tainly as we do so in such matters, so certainly shall we be involved in irremediable disappointment. The "quantillâ sapientiâ regitur mundus" of Oxenstiern is no doubt quite true wherever the frame of government has been once arranged; but when revolutionary impulses are given, a complete change takes place, and the difficulty arises, not merely of selecting the best course in urgent and pressing circumstances, but of guarding against the explosion of the fiery elements which are then in combustion. We think that too much caution cannot be used in the management of slave colonies, nor too much circumspection in the adoption of measures which are unsanctioned by the resident proprietors, however promising they may be made to appear by their theoreti cal advocates.

To complete this very interesting Essay, some details were necessary of the circumstances under which M. Humboldt and his distinguished associate, M. Bonpland, obtained or rather collected their information. These are given in a sort of personal narrative, which by blending a variety of objects, is rendered amusing as well as instructive. Disappointed in joining Capt. Baudin, as had been originally arranged, by some erroneous intelligence, Humboldt, it appears, had resolved on settling in Cuba, but that determination was subsequently altered:-yet during his residence he made some excursions, the details of which he has consigned to this portion of his work. On no occasion, perhaps, was M. Humboldt's zeal in the pursuit of science more conspicuous than in his first voyage from Cuba. He embarked at Batabano, with his distinguished associate, in one of the smallest class of schooners, with a cabin as hot as human nature could well sustain; yet he calmly observes, that they had been prepared for it by previous abominations. The voyagers visited many of the keys, some of which were found to be interesting from their productions; among others, the Jardinillos, celebrated in Columbus's time as the scene of a remarkable kind of fishing. The Indian fishermen were accustomed to tie a sort of fish called, by them, revès, (a species of remora) by the tail, and let him down among the largest turtles, to which he attached himself so firmly by his tenacula, that on being drawn up, he brought the turtle with him. It seems that this was considered a traveller's tale, when first told in Europe; nor can we wonder at it, when we read the marvellous narration of Anghierra, who gravely states, "Non aliter ac nos canibus gallicis per quora campi lepores insectamur, incolæ (Cuba insula) venatorio pisce pisces alios capiebant."-A good specimen of a free narrative! Our traveller, in the course of this short voyage has collected many valuable physical facts, for which we cannot do better than refer to the work itself; for were we to do more, we might transcribe the whole of the narrative, with satisfaction to ourselves, and amusement to our readers. After visiting the city of Trinidad, the travellers were conducted by the municipality to the mouth of the river Guaurabo in a handsome carriage, and to increase their embarrassment, the clerical poet of the place, clothed in velvet, notwithstanding the heat, celebrated in a sonnet their return to

the Orinoco. Gratifying as this ceremonial was intended to be, it yielded in interest to a sight that attracted their notice on the road. The plants and foliage were covered with phosphorescent insects, the intensity of whose light varied at their pleasure. In a hut of the poorest inhabitants, a dozen of these insects, in a perforated calabash, serves as a night-light.

It is only necessary to shake the vessel violently to insure a strong light. Death alone destroys the luminous quality, and a small quantity of sugar-cane affords abundant nutriment to the insect.

A favourable breeze carried our travellers from the coasts of Cuba, and our author's reflections on the occasion, are at once just and agreeably stated, though we cannot follow him in all his alleged facts.

We have now concluded a very imperfect sketch of the "Essai Politique sur l'isle de Cuba," and before touching on the remaining contents of the work, we shall discuss some collateral topics that present abundant materials for reflection, though they do not fall within the scope of our author's plan. And the first of these topics is naturally the probable future fate of this noble island.

It is not to be wondered at, that various speculations should be hazarded on the subject. Some suppose that independence as a separate state must take place; others that it must pass into the hands of some other European power, than that of Spain: and a third set of politicians assert that it must become a member of one of the American confederations. Although these schemes appear abundantly futile to one conversant with facts, yet they are worthy of examination for the sake of those who in such matters are naturally swayed by the authority of great names.

The independence of Cuba as a distinct state, is a question that we think may be easily set at rest. The extent and consequent exposure of coast, the smallness of the population compared with the area, the difficulty, or rather the impolicy of drawing the attention of the inhabitants from the soil to the formation of military forces for self defence, and lastly, the certainty that this independence would give birth to civil warfare, and afford a plausible pretext for foreign interference, presents obstacles that cannot be overlooked. But these are not the only impediments: Cuba, as has been already shown, owes the prosperity of its finances to a free trade, which would inevitably be destroyed in the event of the destruction of public confidence; which again would be the sure consequence of a state of warfare.

The only two great powers of Europe that could pretend to the occupation of Cuba, are Great Britain and France; there is no probability that either will concede the possession to the other, even were Spain content to surrender this most valuable of her remaining American territories: and we are not aware that any one has been so absurd as to suggest a joint tenancy. But were the diplomatic politeness of the day to induce either of these powers to wave any objection in favour of her rival, we apprehend that the cabinet of Washington would enter a most formidable protest

against the establishment of any new European power, almost within her bounds, and in a situation that would, in the event of a war, impose a most irresistible check on her.

