neighbor at home, and made a shining figure as a patriot in the senate-house, he died with a peaceful conscience, and the tears of his country were dropped upon his tomb.

The world, that knew the whole series of his life, stood amazed at the mighty change. They beheld him as a wonder of reformation, while he himself confessed and adored the divine power and mercy, which had transformed him from a brute to a man.

But this was a single instance; and we may almost venture to write MIRACLE upon it. Are there not numbers of both sexes among our young gentry, in this degenerate age, whose lives thus run to utter waste, without the least tendency to usefulness.

When I meet with persons of such a worthless character as this, it brings to my mind some scraps of Horace,

There are a number of us creep

Into this world, to eat and sleep;
And know no reason why they're born,
But merely to consume the corn,
Devour the cattle, fowl, and fish,
And leave behind an empty dish:
Tho' crows and ravens do the same,
Unlucky birds of hateful name;
Ravens or crows might fill their places,
And swallow corn and carcasses.

Then, if their tomb-stone when they die,

Ben't taught to flatter and to lie,
There's nothing better will be said,
Than that the've eat up all their bread,
Drank
up all their drink, and gone to bed.

There are other fragments of that heathen poet, which occur on such occasions; one in the first of his satires, the other in the last of his epistles, which seem to represent. life only as a season of luxury.

. Exacto contentus tempore vité

Cedat uti conviva satur.

Lusisti satus, edisti satis atque bibisti:
Tempus abire tibi.

VOL. IV.

3 B

THAT SELF-DENIAL IS NOT THE ESSENCE OF VIRTUE.

From the Pennsylvania Gazette, No. 324, Feb. 18, 1735.

IT is commonly asserted that without self-denial there is no virtue, and that the greater the self-denial, the greater the virtue.

If it were said, that he who cannot deny himself any thing he inclines to, though he knows it will be to his hurt, has not the virtue of resolution or fortitude, it would be intelligible enough, but as it stands it seems obscure or erro

neous.

Let us consider some of the virtues singly.

If a man has no inclination to wrong people in his dealings, if he feels no temptation to it, and therefore never does it; can it be said that he is not a just man? If he is a just man, has he not the virtue of justice?

If to a certain man, idle diversions have nothing in them that is tempting, and therefore he never relaxes his application to business, for their sake; is he not an industrious man? Or, has he not the virtue of industry?

I might in like manner instance in all the rest of the virtues; but, to make the thing short, as it is certain, that the more we strive against the temptation to any vice, and practise the contrary virtue, the weaker will that temptation be, and the stronger will be that habit, till at length the temptation has no force, or entirely vanishes; does it follow from thence, that in our endeavors to overcome vice, we grow continually less and less virtuous, till a length we have no virtue at all.

If self-denial be the essence of virtue, then it follows, that the man, who is naturally temperate, just, &c. is not

virtuous; that but in order to be virtuous, he must in spite of his natural inclinations, wrong his neighbors, and eat and drink, &c. to excess.

But perhaps it may be said, that by the word virtue in the above assertion, is meant merit; and so it should stand thus: without self-denial there is no merit, and the greater the self-denial, the greater the merit.

The self-denial here meant, must be when our inclinations are towards vice, or else it would still be nonsense. By merit, is understood desert, and when we say a man merits, we mean that he deserves praise or reward.

We do not pretend to merit any thing of God, for he is above our services; and the benefits he confers on us, are the effects of his goodness and bounty.

All our merit then is with regard to one another, and from one to another.

Taking then the sssertion as it last stands.

If a man does me service from a natural benevolent inclination, does he deserve less of me than another, who does me the like kindness against his inclination.

If I have two journeymen, one naturally industrious, the other idle, but both perform a day's work equally good, ought I to give the latter the most wages?

Indeed lazy workmen are commonly observed to be more extravagant in their demands than the industrious, for if they have not more for their work, they cannot live as well; but though it be true to a proverb, that lazy folks take the most pains; does it follow that they deserve the most money.

If you were to employ servants in affairs of trust, would you not bid more for one you knew was naturally honest, than for one naturally roguish, but who have lately acted honestly, for currents whose natural channel is dammed up, till the new course is by time worn sufficiently deep, and become natural, are apt to break their banks. If one servant is more valuable than another, has he not more merit than the other? and yet this is not on account of superior self-denial.

Is a patriot not praise-worthy, if public spirit is natural to him?

Is a pacing horse less valuable for being a natural pacer? Nor in my opinion, has any man less merit for having in general natural virtuous inclinations.

The truth is, that temperance, justice, charity, &c. are virtues, whither practised with, or against our inclinations, and the man who practises them, merits our love and esteem; and self-denial is neither good nor bad, but as it is applied; he that denies a vicious inclination, is virtuous in proportion to his resolution, but the most perfect virtue is above all temptation, such as the virtue of the saints in heaven, and he who does a foolish, indecent, or wicked thing, merely because it is contrary to his inclination (like some mad enthusiasts I have read of who ran about naked, under the notion of taking up the cross) is not practising the reasonable science of virtue, but is a lunatic.

ON TRUE HAPPPINESS.

From the Pennsylvania Gazette, No. 363, Nov. 20, 1735.

THE desire of happiness in general is so natural to us, that all the world are in pursuit of it; all have this one end in view, though they take such different methods to attain it, and are so much divided in their notions of it.

Evil, as evil, can never be chosen; and though evil is often the effect of our own choice, yet we never desire it, but under the appearance of an imagininary good.

Many things we indulge ourselves in, may be considered by us as evils, and yet be desirable; but then they are only considered as evils in their effects and consequences, not as evils at present, and attended with immediate misery.

Reason represents things to us, not only as they are at present, but as they are in their whole nature, and tendency; passion only regards them in their former light; when this governs us, we are regardless of the future, and are only affected w iththe present.

It is impossible ever to enjoy ourselves rightly, if our conduct be not such, as to preserve the harmony and order of our faculties, and the original frame and constitution of

our minds; all true happiness, as all that is truly beautiful, can only result from order.

Whilst there is a conflict betwixt the two principles of passion and reason, we must be miserable in proportion to the struggle, and when the victory is gained, and reason so far subdued, as seldom to trouble us with its remonstrances; the happiness we have then, is not the happiness of our rational nature, but the happiness only of the inferior and sensual part of us, and consequently, a very low and imperfect happiness, to what the other would have afforded

us.

If we reflect upon any one passion and disposition of mind, abstract from virtue, we shall soon see the disconnection between that, and true solid happiness. It is of the very essence, for instance, of envy to be uneasy and disquieted. Pride meets with provocations and disturbances, upon almost every occasion. Covetousness is ever attended with solicitude and anxiety. Ambition has its disappointments to sour us, but never the good fortune to satisfy us; its appetite grows the keener by indulgence, and all we can gratify it with at present, serves but the more to inflame its insatiable desires.

The passions by being too much conversant with earthly objects, can never fix in us a proper composure and acquiescence of mind. Nothing but an indifference to the things of this world; an entire submission to the will of Providence here, and a well grounded expectation of happiness hereafter, can give us a true satisfactory enjoyment of ourselves. Virtue is the best guard against the many unavoidable evils incident to us; nothing better alleviates the weight of the afflictions, or gives a truer relish of the blessings of human life.

What is without us, has not the least connection with happiness, only so far as the preservation of our lives and health depends upon it. Health of body, though so far necessary, that we cannot be perfectly happy without it, is not sufficient to make us happy of itself. Happiness springs immediately from the mind; health is but to be considered as