the two extracts, (also added to the documents) wherein the " said privy council gave the King to undertland, That the prin* ciple laid down in the fourth secret article of the treaty of “ Petersburgh, went beyond the common rules : and that if ** his Polith Majesty should approve of it, by acceding thereto, his Prullian Majesty might look upon it as a violation of the *** treaty of Dresden."

What follows next, is a course of Saxor artifices, to keep the negotiation in hand, without putting the lalt hand to it : At Paris, declaring, folemnly, the treaty of Petersburgh contained nothing more than was in the German copy, which had been communicared to the court of Frence; no secret or separate article having been communicated to the King of Poland: At Petersburgh, profesling always a readiness to accede in form to the faid treaty; but always finding some pretence to postpone it.-Thus, when invited afresh in the year 1751, they sent powers and instructions to the Sieur Funck at Petersburgh accordingly; but withal required, that the King of England, as Elector of Hanover, should be in duced to accede firit.-And when his Britannic Majesty declined all concern in that mystery of iniquity, recommended another alliance, of a nature innocent enough to bear being produced and avowed:-Retaining, neverthelets, their original purpose, to put in for a share of the Prussian spoils, whenever the proper opportunity should offer. In proof of which several clauses out of the Saxon dispatches are produced. " But then it is not unfit to be observed by the way, that neither the dispatch of June 16, 1756, from Count Flemming, the Saxon Minister at Vienna, to Count Bruhl, nor that of the Sieur Funck at Petersburgh, of June, 1753, {it is in this order they are ranged in the memorial] out of which the two following clauses are laid to be taken, arc annexed to the documents." Your Excellency knows," (lays Count Flem.



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