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above ground in two places) for fuel, when the woods, shall be destroyed. This colony would have the trade of the Miamis or Twigtwees; and should, at first, have a small fort near Hockockin, at the head of the river; and another near the mouth of Wabash. Sanduski, a French fort near the lake Erie, should also be taken; and all the little French forts south and west of the lakes, quite to the Mississippi, be removed, or taken and garrisoned by the English.-The colonists for this settlement might assemble near the heads of the rivers in Virginia, and march over land to the navigable branches of the Kanhawa, where they might embark with all their baggage and provisions, and fall into the Ohio, not far above the mouth of Sciota. Or they might rendezvous at Will's Creek, and go down the Monongahela to the Ohio.

The fort and armed vessels at the strait of Niagara would be a vast security to the frontiers of these new colonies against any attempts of the French from Canada. The fort at the mouth of the Wabash would guard that river, the Ohio, and Cutava river, in case any attempt from the French of Mississippi. (Every fort should have a small settlement round it; as the fort would protect the settlers, and the settlers defend the fort and supply it with provisions.)........

The difficulty of settling the first English colonies in America, at so great a distance from England, must have been vastly greater, than the settling these proposed new colonies for it would be the interest and advantage of all the present colonies to support these new ones; as they would cover their frontiers, and prevent the growth of the French power behind or near their present settlements; and the new country is nearly at equal distance from all the old colonies, and could easily be assisted from all of them.

And as there are already in all the old colonies many thousands of families that are ready to swarm, wanting more land; the richness and natural advantage of the Ohio country would draw most of them thither, were there but a tolerable prospect of a safe settlement. So that the new

colonies would soon be full of people; and from the advantage of their situation, become much more terrible to the French settlements, than those are now to us.. The gaining of the back Indian trade from the French, by the navigation of the lakes, &c. would of itself greatly weaken our enemies :-it being now their principal support, it seems highly probable, that in time they must be subjected to the British crown, or driven out of the country.

Such settlements may better be made now, than fifty years hence, because it is easier to settle ourselves, and thereby prevent the French settling there, as they seem now to intend, than to remove them when strongly settled.

If these settlements are postponed, then more forts and stronger, and more numerous and expensive garrisons must be established, to secure the country, prevent their settling, and secure our present frontiers; the charge of which may probably exceed the charge of the proposed settlements, and the advantage nothing near so great.

The fort at Oswego should likewise be strengthened, and some armed half-gallies, or other small vessels, kept there to cruise on lake Ontario, as proposed by Mr. Pownall in his paper laid before the commissioners at the Albany treaty.

If a fort was also built at Tirondequat on lake Ontario, and a settlement made there near the lake side, where the lands are said to be good, (much better than at Oswego;) the people of such settlements would help to defend both forts on any emergency.

THE CANADA PAMPHLET.

The Interest of Great Britain considered, with Regard to her Colonies, and the Acquisitions of Canada and Guadeloupe3.

I HAVE perused with no small pleasure the "Letter addressed to Two Great men," and the Remarks on that letter. It is not merely from the beauty, the force and perspicuity of expression, or the general elegance of manner conspicuous in both pamphlets, that my pleasure chiefly arises; it is rather from this, that I have lived to see subjects of the greatest importance to this nation publicly discussed without party views, or party heat, with decency and politeness, and with no other warmth, than what a zeal for the honor and happiness of our king and country may inspire; and this by writers, whose understanding (however they may differ from each other) appears not unequal to their candor and the uprightness of their intention.

But, as great abilities have not always the best information, there are, I apprehend, in the Remarks, some opinions not well founded, and some mistakes of so important a nature, as to render a few observations on them necessary for the better information of the public.

3 In the year 1760, upon the prospect of a peace with France, the late Earl of Bath addressed a Letter to Two Great Men (Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Newcastle) on the terms necessary to be insisted upon in the negociation. He preferred the acquisition of Canada, to acquisitions in the West Indies. In the same year there appeared Remarks on the letter addressed to two great men, containing opposite opinions on this and other subjects. At this moment a philosopher stepped into the controversy, and wrote a pamphlet entitled, "The Interest of Great Britain considered, with Regard to her Colonies," &c. The arguments he used, appear to have carried weight with them at the Courts of London and Paris, for Canada was kept by the peace.

