Special Committee on "Legal Ethics"-HoN. NATHANIEL EWING, Chair man Special Committee on "Constitution of Courts in Pennsylvania"-HoN. HAROLD M. MCCLURE, Chairman Special Committee on "Contingent Fees"-HON. ABRAHAM M. BEITLER, Chairman Special Committee on "Attorney-General's Department”—Hon. M. HAMPTON TODD, Chairman Special Committee on "Digesting of Statutes"-J. NORMAN MARTIN, Esq., Chairman Special Committee on "Judiciary Department"-THOMAS S. BROWN, Esq., Chairman Special Committee on "Jury System"-THOMAS J. MEAGHER, ESQ., Chairman Special Committee on "Revision and Unification of the Statutes"CHARLES WETHERILL, ESQ., Chairman Appointment of Committee on Nominations Consideration of Reports of Committees Evening Meeting, 8 o'clock Annual Address-HON. ANDREW J. MONTAGUE, Ex-Governor of Virginia-Subject: "A More Effective Cabinet" WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1911 Morning Meeting, 10 o'clock Further Consideration of Reports of Committees Reading of Bills for Proposed Legislation (No Afternoon Meeting) Evening Meeting, 8 o'clock Paper by HoN, ROBERT RALSTON, Philadelphia-Subject: "The Delay in the Execution of Murderers" Discussion of Papers THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1911 Morning Meeting, 11 o'clock Paper by JOHN MARSHALL GEST, ESQ., Philadelphia-Subject: "The Law and Lawyers of Balzac❞ Further Discussion of Papers Unfinished Business Afternoon Meeting, 3 o'clock Appointment of Delegates to the American Bar Association and the Comparative Law Bureau Unfinished Business New Business Election of Officers Annual Banquet, 7.30 p. m. EDWIN W. SMITH, retiring President, Toastmaster Responses to toasts are expected from His Excellency the GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, EX-GOVERNOR ANDREW J. MONTAGUE, of Virginia, HON. JOSEPH BENJAMIN DIMMICK, of Scranton, Pennsylvania, WARREN I. SEYMOUR, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and others to be hereafter announced. Which is respectfully submitted, J. B. COLAHAn, Jr., Chairman. E. H. HALL, Delaware: I move that the Report of the Executive Committee be received, filed and approved. Duly seconded, and agreed to. THE PRESIDENT: The next thing in order is the Report of the Committee on Law Reform. ALEX. SIMPSON, JR., Chairman, Philadelphia: The Report of this Committee being in print and accessible to all the members, it does not seem that there is anything else necessary to be now said. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LAW REFORM To the Members of the Pennsylvania Bar Association: GENTLEMEN :-At the 1909 meeting of the Association, the following resolution was referred to your Committee (Report of 1909, page 303): "Resolved, That the Committee on Law Reform be requested to consider and report upon the advisability of sub mitting to the Legislature for adoption an Act providing for supplementary proceedings after the entry of judgment against a defendant in any action; for the purpose of ascertaining through the examination of defendant or other witnesses what property may be subjected to the execution on the judgment." Last year we reported in regard thereto as follows (page 62): "Your Committee are not prepared to report upon that subject at the present time, and therefore request that its consideration be postponed until next year. It is at least doubtful whether the end sought thereby could not be far better secured through amendments of the National Bankruptcy Act and the State Insolvent Act, so as to allow a single creditor, whose claim has ripened into judgment, and an execution thereon been returned nulla bona, to proceed against the debtor in bankruptcy in cases within the Bankrupt Act, and in insolvency in cases not within it, with the usual examination following those proceedings." Your Committee are still of the opinion there expressed, but in view of the extreme difficulty in obtaining both legislative and congressional action along the lines stated, have deemed it wise to present the following draft of an Act, as a substitute until such time as the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Acts are amended to meet the difficulty. The immunity provision at the end of Section 2 is taken bodily from the Act of Congress of 11th February, 1893, c. 83, 27 Stat. at L. 443, which was sustained in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896) It is seriously doubtful whether any less comprehensive immunity would be sufficient to preserve the proposed Act against the charge that it violated the constitutional provision that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case "to be a witness against himself" (5th Amendment to Constitution of the United States), or (Article 1, Sect. 9, of Constitution of Pennsylvania) "to give evidence against himself," in view of the decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892) At any rate, it is deemed best to adhere to the language which has received such high judicial approval, rather than embark upon uncharted seas. The proposed Act is as follows: AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ORAL EXAMINATION OF A JUDGMENT DEBTOR FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCOVERING WHETHER HE HAS PROPERTY WHICH MAY BE MADE SUBJECT TO EXECUTION ON THE JUDGMENT. SECTION I. Be it enacted &c., That in any case in which a final judgment has been or may hereafter be recovered in any court of record in this Commonwealth, upon which an execution has been issued and a return made by the Sheriff of the proper county to the effect that property cannot be found sufficient to satisfy the said judgment and execution, upon petition of the plaintiff under oath setting forth that he believes the defendant has property which should be applied towards the payment of such judgment, the court shall enter an order requiring the judgment debtor to attend and be examined orally concerning his property, before the court itself or before a commissioner to be named in said order, at such time and place as the court or commissioner may appoint. The attendance of the debtor for the purposes of such examination may be enforced by said court by subpoena and attachment, as in the case of other witnesses. SECTION II. The judgment debtor may be compelled in the same manner as other witnesses in judicial proceedings, to answer all pertinent questions addressed to him at such examination concerning his property; and he shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said court or commissioner, except for perjury in giving such testimony. SECTION III. The examination shall be taken stenographically, reduced to writing, and filed among the records of the case. All expenses of the examination shall be paid by the plaintiff in the first instance, and shall be taxed as costs and collectible from the defendant in the same manner as other costs in the case, if it be ascertained thereby that the defendant has property which can be made liable for said judgment. Two years ago there was also referred to your Committee the following resolution (Report of 1909, page 303): "Resolved, That the Committee on Law Reform be requested to consider the advisability of recommending an Act of Assembly authorizing the Courts of Common Pleas to strike off on rule or motion a mechanics' lien filed in violation of a written agreement containing a waiver of the right to file the lien, which agreement was duly executed and filed of record in accordance with the requirements of the Act of Assembly." Last year we reported thereon as follows (pages 62-3): "That resolution grew out of the decision in Burger v. S. R. Moss Cigar Co., 225 Pa. 400 (1909) reversing the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County in the same case,-26 Lancaster Law Review, 89-for striking off the lien. The right to strike off under such circumstances upon proper petition filed, is expressly given by Section 23 of the Act of 4th June, 1901, P. L. 442-3, which was not referred to in the opinion of the Court below or of the Supreme Court, or in the paper book of either party, nor in any of the cases cited in any of those opinions or paper books. It would be idle to repeat the language of Section 23 in another statute. Doubtless the Supreme Court would have decided differently had their attention been called to that section. Certainly the Court below would not have had to argue so extensively that it had the right, had it known that that right was expressly given by the statute under which the lien was filed." Being advised, however, that the exact point which that resolution was intended to provide for was pending in the Supreme Court, the attention of which had been |