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ately followed. But they were nailing decisive words, which if they were fairly quoted, had put an end to the dispute, and left the remarker without the least room for evasion; and therefore he very honestly dropped them.

Our author says it is necessary to consult Bracton, in order to fix our idea of a libel. Now Bracton, throughout his five books de legibus, et consuetudinibus angliæ, only once happens to mention libels, very perfunctorily. He says, no more than, that a man may receive an injury by a lampoon and things of that nature. Fit injuria cum de eo factum carmen famosum et huejusmodi. Pray how is any person's idea of a libel, the better fixt by this description of it? Our author very sagaciously observes, on these words of Bracton, that the falsity of a libel, is neither expressed nor implied by them. That it is not expressed is self-evident; but that it is not implied, we have only the remarker's ipse dixit for it.

But it was really idle and impertinent to draw this antient lawyer into the dispute, as nothing could be learned from him, only that a libel is an injury, which every body will readily grant. I have good ground to suspect, that our author did not consult Bracton on this occasion; the passage cited in the remarks, is literally transcribed from Coke's ninth report, folio 60; by which an unlearned reader might be easily led to believe, that our author was well skilled in antient learning: ridiculous affectation and pedantry this.

To follow the remarker through all his incoherencies and absurdities, would be irksome; and indeed nothing is more vexatious than to be obliged to refute lies and nonsense. Besides, a writer who is convicted of imposing wilful falsehoods on the reader, ought to be regarded with abhorrence and contempt. It is for this reason I have treated him with an acrimony of style, which nothing but his malice and want of sincerity, and not his ignorance, his dullness, or vanity, could have justified: however, as to the precedents and proceedings against libelling, before the case of the seven bishops, he ought to be left undisturbed in the full enjoyment of the honor he has justly acquired by transcribing them from com

mon-place books and publishing them in gazettes. Pretty speculation these to be inserted in newspapers, especially when they come clothed and loaded under the jargon and tackle of the law.

I am sure that by this time the reader must be heartily tired with the little I have offered on the subject, though I have endeavored to speak so as to be understood; yet it in some measure appeared necessary to expose the folly and ignorance of this author, inasmuch as he seemed to be cherished by some pernicious insects of the profession, who neglecting the noblest parts fced on the rotten branches of the law.

Besides, the liberty of the press would be wholly abolished, if the remarker could have propagated the doctrine of punishing truth. Yet he declares he would not be thought to derogate from that noble privilege of a free people. How does he reconcile those contradictions? why truly thus: he says, that the liberty of the press is a bulwark and two-edged weapon, capable of cutting two ways, and is only to be trusted in the hands of men of wit and address, and not with such fools as rail without art. I pass over the blunder of his calling a bulwark a two-edged weapon, for a lawyer is not supposed to be acquainted with military terms; but is it not highly ridiculous, that the gentleman will not allow a squib to be fired from the bulwark of liberty, yet freely gives permission to erect on it a battery of cannon.

Upon the whole to suppress inquiries into the administration is good policy in an arbitrary government; but a free constitution and freedom of speech, have such a reciprocal dependance on each other, that they cannot subsist without consisting together.

ON GOVERNMENT.

From the Pennsylvania Gazette, April 1, 1736.

GOVERNMENT is aptly compared to architecture, if the superstructure is too heavy for the foundation, the building totters, though assisted by outward props of art. But

leaving it to every body to mould the similitude according to his particular fancy, I shall only observe, that the people have made the most considerable part of the legislature in every free state; which has been more or less so, in proportion to the share they have had in the administration of affairs. The English constitution is fixt on the strongest basis, we choose whomsoever we please for our representatives, and thus we have all the advantages of a democracy, without any of its inconveniencies.