The difficulties that oppose the change in the European masters of Cuba, equally present themselves to any transfer to the United States, and may at present be deemed insurmountable. They also apply, to a certain extent, to the union with any of its continental neighbours, though in a more limited degree, owing to the common origin, common language, and institutions of the people. But these fadeaway, when compared with those that offer themselves from a consideration of the actual state of the newly established governments, as well as the internal interests of Cuba itself. The fact is, that it would lose every thing and gain nothing by such an association. Supposing that every general difficulty were smoothed away, let us inquire in the first place, what are the advantages and disadvantages of a political connexion with Mexico; and, secondly, with Colombia.

Now what are the benefits held out by the first to Cuba? Independence (a word by the way that has been more perverted in its application than most words); supply of sugar on the cessation of the slave trade; that of flour and grain; the consumption of the insular productions on the continent; and protection from the confederating states. These we take in succession. The independence would only be nominal, for what could the small number of Cuban deputies do in opposition to those of the continent, whose united interests would naturally bend those of the minority to suit the purposes of the majority. This is human nature, and a very strong case of community of interests must be made out before we can concede the point. Besides, there is much truth in the maxim, that unequal alliances are injurious to all parties, but most especially to the weakest. The supply of sugar, flour, and grain, is an equally untenable ground of alliance. Mexico is well known to be divided into two great districts, the Tierra Caliente, or the low hot regions, and the elevated plains which, as it were, cluster around the great central plateau of Anahuac. In the former of these, tropical productions are cultivated, and in the latter, the Cerealia, and other fruits of the temperate zone. Although sugar was formerly produced to a considerable extent in the state of Vera Cruz, the manufacture has nearly ceased, and the few canes that are cultivated are employed in the manufacture of an inferior rum, called Chingirito. Sugar is only produced, to any extent, in the neighbourhood of Cuernavaca, about twenty leagues to the south-west of the city of Mexico. At this last place, notwithstanding all the reputed advantages, the price is more than 6d. per lb. Now to bring it to the coast would augment the charges very much, as mules afford the only means of transport; wagons not having been generally introduced, and canals being, in our opinion, impracticable, from the nature of the country. After this additional and unavoidable charge, there would be freight, and all the mercantile charges superadded; so that before Mexican sugar could be furnished to the consumer at

Cuba, it would cost at least six times what it can be produced for on the spot.

The objection to supplies of sugar applies with even greater force to those of flour, and the practical illustration of the absurdity of such a notion is, that on the coast of Mexico, flour can be brought from the United States and sold at eight dollars per barrel of 200lbs., while the same quantity of Mexican flour costs more than ten dollars at the capital, to which, in order to complete the comparison, must be added the carriage to the coast, and of course freight and other charges would still further enhance the cost in Cuba.

As to the consumption of Cuban produce on the continent, a very simple statement will set this at rest. During twenty-five years, when Mexico belonged, as well as Cuba, to Spain, the entire value of all the exports from Cuba only amounted to 51,008,190 dollars, or a trifle above 2,000,000 a year, (about 400,000l. sterling,) of which about 1,700,000 dollars were vested in European manufactures and products, and only about 300,000 dollars, or about 60,000. a year of indigenous Cuban articles, chiefly wax. But if even this trade were as valuable as it has been represented, can there be a reasonable doubt on the mind of any man conver sant with the affairs of America, that in the face of all the decrees of the Mexican Congress, wax will be sent from Cuba to Yucatan and Vera Cruz, whenever it may be wanted: We know that notwithstanding the apparent interruption of intercourse between the two countries, the communications between Yucatan and Cuba are as regular and open as ever.

Last of all, let us examine the value of the protection that can be afforded by Mexico. There are some persons who appear to estimate the power of protection merely by the extent of surface over which they have been poring on the map, and to disregard with sovereign contempt or indifference passing events. Before Mexico can aid any of her neighbours, she must be enabled to protect herself. She has declared her own insolvency, by the non-fulfil ment of a single engagement with her public creditors. The moment the funds retained out of the original loans for the payment of the earlier dividends were exhausted, she literally stopped payment. Money she has not, and as she cannot borrow, any union with Cuba would be most disastrous for the latter. It is quite clear that were this brilliant scheme to be realized, all the produce of the prudent and wise measures of the insular government would be appropriated to Mexican purposes. Nor would this be the only danger; for from what is universally known of the talents and acquirements of the practical statesmen (if the term may be so profaned) of New Spain, there cannot be a doubt that on finding Cuba produc tive, their inordinate itch for legislation would entail on her (in addition to her own) all the horrors of Mexican mal-administration of revenue. The fable of the golden egg would be realized, and the consequences would be inju rious to all. The military and naval protec tion so much talked of is as little to be depend ed on as the rest of the imaginary benefits Recent occurrences show that Mexico is very far from being perfectly tranquil, and the smal

sanguine theorist. We know that after meeting all the ordinary and extraordinary disbursements, including the maintenance of very large military and naval forces, which have been successively equipped since 1810, there has been a large surplus of revenue applicable to local purposes, or to the more general objects of Spain; and it is to be regretted that this fund should have been applied by Ferdinand to his European wants, instead of the establishment of some beneficial institutions which were contemplated in the island.

