CHAPTER X. AUSTIN AND PENNY EXPEDITION. REPORT OF COMMITTEE. THEIR QUESTIONS TO SCORESBY, AUSTIN, KELLETT, OMMANEY, SIR JOHN RICHARDSON, PENNY, AND STEWART, AND REPLIES.— RETURN OF SIR JOHN ROSS. REMARKS. OPINIONS. HIS REPORTS AND IN going over the evidence before the Committee, we notice with surprise the manifold and varied nature of the impressions and opi nions of the various officers of both Expeditions, as to the motives, condition, and movements of Franklin after he left Beechey Island; the slender ground on which they are formed shows them to be evidently more the ebullitions of hasty fancy, than the serious conclusions of well-weighed reflection. We would give them here, but they would swell our pages beyond the limits intended, and would conduce to nothing conclusive. We may say the majority are in favour of the Wellington Channel, as the route adopted by Sir John Franklin. Some few think the Erebus and Terror, with their officers and crews, all perished in returning; but there is not a single opinion in favour of a farther search south-west of Cape Walker. The direction in which the Franklin Expedition was sent was henceforth to be left again to its own dreary solitude. The Expedition under Austin and Penny returned, but dissatisfaction reigned on all sides; no positive conclusions could be drawn, and why? These enterprising men, having failed to discover farther indications of the course of the missing Expedition after it left Beechey Island, all was again left to prejudice or conjecture. The alienated feeling between the commanders did not tend to clear the sad mystery enveloping the fate of Franklin and his devoted officers and All this was deeply to be deplored, and the more so, as each had done more to achieve the recovery of the missing Expedition, now absent six years, than had been done during all that long period of painful doubt and anxiety. All was now uncertainty; failure on every side; the Plan forgotten, and the Instructions left. These deserted-without fixed rendezvous for the Franklin Expedition to fall back upon, and where it might be sought men's minds wandered crews. in darkness; the delay in searching, the long absence, the want of success, all contributed to give rise to new thoughts-thoughts fevered with anxiety or enthusiasm. Can we wonder then, that, amongst the rest, the most absurd intentions should be attributed to Sir John Franklin, amounting to little short of an absolute dereliction of his Instructions? or be surprised at the monstrous plans and the visionary schemes that sprang up, followed by villainous reports and lying rumours? To these, add the deep anxieties and the depressing cares, "the foreboding fancies and prophetic tears" of the solitary hearths at home. All these tended, in the end, to so complicate and confuse, that thought-distracted from the original Plan and Instructions in her search after truth, finding no resting place in the chaos thus created-became herself wild, imaginative, and ungovernable. Knowing this, we cannot greatly wonder that these persevering commanders should have become perplexed, and that the conclusions drawn by them should have had no other foundation than mere conjecture-conjecture it was, for there was not a particle of evidence to sustain either opinion. Penny, ardent and persevering while undergoing the labours and discomforts of the search, disappointed in his humane object became, shall we say it? susceptible, flighty, and peevish, alike painful to himself and his kind-hearted co-operator. Austin-equally zealous and alike disappointed, but having his feelings more under command, more disciplined-did not show their pressure outwardly, but still his mind was ill at ease, his responsibilities were great, and, as a naval officer, he was more amenable to the Admiralty. It became him, whatever the ideas, and however suggested by experience, "if they had no tangible relation whatever to the missing ships," to reject them. But, as we have said, chaos prevailed, and minds were darkened; not alone those who had little claim to the knowledge of Arctic matters, but also others more profound, and of high scientific acquirements-all seemed under a cloud, or how can we imagine an Austin coming to the conclusion "that the Expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the object of its mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Strait?"† when as yet he had only examined a small portion of that space to which the Franklin Expedition was so specially directed. It could only have arisen on the assumption that, if not discovered to the eastward of 103° West (as far as they had searched), he must have ** See Dr. Sutherland's "Journal of Penny's Voyage," p. 305. made large westing along the southern shores of the Parry group, and must be looked for at Melville Island; and if not there—and both had been searched in vain-hence must come the conclusion, that he could not have gone to the southward and westward; but the intermediate gap or space of about 12° of longitude (= 216 miles) seems to have been forgotten, or the question would have suggested itself, May he not be locked up in the ice, and helpless to the south-west, between 73° or 74° North and about 110° West? Again, Penny's opinion that he went up Wellington Channel and on to the north-west, arose, no doubt, from his discovery of the navigable sea to the north-west of that channel, and the prevailing mania in favour of it, already so often abjured in these pages. Again, the laudable but erratic anxiety to be doing something under the anguish of disappointment, and yet, being without any positive evidence or trace to direct him to the missing ones, he fears the responsibility. The general conclusions then drawn were, that Franklin did not prosecute the object of his voyage to the south-west, the west, or the north-west. In what direction, then, did he steer, after leaving Beechey Island? We think he followed the intent of his Instructions; these directed him to Cape Walker, and thence to the south-west. He was unable to reach that cape, but having the whole space between it and Banks' Land before him, he persisted to the westward, and ultimately was locked in the ice on the south-west side of Melville Sound. it We again express our regret at the unhappy termination of these Expeditions. The merit due to them for their extraordinary