Popular governments have not been framed without the wisest reasons. It seemed highly fitting, that the conduct of magistrates created by and for the good of the whole, should be made liable to the inspection and animadversion of the whole. Besides, there could not be a more potent counterpoise to the designs of ambitious men, than a multitude that hated and feared ambition. Moreover the power they possessed though great collectively, yet being distributed among a vast number, the share of each individual was too inconsiderable to lay him under any temptations of turning it to a wrong use. Again, a body of people thus circumstanced, cannot be supposed to judge amiss on any essential points; for if they decide in favor of themselves, which is extremely natural, their decision is just, inasmuch as whatever contributes to their benefit is a general benefit, and advances the real public good. Hence we have an easy solution of the sophism, so often proposed by the abettors of tyranny, who tell us, that when differences arise between a prince and his subjects, the latter are incapable of being judges of the controversy, for that would be setting up judge and party in the same person.

Some foreigners, have had a truer idea of our constitution. We read in the memoirs of the late archbishop of Cambray, Fenelon, the celebrated author of Telemachus, a conversation which he had with the pretender, (son of James II. of England.) If ever you come to the crown of England,” says the bishop, "you will be a happy prince; with an unlimit"ed power to do good, and only restrained from doing evil.”

A blunt Briton, perhaps, would have said in plain English, "You'll be at liberty to do as much good as you please, but "by G― you shall do us no hurt." The bishop sweetened the pill; for such it would appear in its simple form, to a mind fraught with notions of arbitrary power, and educated among a people, who with the utmost simplicity, boast of their slavery.

What can be more ridiculous than to hear them frequently object to the English gentlemen that travel in their country.i What is your king? Commend me to our grand monarch, who can do whatever he pleases. But begging pardon of these facetious gentlemen, whom it is not my intention to disturb, in their many notions of government, I shall go on to examine what were the sentiments of the antient Romans on this head.

We find that their dictator, a magistrate never created but in cases of great extremity, vested with power as absolute during his office (which never exceeded six months) as the greatest kings were never possessed of; this great ruler was liable to be called to an account by any of the tribunes of the people, whose persons were at the same time rendered sacred, by the most solemn laws.

This is evident proof, that the Romans were of opinion, that the people could not in any sense divest themselves of the supreme authority, by conferring the most extensive power they possibly could imagine, on one or more persons acting as magistrates.

This appears still more evident, in remarking that the

i Qu'est ce qui votre roi? parles moi de notre grand monarque, morblieu! qui peut faire tout ce qu'il veut.

*Si antiquus duimus plebi Romanæ esset, (says one of the tribunes.) Se audacter laturum de abrogando. Q. Fabii, Dictatoris Imperio, T. Liv. lib. 22. chap. 25.

1 Tribunes plebis appello, (says an illustrious senator to the dictator) provoco ad populum, eumque tibi fugienti senatus judicium, judicem fero. lib. 8. chap. 33.

people sat as umpire of the differences which had arisen between the dictator and senate, in the case of young Fabius.

The great deference which Cicero paid to the judgment of the Roman people, appears by those inimitable orations, of which they were the sole judges and auditors. That great orator had a just opinion of their understanding. Nothing gave him a more sensible pleasure than their approbation. But the Roman populace was more learned than ours—more virtuous perhaps; but their sense of discernment was not better than ours. However, the judgment of a whole people, especially of a free people, is looked upon to be infallible, so that it is become a common proverb, that the voice of God is the voice of the people-Vox Dei est populi vox. And this is universally true, while they remain in their proper sphere, unbiassed by faction, undeluded by the tricks of designing

men.

Thank God! we are in the full enjoyment of all these privileges. But can we be taught to prize them too much? or how can we prize them equal to their value, if we do not know their intrinsic worth, and that they are not a gift bestowed upon us by other men, but a right that belongs to us by the laws of God and nature?

Since they are our right, let us be vigilant to preserve them uninfringed, and free from encroachments; if animosities arise, and that we should be obliged to resort to party; let each of us range himself on the side which unfurls the ensigns of public good. Faction will then vanish, which if not timely suppressed, may overturn the balance, the palladium of liberty, and crush us under its ruins.

The design of this paper, is to assert the common rights of mankind, by endeavoring to illustrate eternal truths, that cannot be shaken even with the foundations of the world.

I may take another opportunity to show, how a government founded on these principles rises into the most beautiful structure, with all the graces of symmetry and proportion, as much different from that raised on arbitrary power, as Roman architecture from a gothic building.

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