and the same clear Instructions. The majority show, however, that the original idea of the voyage is understood. One is particularly incoherent, wandering, and vague; it is next to impossible to conclude, with certainty, what is meant. He assumes intentions at variance with the express intent of the voyage, and gives for the Expedition a most improbable position, a position in direct violation of its orders; still he looks west, not north. There are three who are really Arctic authorities, whose opinions are founded on a simple interpretation of Sections 5 and 6 of Franklin's Instructions; and there is also another, whose general views are sound as to the space to which the ships were sent, and particularly in his opinion as to their position; but he looks on other and irrelevant matter, which weakens and detracts from his otherwise sound arguments. One passes over altogether, without notice, the object and direction of the Expedition, and looks to the north alone; he would extend the search in an improbable direction, and to a perplexing extent, only on talked-of "intentions," casually expressed by Sir John Franklin before his departure. There is yet another. He advocates a search in a doubtful direction; he asserts and re-asserts the soundness of his views; at last believes them to be facts, and argues from them as though they were so; still their locality, though doubtful, is in the south, and the north is unthought of. Thus do they vary, and yet Franklin is as yet unsought for. His movements, beyond his orders, are wholly unknown.

The sum of these plans and opinions amounts to this; that while the majority of the distinguished men we have so fully quoted leave not a doubt as to the clearness and intent of the Instructions given to Franklin for his guidance, there are two who speak of Franklin having "intentions" beside them; in fact, in complete opposition to them. Whether these supposed intentions have or may influence the direction of the efforts of the after searching squadrons-may draw them from the true direction of search (so clearly given in Sections. 5 and 6) will be seen in the sequel; for ourselves, we have ever considered that Sir John Franklin would deem his Instructions absolute. Whatever private views he might have, whatever his wishes or intentions, he would make his opinions subordinate to the manifest tenor and spirit of his orders. This was his duty, and, because his duty, with him paramount to every consideration of private feeling. It will be observed, that even in the opinions advocating a search by the south and west, they vary in many points; this surprises us, because the space included between 70° and 74° N., and 98° and 115° W.,

was altogether unknown; it might be navigable water. If conjecture must be called in, why not have assumed a progress for the Expedition in the obvious direction to which the Instructions tended, rather than to other and less probable ones, involving, as we see, many points of difference? Again, there seems a feeling that the Expedition had attained large westing, which can only be accounted for by its continued absence, the known daring and perseverance of the navigators, and the imaginary freedom with which it was thought the Arctic seas could be navigated; for of positive information there was none: the fact is, conjecture was beginning to run wild. As to the north, while its advocates were equally destitute of all intelligence, they built up a theory of assumed intentions, unsupported by a single fact, that called aside and diverted attention from the Instructions, if it did no worse; but in attributing intentions foreign to his orders, they indirectly, but literally, involve the gallant Franklin in the grave charge of disobeying them, thus rendering him open to animadversion from any and every malicious or slanderous quarter,-thus doing a positive injury, as far as they are concerned, to this great man's name, unjust and perhaps irreparable!

An extract from a letter (dated York Factory, Aug. 28th, 1848) * from Mr. Hargreave to A. Barclay, Esq., Secretary of the Hudson's Bay Company, may be noticed here: "I may mention, as a rumour possessing some interest, that in a private communication of March 1st from Mr. M'Pherson, of Mackenzie River District, he says:There is a report from Peel's River that the Esquimaux saw two large boats (query, ships ?) to the eastward of the Mackenzie, full of white men, and they (the Esquimaux) showed knives, files, &c., to the Peel's River Indians, which they had received from these white men. Could these have been Franklin or Rae ?' He adds: 'Rae never left the southern point of Committee Bay,' and 'Indian information is proverbial for its inaccuracy and exaggeration."" This report seems to have the same source as that given by Mr. Peers (ante, p. 73). There is an appearance of truth about it. The articles given by the white men are specified, and indicate facts: we shall refer to them again.

Thus closed the year 1848. Many and various were the reports and rumours as to the movements and the fortunes of the Franklin Expedition, but not a single fact regarding it had reached England up to this time, since it parted from the whalers in Baffin's Bay. All plans and suggestions then, if not based on the Instructions issued for its guidance, were purely speculative-purely ideal.

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 188, " Arctic Expedition, 1849," p. 9.

90

CHAPTER VI.

INTELLIGENCE FROM SIR J. C. ROSS-OPINIONS

NORTH STAR" SAILS-LIEUT. S. OSBORN-REWARDS-DR. M'CORMICK-SIR JOHN RICHARDSON-SIR JOHN ROSS-POND'S BAY REPORT-SIR J. C. ROSS RETURNS-SIR JOHN RICHARDSON ARRIVES-DR. RAE-SIR F. BEAUFORT-PROPOSED EXPEDITION BY BEHRING'S STRAITOPINIONS-HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY-MR. CHRISTOPHER-CAPT. PENNY-BEHRING'S STRAIT-1849 CLOSES.