exertions, and zealous, persistent efforts over such an extended area, is most praiseworthy, but it was altogether lost for a time, to be better appreciated hereafter. We lament that such men as Austin and Ommaney, and their officers and crews, should have been placed, as were, on their trial when they returned, for conduct that commands, and should ever command, the approbation of Englishmen, for they had highly distinguished themselves; still, let not Penny and Stewart, and their officers and men, be forgotten; their zeal in the cause was doubtless, and their prolonged efforts were well conducted and well carried out, but theirs was an anomalous position-not of the Navy and yet of the Government: let it suffice, the Committee before named express "unqualified admiration of the arrangements of Captain Austin and Mr. Penny," and of the " zeal, energy, intrepedity, and perseverance" of the officers and crews. It has been. attempted to lower the merits of Penny's discoveries, by carping at some of his positions, bearings, &c. To say the least, this is un generous; for surely there is all the difference between observations taken in an open boat, in such an inclement region, average temperature scarcely above zero, and those obtained amidst the facilities and comforts offered by luxuriously equipped argosies, furnished with every advantage as to instruments. But "let one plain tale be told, that doth surpass all saws"-William Penny discovered that sea to the northward of the Wellington Channel; he led the way. It is gratifying to add, notwithstanding these untoward circumstances, that the Admiralty appreciated and fully recognized the extraordinary merits of not only Captains Austin and Ommaney, and their officers and men, but also Messrs. Penny and Stewart, and the officers and crews under their command. An extract or two from the Report of the before-noticed Committee (dated 20th November, 1851) may not be out of place:-" With respect to the results of the late Expedition," as regards the search for the missing ships, they remark, "it is a matter of no small interest and importance to have ascertained with certainty the exact position in which they passed the winter of 1845-6; while the careful and minute exploration of the coast to the southward and westward, by Captain Ommaney and Lieutenant M'Clintock, without discovering any traces whatever of Sir John Franklin, would seem to afford a very strong presumption that he did not pass that way; and conjecture, therefore, naturally turns towards Wellington Channel, to which, it is well known, he had often looked, as affording one chance of a passage to the north-west, and which we see, by Mr. Penny's account of his examination of the upper part of the Channel, appears to form at least a possible outlet in that direction." How the Committee can have presumed that Franklin did not pass to the southward and westward, from the results of Captain Ommaney's and Lieutenant M'Clintock's explorations (explorations commanding our highest admiration), while as yet the space between 103° West and Banks' Land-that important space that formed the groundwork of the original PLAN of the voyage-remained unsearched, we cannot conceive. We are compelled to say, but with due deference, it was “a very strong presumption." After thus disposing of Sections 5 and 6 of Franklin's Instructions, of Cape Walker, and the south-west, we cannot greatly wonder that "conjecture naturally turns to Wellington Strait," the "presumption" of the one and the “conjecture" of the other being equally without foundation, equally fallaeious and improbable. As to Sir John Franklin's predilections in favour of Wellington Channel, we think there is some little error Are we pre here; his views are shown in a Plan, read before the Royal Geographical Society, dated 10th February, 1836.* The concluding sentence says, "No service is nearer to my heart than the completion of the survey of the north coast of America, and the accomplishment of a North-West Passage." Neither " verbal information" or "expressed intentions" can stand before a recorded opinion. We must take his Instructions, it is said written principally, if not wholly, under his own dictation; but whether so or not, they are binding on him, and it is admitted he would not treat them with "levity." pared to say he was unwilling or unable to fulfil them? To say “unwilling," is to charge this great and good man with a wilful disobedience of orders. Let shame follow the thought! Or if to say "unable," is boldly to assert that, of which we have not a shadow of proof. Thus do the Wellington Channel advocates place us on the horns of a dilemma. We thought, at the time, he followed his Instructions, and that he never attempted the Wellington Channel, and we think so still. The paragraph No. 11, in reply to No. 10, is affectingly creditable to the feelings of the Committee for the relatives and friends of the Franklin Expedition, who still clung to hope, "even against hope," and whose thoughts (as might be expected) turn eagerly towards further explorations "in any and every direction."† We might add, this disposition to search "in any and every direction" has been shown by others (not relatives), and cannot be better illustrated than in the importance and preference given to Wellington Channel, Jones's Sound, and the "great sound at the head of Baffin's Bay." In reply to their lordships' question, "What benefits can be expected from any further research, with the means and direction in which the Committee are of opinion that such search should be prosecuted?" after recommending "that an Expedition should be despatched next year to Barrow's Strait," the Committee observe :"We consider any further exploration in the direction of Melville Island, or to the south-west of Cape Walker, wholly unnecessary; and we, therefore, propose that all the strength and energy of the expedition should be directed towards the examination of the upper part of Wellington Strait." Thus was a veto given to all further * See "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 1836," vol. vi., part i., pp. 43-46; also, ibid., Captain (now Admiral Sir F.) Beaufort's opinion thereon, p. 47; also, the "Voyage of the Terror, 1836-7," by Captain (now Admiral Sir G.) Back. + See Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition," Report, p. v. |