Thus, as far as the enjoyment of practical liberty of opinion, freedom of action, and exemption from oppressive taxation, can render life valuable, the resident in Cuba may be considered as peculiarly favoured: so much so, that he would be little less than mad, were he to forego his present positive enjoyments, for others of a more specious, but less practical description. The advantages now possessed are of too high an order to be rashly thrown away, and we do not believe that they are likely to be hazarded, but that Spain is likely to retain her possession, both of Cuba and Porto Rico, in spite of all the scheming of her enemies; thus realizing, in despite of herself, the advice of the Conde d'Aranda, in 1783, to which we alluded in our last number. This distinguished diplomatist, it will be recollected, advised the establishment of tributary sovereigns in Mexico, Peru and Terra Firma, and the retention of Cuba and Porto Rico as colonies. Had that advice been adopted, it is more than probable, that we should never have had an opportunity of speculating on the various contingencies that may emanate from the successive revolutions that have been enacted on the vast continent of South America.

The blot in the colonial administration of Cuba, which must be pointed out, equally with the favourable topics, is unquestionably the continued traffic in slaves: there is too much reason to fear that it meets with encouragement, where it ought to receive very different treatment. Humboldt adverts generally to the mischievous consequences of this most unhallowed trade; but we derive our principal information respecting it from the correspondence of the British Commissioners at the Havana with the Secretary of State, in which most important disclosures have been made. From this source, we shall give what is necessary to illustrate our subject, and point out some of the evils to the colony itself, arising from the continuance of a traffic, at once repugnant to the general principles of morality and productive of the worst consequences to those engaged in it.

The reports made by the gentlemen to whom we refer, (of whose zeal, integrity and exertions, it is impossible to speak in too high praise,) are full of most damnatory matter on the indirect protection afforded to the slave trade in Cuba. The eagerness with which it has been pursued and upheld has been most scandalously active. In 1825, it was known that thirty-two vessels had sailed for the coast of Africa, notoriously on slaving voyages; of these, fortunately, only fourteen are positively known to have returned in safety. The zeal

displayed by our navy, and the consequent failure of many of the enterprises, reduced the number in the following year to fifteen, of which, up to the 1st of January, 1827, only five had returned in safety. In 1827, there seems to have been a revived activity, for by the report of the British Commissioners, it ap pears, that no less than seven vessels sailed from the port of Havana alone, on slaving voyages, in the month of September.

The grounds of complaint against the authorities in Cuba on this subject, are very distinct; and although, at one period, the ill success of the adventures disheartened the sordid speculators, yet it does not appear, that the views of the British government were ever heartily seconded by the Spanish government, or, at all events, by its insular representatives. Vessels, notoriously slavers, sail from the Havana without notice. If the British Commissioners receive intimation, that a vessel of that description has entered the port, and represent the same to the governor, he refers the matter to the admiral, who in his turn refers to some other officer, and in the end every thing is reported as having been perfectly as it ought to have been. This system of waiving responsibility is very naturally complained of by the British officers, and forms, in our opinion, a well grounded charge against the good faith of the cabinet of Madrid, or its officers; all the orders of that court are disregarded, and there is too much reason to fear, that even the clergy are not honest in their exhortations. The British Commissioners are quite explicit on these grounds, and say without reservation,— 'Unfortunately, the information which we are enabled to communicate reaches us too late to be of much avail for the detection of delinquents; for it is not until the suspected vessel actually enters the port, after unloading her cargo of slaves, that we are in possession of any ostensible fact upon which to found a representation!" and they add, (what was af terwards verified,) "we are convinced that a cargo of slaves might be landed on the public wharf, and marched through this city, at the most public hours, without any one person consenting, from disinterested motives, to bear the odium, and incur the personal danger to which he would certainly be liable, by coming forward as a witness to the transac tion."

The correspondence of those very active and intelligent officers, Mr. Kilbee and Mr. Macleay, teems with statements of unavailing remonstrances; and it seems that their zeal had operated unfavourably against them; for the Spanish minister (Conde de Alcudia) actually preferred charges against them to the British Secretary of State, which however proved to be most ineffectual, and they had the gratification of finding their zealous conduct fully ap proved of by his Majesty; while the complain ant, to speak in the mildest terms, shuffled out of his charges in no very equivocal way. The complaints of malversation, or at least, of des perately hard winking, continued to the close of 1827.

As an instance of the means by which the representations of the British members of the mixed commission were rendered nugatory by