favoring of manufacturing classes, and oppression of the merchant-Payment of duties falls upon both seller and buyer-Consideration of the maxim that the consumer pays the duties- High duties certain to be attended with inequality-An equalization only to be obtained by excises-Special interest of New YorkThe desire for revenue likely to limit excess in duties-Consideration of the objection that the House of Representatives is too small-Actual representation of all classes purely visionaryInterests of mechanics and manufacturers-Of the learned professions-Of the landed interests-Taxation of land-The representative body will be chiefly composed of landholders-Mutual interest of all classes-Responsiveness of representatives to public opinion-Extensive information needed in the business of taxation-The most productive system of finances is the least burth213 ensome, NO. 36 [34]. TAXATION CONSIDERED HAMILTON. MORE ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS INTERNAL TAXES. Taxation for the benefit of individuals—Little affinity between various classes of society-Assertion that the nation cannot exercise the power of taxation with advantage-The same power in the state legislatures-Usual method of laying taxes-Internal taxes divided into direct and indirect-Indirect taxes are duties and excises on articles of consumption-In laying these taxes the principal object should be to avoid objects already taxed by particular states-The objection to direct taxes-Method of laying land taxes-The nation can use the method of each state-Direct taxes must be apportioned by population-The abuse of direct taxes provided against with guarded circumspection-Proposition that the nation shall collect all internal taxes by requisitionImpossibility that the revenue laws of nation and states will clash-A small land tax sufficient for the states-Specters raised out of this power of internal taxation-Double sets of tax collectors-Probable employment of state officials-Unlikelihood of double taxation-Poll taxes, . 219 NO. 37 [36]. MADISON. DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONVENTION IN FRAM ING A CONSTITUTION. Difficulty of discussing public measures in the right spiritPredetermined friends and enemies-The Federalist addressed to neither, but to those who wish merely the happiness of the country-Novelty and difficulties of the work pointed out--The constitution of necessity not perfect, but the convention worked without party feeling, and all were finally satisfied, NO. 38 [37]. 227 MADISON. INCOHERENCE OF THE OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION. All governments of deliberation and consent hitherto framed by individuals-Examples-Errors in the new system arise from EDITOR'S TABLE OF CONTENTS. lxi lack of experience-The present situation of America-Existing evils shown, and the futility of the objections and remedies of the opposition, NO. 39 [38]. . 237 MADISON. THE CONSTITUTION STRICTLY REPUBLICAN. Only a republican system possible for America-The principles of republican government shown by examples-The proposed constitution conforms to the standard-Proofs of this from the provisions of the constitution-Neither wholly national nor wholly federal, NO. 40 [39]. 245 MADISON. THE RIGHT OF THE CONVENTION TO FRAME SUCH A CONSTITUTION. The authority under which the convention acted examinedProper even to have exceeded authority, from consideration of duty-Constitution merely recommended-Necessity for a radical change-Whether the convention exceeded its powers does not affect the question of ratification, . NO. 41 [40]. .252 MADISON. VIEW OF POWERS SUPPOSED TO BE VESTED IN THE UNION. The quality of power conferred-Not greater than it should be -General objections considered-The objects of the powers conferred-Declaring war and granting letters of marque-Providing armies and fleets-Regulating and calling out the militia— Levying taxes and borrowing money, . 260 NO. 42 [41]. MADISON. POWERS GOVERNING INTERCOURSE WITH FOREIGN NATIONS AND BETWEEN Regulation of intercourse with foreign nations-Ambassadors, consuls, and treaties-Punishment of piracy, felonies on the high seas, and offenses against the laws of nations-Regulation of foreign commerce-The sanction of the slave trade-Objections on that point considered-Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the states-Interstate commerce and the Indian trade-Coinage of money-Punishment of counterfeiters -Standard of weights and measures-Naturalization-Bankruptcy laws-Rule for proving public acts-Postroads and postoffices, . 271 NO. 43 [42]. MISCELLANEOUS POWERS. MADISON. Miscellaneous powers-Copyrights and patents-The federal city-Punishment of treason-Admission of new states-Govern ment of territories and control of public property-Guaranty to every state of a republican form of government-Protection of state against invasion and against domestic violence-Assumption of payment of outstanding debts-Amendments to the constitution-The establishment of this government on the adherence of nine states-Objection that this is a violation of the confederation-Relations between ratifying states and those which refuse to ratify, NO. 44 [43]. 