history been taken up in describing the numerous swarms of this mischievous species which has infested the earth in the successive ages: Now is it worth the inquiry of the virtuous, whether the Rhine or the Adige may not perhaps swarm with them at present, as much as the banks of Hypanis; or whether that silver rivulet the Thames, may not show a specious mole-hill, covered with inhabitants of the like dignity and importance. The busy race of beings attached to these fleeting enjoyments are indeed all of them engaged in the pursuit of happiness: and it is owing to their imperfect notions of it, that they stop so far short in their pursuit. The present prospect of pleasure seems to bound their views, and the more distant scenes of happiness, when what they now propose shall be attained, do not strike their imagination. It is a great stupidity, or thoughtlessness, not to perceive, that the happiness of rational natures is inseparably connected with imortality. Creatures only endowed with sensation, may in a low sense, be reputed happy, so long as their sensations are pleasing; and if these pleasing sensations are commensurate with the time of their existence, this measure of happiness is complete. But such beings as are endowed with thought and reflection, cannot be made happy by any limited term of happiness, how great soever its duration may be. The more exquisite and more valuable their enjoyments are, the more painful must be the thought that they are to have an end; and this pain of expectation must be continually increasing the nearer the end approaches. And if these beings are themselves immortal, and yet insecure of the continuance of their happiness, the case is far worse, since an eternal void of delight, if not to say astate of misery, must succeed. It would here be of no moment, whether the time of their happiness were measured by days or hours, by months or years, or by periods of the most immeasurable length: these swiftly flowing streams bear no proportion to that ocean of infinity, where they must finish their course. The longest duration of finite happiness avails nothing, when it is past: nor can the memory of it have any other effect than to renew

a perpetual pining after pleasures never to return, and since virtue is the only pledge and security of a happy immortality, the folly of sacrificing it to any temporal advantages, how important soever they may appear, must be infinitely great, and cannot but leave behind it an eternal regret.

Note. The reader familiar with the happy views of moral good which distinguishes the writings of Dr. Franklin above all the writers of his age, cannot fail to perceive in this beautiful production, the first conceptions, which were amplified and digested into the allegory of the EPHEMERON, which is to be found in another part of these works; addressed to madam Brillon. Philadelphia Editor.

ON TRUE HAPPINESS.

From the Pennsylvania Gazette, Nov. 20, 1735.

THE desire of happiness is in general so natural, that all the world are in pursuit of it; all have this one end solely in view, though they take such different methods to attain it, and are so much divided in their notions of what it consists of.

As evil can never be preferred, and though evil is often the effect of our own choice, yet we never desire it, but under the appearance of an imaginary good.

Many things we indulge ourselves in, may be considered by us as evils; and yet be desirable: but then, they are only considered as evils in their effects and consequences, not as evils at present and attended with immediate misery.

Reason represents things to us, not only as they are at present, but as they are in their whole nature and tendency: passion only regards them in the former light; when this governs us, we are regardless of the future, and are only affected by the present.

It is impossible for us ever to enjoy ourselves rightly, if our conduct be not such as to preserve the harmony and order of our faculties, and the original frame and constitution of our minds: all true happiness, as all that is truly beautiful, can only result from order.

Whilst there is a conflict betwixt the two principles of passion and reason, we must be miserable, in proportion to the

ardor of the struggle, and when the victory is gained, and reason is so far subdued, as seldom to trouble us with its remonstrances, the happiness we have then attained, is not the happiness of our rational nature, but the happiness only of the inferior and sensual part of us; and consequently a very low and imperfect happiness, compared with that which the other would have afforded us.

If we reflect upon any one passion and disposition of mind abstracted from virtue, we shall soon see the disconnexion between that and true solid happiness; it is of the very essence, for instance, of envy to be uneasy and disquieted: pride meets with provocations and disturbances upon almost every occasion: covetousness is ever attended with solicitude and anxiety: ambition has its disappointments to sour ùs, but never the good fortune to satisfy us; its appetite grows the keener by indulgence, and all we can gratify it with at present, serves but the more to inflame its insatiable desires.

