tance of respect for law, but to the self-destructive nature of wrong. That continued wrong sooner or later ends in the destruction of the wrong-doer, either from within or without, must be generally admitted. Thus is the truth of the doctrine of "the survival of the fittest" vindicated in moral as in natural law. But it is also true that this law is restrictive only, and that the school of Hume and Bentham has overlooked the deeper originative law in moral philosophy, as the school of Darwin has done in biological philosophy.

It may still be urged that, if it be granted that experience of the pains of evil-doing be not transmitted as an intellectual acquisition from generation to generation, nevertheless such experience is sufficient to educate each separate generation as it passes, without any other than automatic action on their part. It may be replied to this that the results thus obtained are not due to will, but simply follow compulsion, the motive thus created only varying in strength with the characters of the individuals. Its success is restricted to circumstances where the penalties are sufficiently certain to constitute counter-inducements to effect the necessary restraint. This can only be the case with the weaker members of society. Wherever there is sufficient power to escape penalties, wrong-doing has no restraint. Under such a system might and right are identical; for the strongest needs no protection of law. It is true that society can combine against a single malefactor, but it is also true that malefactors can combine. In fact, it is one of the usual phenomena of human society, to find men becoming malefactors as soon as they attain to power; or to find society governed by a few malefactors who have an army to enforce their pleasure.

While then inheritance does not secure the performance of altruistic acts, appetent affections may be so increased by accumulation in descent as to become uncontrollable, so that will either does not come into existence, or is extinguished, so far as regards those affections. In such a situation there is no such equivalency between opposing motives as gives opportunity for the will, the experience of appetent pleasure being too strong to allow of hesitancy in the face of vague representations of imaginary conse quences on the other side. Even in highly intelligent men, to whom consequences are best known, knowledge may be thrust from consciousness, by strong feeling in favor of one alternative at the moment of action.

Which expresses the quality called the Will by Schopenhauer.

VII. CONSEQUENCES.

It is now well to consider how far an automatic mind has any claim to personality or individvality, as generally understood. From the usual stand-point, a being without "liberty," or will properly so called, is without character, and is in so far a nonentity. Even the character of the Deity cannot escape this destructive analysis; for according to Spinoza, if He is good, but a single line of action, without alternatives, lies open to God, if He be at the same time omniscient. All this is changed if the element of spontaneity in character be pre-supposed. The existence of such a quality renders foresight of its decisions in some cases no more than a calculation of chances, and in other cases impossible; thus offering the only conceivable limit to omniscience, and hence to omnipotence. And as we regard the goodness of God as the anchor of the universe, if that goodness be in some respect inconsistent with omnipotence, we are strengthened if we discover that there is ground for correcting our traditional suppositions in regard to the latter. Can we not find this ground in a liberty or freedom which is the condition of what we suppose, in the absence of knowledge, to be the characteristic of the highest class of conscious existences? E. D. COPE.

NAVAL

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.

AVAL government may be defined as that system of fundamental rules by which a navy is governed; or by which the members of the Naval Service are to regulate their official actions. The chief desideratum is that these rules shall be so framed as to ensure an energetic, efficient and economical administration of naval affairs.

A brief review of the history of one of the oldest naval governments extant-the English-will serve to illustrate the principles on which that species of government should be based.

The Board of Admiralty of Great Britain may be likened to one of those imposing Elizabethan structures to be met with occasionally in England. Begun originally in a natural and unpretending way, but added to by successive generations, they have grown into

what we find them to-day, rambling and incongruous edifices, yet wonderfully substantial, and of the utmost practical utility. It needs a life-time, almost, to become familiar with their wilderness of nooks and crannies, their conveniences, and, it must be admitted, their inconveniences. The head of the house must often in the course of nature change; but the old retainers, with their seemingly perpetual existence cling to the estate, bringing down with them and transmitting to their descendants the traditions and the secrets of the place. Like the science of English law the Board also has its inexorable lex non scripta.

One of the earliest attempts in England at the formation of a Navy Board was in the first year of the reign of Richard I. (1189) when five commissioners, including an archbishop and a bishop, were appointed with the title of "Leaders and Governors of all the King's Navy." During several years of the reign of King John, the principal management of the navy was entrusted to a priest named William de Wrotham, archdeacon of Taunton, for most of the high offices in England were filled at this time by priests. He was designated "Keeper of the King's Ships," or "Keeper of the Seaports." But in these early days the seas were infested with pirates, for which reason "Wardens of the Sea" were appointed. Their duties were to guard the seas and coasts about England and to try offenders against the laws of the sea. In 1224 "the lord the King," committed "to Geoffrey de Lucy the guardianship of the sea-coast of England from Pevensey to Bristol." In this manner were the coasts of England portioned out to be guarded by the navy, the warden or admiral of each district being not only "Keeper of the Coast," but invested with judicial functions as well. It was in very much the same way that the quæstors of the Roman fleet, after the Pyrrhic war, had been appointed to the guardianship of the coasts of Italy and to form a war marine for their protection.