280 MADISON. RESTRICTIVE POWERS ON THE STATES. Forbidding the establishment of treaties and alliances between the states-Issue of letters of marque-Coinage of money-Issue of bills of credit-Establishment of any legal tender other than gold and silver-Bills of attainder-Ex-post-facto laws-Laws impairing contracts-Titles of nobility-Imposition of duties on exports and imports-The power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry the preceding powers into execution-Necessity of such a power-Prohibition of the exercise of any powers not expressly delegated-Positive enumeration of general powers delegated-Negative enumeration by specification of reserved powers and by silence-Remedy for an abuse of this general power-The supremacy of the constitution, the constitutional laws, and treaties-Oath of state and federal officers to support constitution-No part of the powers delegated unnecessary or improper, NO. 45 [44]. 294 MADISON. THE WHOLE MASS OF NATIONAL POWER IN The new constitution not dangerous to the state governments -Tendency in confederacies is to weaken the central powerState governments will have more influence among the peopleState governments are essential parts of the federal government -The officers of the United States are less numerous than those of the states-The reserved powers are relatively greater than those delegated--Proposed change consists less in giving new than in strengthening old powers, NO. 46 [45]. INFLUENCE OF THE . 303 MADISON. FEDERAL AND THE STATE GOVERNMENTS WITH THE PEOPLE. Federal and state governments only different agents of the same constituents-The first attachment of the people will be to the state governments-Popularity will come to the federal government only if it is better administered-Objection on score of federal military power answered-Concluding remarks on the proposition that the powers of the Union will be dangerous to the state governments, . 310 V The maxim that there should be separate and distinct departments, considered-This maxim true-The new constitution does not violate it-The views of Montesquieu-The provisions of the various state constitutions on this point examined, . 319 NO. 48 [47]. MADISON. MEANS OF GIVING INDEPENDENCE TO THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS. Powers of one department, it is conceded, should not be exercised by another-One department should not have an overruling influence over another-Security against the invasion of one department by another, considered-The tendency of the legislative to absorb the other departments-An instance of encroachments in Virginia-Experience of Pennsylvania, NO. 49 [48]. 327 [?] MADISON. PROBABLE EXCESSIVE INFLUENCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. Propriety of a well-defined mode of appealing to the peopleA sufficient remedy-Very dangerous and useless if too frequently applied-Reasons for this-When such appeals are useful-Remarks on occasional appeals to the people, NO. 50 [49]. 334 [?] MADISON. ᄂ PERIODICAL CORRECTING OF INFRACTIONS The merits and disadvantages of short and long intervals— NO. 51 [50]. .. 339 [?] MADISON. METHOD OF BALANCING THE DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT Modes of obtaining mutual checks and balances-Advantages of the federal government in securing the rights of the people-Division of the delegated powers-Different interests among the people, NO. 52 [51]. TION 342 [?] HAMILTON. QUALIFICATION AND TERM OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Electors-The qualifications of the members-The term of office-Biennial elections-Value of frequent elections-Terms of service in other governments—In England, Ireland. and in the American colonies-Biennial elections not dangerous-Reasons for this drawn from the nature and position of Congress, . 348 NO. 53 [52]. [?] HAMILTON. TERM OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Objection_that when annual elections end tyranny begins, answered-Biennial elections necessary and useful-Objections to unduly short terms-Biennial elections useful and safe, . 353 NO. 54 [53]. [?] HAMILTON. RATIO OF REPRESENTATION IN LOWER BRANCH. Numbers the proper standard for representation-Slave representation-Objection that slaves do not enter into local representation, considered--The right of representation of property as well as persons-Votes in Congress should be proportioned to the wealth of the states-No inducement for falsifying the census, as it is the basis of taxation as well as representation, NO. 55 [54]. 360 [?] HAMILTON. SIZE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Importance attached to this subject-Difficulty of determining the proper number-Small states require smaller ratiosLimited powers of Congress do not demand a numerous representation-Various objections considered and answered-Sources of danger considered, NO. 56 [55]. 366 [?] HAMILTON. NECESSARY KNOWLEDGE IN THE REPRE- TO THE RATIO OF REPRE- Objection that Congress will be too small to know the interests and wishes of its constituents, considered-The representative ought to know the interests of his constituentsObjects of federal legislation-A few representatives__ will be sufficient-Taxation-Militia-The experience of Great Britain, .. 372 [?] HAMILTON. NO. 57 [56]. UNLIKELIHOOD THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRE SENTATIVES WILL ELEVATE THE FEW ABOVE THE MANY. This objection, in principle, strikes at the root of representative government-Members elected by and taken from all classes-Securities to insure fidelity of members, enumeratedProvisions for electing members, and their qualifications, like those of state officers-The relative numbers of the constituencies no reason for approval of state and disapproval of federal system-The doctrine neither reasonable nor admissible-It is not sustained by facts-Examples from House of Commons and from the states, 377 |