BATTLES OF FEROZESHAH AND ASSAYE 147

As these Saracen leaders lived as far back as the year 636, it is possible that this incident may have given rise to the expression that wives are the 'better halves!'

Ferozeshah.

Battle of

Assaye, 74th in a perilous position.

At the battle of Ferozeshah, a Seik chieftain Battle of in command of an immense force of cavalry did not bring a single horseman into action, because he supposed the retrograde movement of our guns towards Ferozepore was a trick to outflank him. At the battle of Assaye, the 74th was placed in a most perilous position. When the enemy's sabres were crossing the bayonets of the 74th, Colonel Maxwell charged at the head of a little band of British cavalry, and down went the Mahrattas by hundreds, and the 74th rallied, re-formed, and pushed on.' The promptitude of that grand charge saved the 74th, though the regiment lost severely; one company went into action with one officer and fifty men, but in the evening only four rank and file survived.

Here we would say Speech of

with Pericles, 'I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's plans.'

Pericles.

Setabuldee,

Lieut. J. B.

Hearsey.

At the charge of Setabuldee Lieutenant J. B. Charge of Hearsey saved our force. This young officer seeing that the enemy's guns at one flank would assuredly interfere with a charge of cavalry that was intended for the other flank, asked permission, with a weak troop of sixty native horsemen, to

Bosquet at
Inkerman.

dash at the enemy.
and he rode right at the guns and captured them.
The other charge having failed, he then, to cover
the repulse, opened fire with his captured guns
and threw the victorious body of natives into
confusion. This young officer was cut down
by the subadar who commanded the guns, and
was left on the field for six hours. Afterwards,
fainting from loss of blood, his body was placed
amongst the slain ready for interment the follow-
ing morning; but he was rescued and lived to be
a distinguished general in the Company's Indian
Army. Here were prudence and dash both com-
bined.

He was permitted to do so,

At Inkerman, Bosquet with his Chasseurs and Zouaves took advantage of the 'critical moment,' and converted a probable defeat into a victory. Dr. Russell tells us, on the authority of a Russian officer, that if our army had moved on the 25th, (after the battle of Alma) to Baksi Serai, we should have found the whole Russian army in a state of complete demoralization, and that if we Sebastopol by had advanced directly on Sebastopol the town

Dr. Russell's

ideas as to the capture of

a coup de main.

(after a slight show of resistance) would have surrendered.' Russell seems to have considered that the auspicious moment had been disregarded, as he adds: To rush into an enemy's territories, to fight such a battle, to repulse such

DR. RUSSELL ON THE CAPTURE OF SEBASTOPOL 149

an immense force, was the precursor of a long
siege, of bloody battles and great losses.' Time
may tell who was right. The obstacles to be en-
countered, and the great risks that must necessarily
have been run to do as the Russian officer had
suggested are the points to be considered.
With all due deference to the opinions of Dr.
Russell, we think that the advance then on Sebas- with Dr.

Reasons for

disagreeing

Russell.

topol would have been a grave error. The 'long siege,' the 'bloody battles,' and the 'great losses,' all go to prove the stubborn character of the foe. To have gone right at the tremendous defences immediately after the battle of Alma might have brought our jaded, but triumphant, army, face to face with tens of thousands of fresh men, who would very probably have rallied those who had been in action, and have made more than a slight show of resistance. It might have ended in a most dreadful repulse; and this we have a full right to infer from the desperate determination of the Russians in all the after engagements. enemy was not shaken to the fullest degree. A Enemy not all portion only of the army had been defeated; and who can tell that the retreat was not ordered as a mere feint just to tempt our commanders to hurl partially worn-out men upon others in a strong position calmly awaiting the attack? If the whole army of Sebastopol had been routed, and utterly

The

shaken.

Chinhut retreat, Lucknow, 1857.

demoralized, then perhaps the onward movement might have been successful. But there was a fine army intrenched inside, and certainly not so 'shaken' as to give in quietly, or indeed without a most terrific struggle. After the disastrous retreat at Chinhut, (Lucknow, June 30, 1857), the garrison did not quietly surrender. The enemy came up with our poor fellows in retreat, but lost immensely in endeavouring to take the place at once by assault. They were repulsed

at every point over a space of about one mile and a quarter, along a front of irregular form, reentering at some parts, salient in others. Had our whole force, however, been defeated at Chinhut, the panic and demoralisation might have been so great as to allow the rebels to have forced their way into the Presidency Position' along with the retiring mass of our troops.

151

CHAPTER VII.

Energetic Measures generally successful when employed with
Judgment The Scale of Victory easily turned; instanced at
Balaclava, Waterloo, Salamanca, Corunna, Friedland-Critical
Moments further Illustrated: Alarcos, Naseby, Monengo, Jena,
&c.-Trivial instances causes of disaster-Dara and Arungzebe,
Tippoo Sahib, &c.-Nothing new under the Sun-Even the
Breech-loader was known 300 years ago-Strange Blindness of
Scientific Men to the value of this weapon.

measures are

successful.

WE quite agree that 'Decisive and energetic Energetic measures have never failed, though contrary generally courses have brought us very near destruction.' 1 But these words of Sir Henry Lawrence allude to not taking advantage of the 'critical time.' He himself was not the man to want in energy. He saved Lucknow by his decision. It was only by a false report that he was induced to let the small force proceed to Chinhut, where some immense masses of the enemy were ready to overwhelm his little band of the brave soldiers of the 32nd Regiment. Individuals of the highest repute cannot always be relied on when giving their opinions on matters relative to war, if they are not fully acquainted with the motives of com

1 Sir Henry Lawrence.

A comshould be

mander's plans

known to be criticised.