reason to believe that the weight of opinion in the Association and throughout the Bar of the State is in favor of doing something with this act, and I believe with the whole system, that will be tantamount to killing it and burying it without resurrection. The question itself is contrary to the spirit of our present constitution. In at least two instances the Supreme Court has said that two of the sections are unconstitutional, giving, as they do—and for that reason— a special remedy to a special class of a greater special class. As I understand it, the Supreme Court has said that, were it not for the fact that the mechanics' lien was embodied in our system prior to the Constitution of 1873, the reasons that make these superpreferred classes unconstitutional would make the whole act unconstitutional; and a thrill of joy has gone through us all, I think, at the thought that in those two decisions of the Supreme Court the Committee on Law Reform concurs. I desire to introduce this resolution as expressing at least my own thought of the propriety of doing something with this act:

"Whereas, it is the sense of this Association that the socalled Mechanics' Lien system does not accomplish the beneficial purposes intended and is essentially contrary to the spirit of the present Constitution of Pennsylvania in its attempt to provide special remedies for particular classes of citizens.

Therefore, Resolved, That the Committee on Law Reform be and is hereby instructed to consider the propriety of the repeal of the Act of 1901 and its supplements and report thereon at the next meeting of the Association.

Duly seconded.

THE PRESIDENT: With all due respect to Mr. Niles, unless it is done with unanimous consent, I would suggest that that motion is now out of order, at least until the consideration of the report of the Committee on Law Reform has been finished. If there is unanimous consent, and Mr. Simpson does not object, I will put the motion. Is there any objection?

ALEX. SIMPSON, JR., Philadelphia: None at all. There is one thing that ought to be said. If the members will remember, when the Committee on Law Reform reported the Mechanics' Lien Act to this Association they stated at the very beginning of their report substantially what Mr. Niles said to-day. We were then of opinion, and so far as I know are still of opinion, that there ought to be no mechanics' lien law, but there is an underlying matter which is suggested by Mr. Niles' remark that there is an antagonism between the spirit of the Constitution of this State and the Mechanics' Lien Law, and that is that that antagonism is just as applicable to the municipal claim law and all other laws of similar character. I am afraid, if we attempt a repeal for that reason, we will find ourselves up against a problem which is very much harder than anyone anticipates. There is no objection, however, to the Committee on Law Reform wrestling with that problem.

V. GILPIN ROBINSON, Philadelphia: I respectfully submit that there is a good deal of wisdom in what Mr. Simpson suggests. As a member of this Association it seems to me that it would be policy to let the Mechanics' Lien Law alone. The fact of making a stir about it will simply provoke opposition that may be hard to stem. There is a very strong sentiment, as shown in the last legislature, in favor of making the Mechanics' Lien Law, if possible,

As

more favorable to the mechanic and material-men. it is now, with the decision of the Supreme Court and the filing of the record and basing the whole thing upon the idea of contract, it is innocuous, but so strong is that feeling that there was a very determined effort in the last Legislature to secure an amendment to the Constitution and one of the strongest reasons urged for that was that the Mechanics' Lien Law might be made more effective for the laboring man and the mechanic and the material-man. And a resolution was introduced and pressed, pressed very ear

nestly, to amend the provisions of the Constitution in such a way that this law and other laws which are in opposition to the general idea of impairing the obligation of contracts could be carried through and put into force. Therefore it does seem to me that this resolution stirring up questions respecting the Mechanics' Lien Law is ill-advised.

S. J. STRAUSS, Luzerne: I would sympathize with this motion if it were a new question; but I know that the Mechanics' Lien Law has another side to it, which helps along the idea of democracy and assists men who without this law could not have got a foothold. Some of the most successful contractors have begun in the smallest way from the fact that they could give assurance of payment to those from whom they purchased material, and in that way began their career. Besides that, I know it to be a fact that in our section most working men, who have a small fund, begin the construction of a house with the fund in hand, and through the fact that they can give assurance of payment through mechanics' liens are enabled to employ carpenters, are enabled to buy material and to build their houses without the intervention of a contractor; all of which would be impossible except for this system. Therefore I believe that the opposition to the repeal of the Mechanics' Lien Law would be very much more popular than we in the State Bar Association imagine. It would cut down among the very poorest, or at least in the sphere next to the very poorest, of artisans and laborers if this law were repealed. I think that this Association ought to accept the law as an institution, as an existing fact which the people of the State after many years demand shall be continued to them. We may theoretically come to the conclusion that it is in violation of the principles against special legislation under the present Constitution. But we must accept it as

a fact, as the Supreme Court has accepted it as a fact, that, in accordance with the general average public opinion, that

law will be preserved. Therefore I believe that the thing to do is to amend the law that it will accomplish the purpose, with due regard for justice to all.

The question being upon the resolution offered by Mr. Niles, it was agreed to.

ALEX. SIMPSON, JR., Philadelphia: The third act. reported by the Committee on Law Reform is an act supplementary to an act relating to replevin, and is intended to meet the case which arises now and again where the affidavit of defence filed raises the real issue in replevin cases. The act as now existing does not provide at all for any answer to the affidavit. This act provides that where the affidavit of defence does raise the real issue, an answer to that may be required and a default judgment recovered if there is no dispute, and if there is, then try the question upon the three pleadings instead of two; that is, we will then have a trial upon a defined issued where there is in fact a real defence in landlord and tenant cases, and the like. I move the adoption of that act.

Duly seconded.

GEORGE WENTWORTH CARR, Philadelphia: I rise to a point of information. Was the act relating to mechanics' liens approved by the Association?

GEORGE WENTWORTH CARR, Philadelphia: I would like to call attention now to what appears to be a typographical error in the Replevin Act. It says defendant may also enter a rule for judgment upon the declaration, affidavit of defence and reply; it would seem to me to be rather difficult for the defendant to enter a rule for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence. Is not that a mistake?

ALEX. SIMPSON, JR., Philadelphia: No; only the de-fendant may enter a rule for judgment upon declaration,

affidavit and reply, and Mr. Carr will see the reason why at

once if he stops to think. cases is really the actor. tenant replevies. The landlord says, "I have distrained upon this property for rent, I am only holding it because of my distraint for rent;" and if a rule for judgment is then taken the plaintiff is the only one that can get the judgment on such a pleading; by no possibility can the defendant get the judgment at that stage of the case. If then in reply to that affidavit of defence a defence is set up which is required to be tried by a jury such as that the distraint from some reason or other is error, it must go to a jury for trial; but if the reply is insufficient there would seem to be no reason why the Court should not say so, on rule taken.

The defendant in this class of In a landlord and tenant case the

GEORGE WENTWORTH CARR, Philadelphia: I understand that now.

GRAHAM C. WOODWARD, Philadelphia: It seems to me that this act does not properly provide for the filing of the reply by the plaintiff. It directs that it shall be filed, but makes no provision in case of default. I therefore suggest that after the words "other cases," in the fifth line, there be inserted something of this kind: "and in case of default judgment may be entered for the defendant for want of such reply."

ALEX. SIMPSON, JR., Philadelphia: I think that follows; but if anyone thinks it makes it clearer, there is no objection, unless some other member of the Committee objects.

THE PRESIDENT: There seems to be no objection to the suggestion.

V. GILPIN ROBINSON, Philadelphia: Ought there not to be a time limit fixed?