The passions, by being too much conversant with earthly objects, can never fix in us a proper composure, and acquiessence of mind. Nothing but an indifference to the things of this world, an entire submission to the will of Providence here, and a well-grounded expectation of happiness hereafter, can give us a true satisfactory enjoyment of ourselves. Virtue is the best guard agains the many unavoidable evils incident to us; nothing better alleviates the weight of the afflictions, or gives a truer relish of the blessings of human life.

What is without us has not the least connection with happiness, only so far as the preservation of our lives and health depends upon it: health of body, though so far necessary that we cannot be perfectly happy without it, it is not sufficient to make us happy of itself. Happiness springs immcdiately from the mind: health is but to be considered as a condition or circumstance, without which this happiness cannot be tasted pure and unabated.

Virtue is the best preservative of health, as it prescribes temperance, and such a regulation of our passions as is most conducive to the well-being of the animal economy. So that

it is at the same time the only true happiness of the mind, and the best means of preserving the health of the body.

If our desires are for the things of this world, they are never to be satisfied. If our great view is upon those of the next, the expectation of them is an infinitely higher satisfaction than the enjoyment of those of the present.

There is no true happiness then but in a virtuous and selfapproving conduct, unless our actions will bear the test of our sober judgments and reflections upon them, they are not the actions, and consequently not the happiness of a rational being.

ON SELF-DENIAL.

From the Pennsylvania Gazette, Feb. 18, 1734.

IT is commonly asserted, that without self-denial there is no virtue, and that the greater the self-denial is, the greater is the virtue.

If it were said, that he who cannot deny himself any thing he inclines to, though he knows it will be to his hurt, has not the virtue of resolution or fortitude, it would be intelligible enough; but as it stands, the proposition seems obscure or

erroneous.

Let us consider some of the virtues singly.

If a man has no inclination to wrong people in his dealings; if he feels no temptation to it, and therefore never does it, can it be said, that he is not a just man? if he is a just man, has he not the virtue of justice?

If to a certain man, idle diversions have nothing in them that is tempting, and therefore he never relaxes his application to business for their sake, is he not an industrious man; or has he not the virtue of industry?

I might in like manner instance in all the rest of the virtues; but to make the thing short, as it is certain, that the more we strive against the temptation to any vice, and practise the contrary virtue, the weaker will that temptation be, and the stronger will be that habit; till at length the tempta

tion hath no force, or entirely vanishes: does it follow from thence, that in our endeavors to overcome vice, we grow continually less and less virtuous, till at length we have no virtue at all?

If self-denial be the essence of virtue, then it follows, that the man who is naturally temperate, just, &c., is not virtu ous, but that in order to be virtuous, he must, in spite of his natural inclinations wrong his neighbors, and eat and drink, &c., to excess.

But, perhaps it may be said, that by the word virtue, in the above assertion, is meant merit, and so it should stand; thus without self-denial there is no merit; and the greater the self-denial the greater the merit.

The self-denial here meant must be, when our inclinations are toward vice, or else it would still be nonsense.

By merit is understood desert; and when we say a man merits, we mean that he deserves praise or reward.

We do not pretend to merit any thing of God, for he is above our services, and the benefits he confers on us are the effects of his goodness and bounty.

All our merit then is with regard to one another, and from one to another.

Taking then the proposition as it stands

If a man does me a service, from a natural benevolent inclination, does he deserve less of me than another, who does me the like kindness against his inclination?

If I have two journeymen, one naturally industrious, the other idle, but both perform a day's work equally good, ought I to give the latter the most wages?

Indeed lazy workmen are commonly observed to be more extravagant in their demands than the industrious; for if they have not more for their work, they cannot live as well as the industrious. But though it be true to a proverb, that lazy folks take the most pains, does it follow that they deserve the most money? If you were to employ servants in affairs of trust, would you pay more wages to one you knew was

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