The above piece (which first appeared before the public in the shape of a pamphlet, printed for Becket, 1761,) has none of the eight subdivisions it is now thrown into, marked out by the author. He conceived however that they might be useful, and afterwards made that arrangement.

In the original, the author has added his observations concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, &c. [printed in a subsequent part of this volume] and introduced it with the following note. "In confirmation of the writer's opinion concerning population, manufactures, &c. he has thought it not amiss to add an extract from a piece written some years since in America, where the facts must be well known, on which the reasonings are founded. It is entitled, Observations, &c."

With respect to the arguments used by the authors of the Letter, and of the Remarks, it is useless to repeat them here. As far as they are necessary for the understanding of Dr. Franklin, they are to be collected from his own work.

The author of the Letter, who must be every way best able to support his own sentiments, will, I hope, excuse me, if I seem officiously to interfere; when he considers, that the spirit of patriotism, like other qualities good and bad, is catching; and that his long silence since the Rmarks appeared, has made us despair of seeing the subject farther discussed by his masterly hand. The ingenious and candid remarker, too, who must have been misled himself before he employed his skill and address to mislead others, will certainly, since he declares he aims at no seduction, be disposed to excuse even the weakest effort to prevent it.

And surely, if the general opinions that possess the minds of the people may possibly be of consequence in pub. lic affairs, it must be fit to set those opinions right. If there is danger, as the remarker supposes, that “ extravagant expectations" may embarrass "a virtuous and able ministry," and " render the negotiation for peace a work of infinite difficulty4;" there is no less danger that expectations too low, through want of proper information, may have a contrary effect, may make even a virtuous and able ministry less anxious, and less attentive to the obtaining points, in which the honor and interest of the nation are essentially concerned; and the people less hearty in supporting such a ministry and its measures.

The people of this nation are indeed respectable, not for their numbers only, but for their understanding and their public spirit: they manifest the first, by their universal approbation of the late prudent and vigorous measures, and the confidence they so justly repose in a wise and good prince, and an honest and able administration; the latter they have demonstrated by the immense supplies granted in parliament unanimously, and paid through the whole kingdom with chearfulness. And since to this spirit and these supplies our "victories and successes"" have in great measure been owing; is it quite right, is it generous to say, with the remarker, that the people "had no share in ac

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quiring them?" The mere mob he cannot mean, even where he speaks of the madness of the people; for the madness of the mob must be too feeble and impotent, armed as the government of this country at present is, to "overrule," even in the slightest instances, the virtue “and moderation" of a firm and steady ministry.

While the war continues, its final event is quite uncertain. The victorious of this year may be the vanquished of the next. It may therefore be too early to say, what advantages we ought absolutely to insist on, and make the sine quibus non of a peace. If the necessity of our affairs should oblige us to accept of terms less advantageous than our present successes seem to promise us; an intelligent people, as ours is, must see that necessity, and will acquiesce. But as a peace, when it is made, may be made hastily; and as the unhappy continuance of the war affords us time to consider, among several advantages gained or to be gained, which of them may be most for our interest to retain, if some and not all may possibly be retained; I do not blame the public disquisition of these points, as permature or useless. Light often arises from a collision of opinions, as fire from flint and steel; and if we can obtain the benefit of the light, without danger from the heat sometimes produced by controversy, why should we discourage it?

Supposing then, that heaven may still continue to bless his majesty's arms, and that the event of this just war may put it in our power to retain some of our conquests at the making of a peace; let us consider,

1. The security of a dominion, a justifiable and prudent ground upon which to demand cessions from an enemy. Whether we are to confine ourselves to those possessions only that were "the objects for which we began the war?." This the remarker seems to think right, when the question relates to "Canada, properly so called; it having never

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