1849. THE year opened: anxiety betrayed her presence.

The Admiralty, having received intelligence from Sir James Ross (dated July 12th, 1848), from which they were led to infer that the Investigator, Captain Bird, would be sent to England in the summer of 1849, in which case the Enterprise would be left to prosecute the search alone; and this being considered unadvisable, not only as being unsafe but as likely to frustrate the objects of the expedition, various Arctic officers, &c., were consulted, and subsequently a meetting took place (January 17th, 1849).* In the end, it was resolved the North Star should be laden with provisions, and sent to Barrow's Strait, under the command of Mr. Saunders, Master, R.N. The North Star sailed May 16th, 1849. Mr. Saunders's orders were to proceed to Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait, and endeavour to intercept the Investigator; failing to do so, he was to make for Whaler Point, Port Leopold, but should that point prove inaccessible on account of the ice, he was to leave notice there where he would land the provisions, &c., on the south side of Lancaster Sound. As some of these opinions embrace the line of search to be adopted for the recovery of the unfortunate Franklin, we shall notice them; they go partly to show the ideas prevailing at this period.

Sir George Back "is of opinion that Sir James Ross . . should be left entirely to his own well known intelligence and discretion, nothing doubting that he will thoroughly explore the Wellington Channel, and other northern passages from Barrow's Strait."

Captain Beechey (January 12th, 1849) says:-"It can hardly be expected that full and efficient examination of every port in search of our forlorn countrymen can be made even by the two vessels there; such a search, I mean, as would alone satisfy this country, and in the lamentable event of hearing no more of the parties, would enable us to lay our heads on our pillows with the inward satisfaction of knowing that we had done all that humanity could suggest, and all

*Parliamentary Papers, No. 188 II., "Arctic Expedition," pp. 1-10.

.

that a great nation, jealous of the lives of its subjects, could possibly have accomplished. Wellington Inlet, Bathurst Inlet, and Regent's Inlet, have all to be examined, in addition to the other routes contemplated by Sir James Ross. Matters have arrived at such a crisis that merely sailing up and down an inlet will not satisfy us; a rigid, minute search of the shore must be made in boats from the ships; the hills must be ascended, the points and headlands examined, for traces of the objects of their search. .. I am informed by Sir John Franklin's nearest connections, that he placed much reliance on Wellington Inlet. . . It ought to be minutely examined, and traced to its head, as far as the ice will permit with safety."

Col. Sabine (January 9th, 1819):-" If Franklin has taken the south-westerly route after passing through the Strait (Barrow's), and has persevered in that course, we shall either hear of him on the side of Behring's Strait, or either Ross or Richardson will surely come upon his traces. . Circumstances may be different, however, if, failing in the south-west, he returned, . to make trial of Wellington Channel. . If that channel be, as it appeared to me, a continuation of the deep and open sea which we found in Barrow's Strait, and if it conduct into an open sea, it may be far more difficult to determine the direction which Franklin may have taken, or to conjecture, otherwise than on the spot, the most eligible course by which he may be followed. It is to this quarter, therefore, that one's thoughts are naturally directed. Supposing that there should appear to be no probability that Franklin has taken that direction (Wellington Channel), they might authorize examine the sounds at the head of Baffin's Bay. Franklin's declared intention, if he failed in one channel to attempt another, and not to desist, if possible, till he had tried all.. . . The search of the sounds referred to, even if unsuccessful, in the absence of more promising traces elsewhere, would be satisfactory."

him to

It was

Capt. Sir Edward Belcher (January 8th, 1849):-" It appears very clear to my mind, that Sir John Franklin could not have adopted the opening to the south-west of Melville Island, for two reasons; -first, because he would have fallen in with Esquimaux, who seem to abound about lat. 70° or 72°; secondly, from the tenor of the remarks of Capt. Parry, it is not probable that he would be able to penetrate the frozen barrier there noticed. . If Sir John Franklin has met with the difficulty noticed in the voyage of Parry in 1819, he will of necessity have sought for a more northern And if he succeeded, I think that the probabilities are

route.

in favour of his safety until he reached the Arctic Circle; there he would be reduced to the necessity of following any open channels which offered southerly, and they may have led him to the northward of Asia, whence I have some slight suspicion that he will eventually emerge."

These opinions, it will be seen, are all founded on the word “if; all on the assumption of failure to the south and west from Cape Walker, and we might so dismiss them; but we cannot, without remarking the little mention that is made of the direction in which the Franklin Expedition was really sent.

Sir George Back is particularly in favour of exploring the northern passage from Barrow's Strait; we would he had given his reasons. Capt. Beechey feelingly describes how the search should be conducted, and names Wellington Channel; but it would seem, only from what he has heard of the stress laid upon it by Franklin himself. We cannot conceive Franklin as likely to have been very greatly influenced by the Wellington Channel route. There is little doubt he was consulted in the drawing up of his own Instructions; and had he given that channel a preference, he would have made it the primary object of his Instructions, and Melville Sound the secondary point for the solution of the question. Melville Sound was made primary, and this is the best proof that Wellington Channel did not possess that paramount influence over Franklin it is said to have done. Let any one consult Parry's chart (1819-20), and he will soon be convinced which offered the more favourable prospect "for the Passage," Wellington Channel, without defined limits, or the limited area of Melville Sound:-he may have spoken of it casually, but nothing more.

Colonel Sabine takes a general view of the tenor of Franklin's Instructions, but he betrays an evident bias in favour of the northern passages. Why his thoughts should be "naturally" directed to the Wellington Channel we cannot conceive; we should rather have thought they would have been more naturally directed to Cape Walker and the south-west, until information had been received that Franklin had altogether failed in that quarter. But Franklin's "declared intentions," and "the great Sound at the head of Baffin's Bay," exert a superlative influence over him; and they must be searched prior to the direction in which the Franklin Expedition was ordered.

Sir Edward Belcher gives two reasons for thinking Sir John Franklin "could not have adopted the opening south-west of Melville Island" (i. e., between it and Banks' Land); we can give one more