In 1297, Sir William de Leybourne was appointed "Captain of the King's Mariners," and was the first to be styled "Admiral of the Sea of the King of England." The commissions issued at this time to admirals imposed a two-fold duty. All details respecting the equipment and management of ships and crews were confided to the admirals who were from time to time appointed to command the King's fleets-those which environed the coasts. In addition to this, they were to hold courts within their several jurisdictions for the administration of “le ley marine a'auncien droit,” and offend

ers against the maritime code were ordered to be delivered up to one of the King's admirals, who was to proceed "according to marine law." The admiral's court had cognizance of all proceedings on the sea, and, in general, of such matters as our Federal courts sitting as courts of admiralty have to-day.

The civil management of the Royal Navy was at this time confined to the King and privy council. When information or advice on naval affairs was required, two or more of the inhabitants of each of the principal sea-port towns, or others supposed to be conversant with the subject under advisement, would be summoned. Here we see, however rude the form, the true principle of naval government, growing spontaneously in obedience to a natural law of development. The civil government of the navy is retained by the civil power; the military branch, subordinate to the civil, is left to the military; while questions of a special nature are referred to experts. In the reign of Henry VIII., an improvement was made in the practical application of this principle. Instead of each admiral having the equipping and fitting out of his own fleet, a central office, called the Admiralty Office, was established in 1512; commissioners were appointed to inspect ships of war, and a court for the trial of marine causes was erected, the latter in 1514. In other words, there was established a Navy Department and a Court of Admiralty.

At the time of which we are speaking, peers and persons of high military reputation were appointed as admirals, instead of eminent seamen, for "the sailors," it was said, "would only obey a great man." In this way it came that the command of fleets and the management of the navy was sometimes entrusted, either through favoritism or other cause, to unprofessional and incompetent hands, and the navy suffered accordingly. In 1604, James I. issued a commission for "an enquiry into the general state of the marine." This was followed in 1618 by a second commission, issued by the King for regulating the affairs of the navy.

This latter commission was composed of men of rank and great naval experience, without whose advice no affairs of importance relating to the navy were to be undertaken. Its appointment was to cover the gross incapacity of the Lord High Admiral, the elegant and witty, but shallow and corrupt, George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, and prime favorite of the King. In this commission we see the origin of the present Board of Admiralty: it was the off-spring of necessity.

At the Restoration (1660) the Duke of York became Lord High Admiral. One of his first acts was the appointing of a commission to report on the state of the navy. And this example of referring difficult questions to a commission is all the more valuable from the great capacity exhibited by the Duke himself for naval affairs, and from his splendid record in the great naval battles with the Dutch. In his case it may be truly said, a good admiral was spoiled to make a bad king. On the retirement of the Duke of York, Charles II. assumed the government of the navy himself, but soon after abandoned it to favorites. James II., on his accession, exercised in his own person the regal authority and the authority of Lord High Admiral, which was merged in him as sovereign. The Admiralty was not therefore in commission during these two reigns.

The prostitution of the important office of High Admiral by granting it to court favorites for corrupt purposes had its natural effect. Immediately after the revolution of 1688, Parliament passed (2 sess. William and Mary) an act establishing a Board of Admiralty; in other words it legalized and rendered permanent the customary commission of experts that incompetent ministers had long rendered necessary. By this act it was "declared and enacted that all and singular authorities, jurisdictions and powers which, by any act of Parliament or otherwise, have been and are lawfully vested * * * in the Lord High Admiral of England for the time being, have always appertained to, and may be exercised by the commissioners for executing the office of High Admiral of England for the time being according to their commissions." Although passed in 1690, this act was not put in force till two years afterwards, when it was resolved in the House of Commons that the House be moved that His Majesty be advised "to constitute a commission of the Admiralty of such persons as are of known experience in maritime affairs: that for the future, all orders for the management of the fleet do pass through the Admiralty that shall be so constituted." In 1702 Prince George of Denmark, consort of Queen Anne, was created Lord High Admiral, and in 1827 William Henry, Duke of Clarence, for about 15 months filled the same high office. With these exceptions the office of Lord High Admiral has been in commission for 184 years.

The Admiralty patent, as it is called, places in the hand of "Our Commissioners for executing the office of Our High Admiral,” full