NO. 16. EDITOR'S TABLE OF CONTENTS. lv HAMILTON. DEFECT OF THE CONFEDERATION IN ITS The only constitutional remedy against delinquent states is force-Impossibility of coercion-Sympathy between the statesProbable appeal of states to foreign nations-A probable dissolution of the Union-Unlikelihood of states supporting a national government-Certain degeneration into a military despotism-Impossibility of coercing the larger states-Military coercion a signal for civil war-The new government must extend to citizens-State resistance of national law-The distinction between non-compliance and active resistance-The new constitution puts state resistance in its true light-Employment of state agencies by national government-No form of government safe from revolution, . NO. 17. 96 HAMILTON. REFUTATION OF THE ARGUMENT THAT A WILL BE TOO POWERFUL. Unlikelihood that the national government will absorb the residuary authority-Objects of national ambition-Local concerns not alluring objects of general jurisdiction-Easier for the states to encroach on the national authorities-Greater popularity of state government-Tendency of mankind to neighborhood attachment-Local justice the most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment-The national government less immediately connected with the people-Example in feudal times-The struggle between king and baron-Example of clanship in Scotland-State governments compared with feudal baronies-Local governments certain to possess the confidence of the people, 105 NO. 18. HAMILTON AND MADISON. EXAMPLES OF GREEK CONFEDERACIES. Amphictyonic council, its powers in history-The Achæan 108 league, NO. 19. HAMILTON AND MADISON. EXAMPLES OF MEDIEVAL AND MODERN CON FEDERACIES. The German empire-Example of Poland-The Swiss confoderacy, NO. 20. 114 HAMILTON AND MADISON. EXAMPLE OF THE UNITED NETHERLANDS. Nature of government-Historical illustrations-The present condition, 119 NO. 21. HAMILTON. SPECIFIC DEFECTS IN THE CONFEDERATION. No sanction of laws-No mutual guarantee of state governments-Dangerous possibility of despotism-Advantage of a national guarantee-System of quotas and its unfairness-Difficulty in finding a basis of taxation-Comparison between the states in respect to wealth-Complex sources of wealth and taxable ability-Inequality of taxation sure to destroy union— The national government must raise its own revenues-Tendency of taxation to distribute itself-Taxes on articles of consumption prescribe their own limit-Distinction between indirect and direct taxes-Difficulties involved with direct taxes, . 123 HAMILTON. NO. 22. DEFECT OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERA- Want of power to regulate commerce-Commercial treaties impossible-Separate prohibitions of certain states-Irritation between the United States-Commerce of Germany-Quotas of soldiers-Competition and results in expense and bounties— Equal suffrage of the states a great evil—And contradicts a fundamental maxim of republican government-Minority government-Resulting evils in congress-A check on good legislation as well as on bad-Result as to foreign nations-Republics subject to foreign corruption-One advantage of monarchyExample of United Provinces-Crowning defect of the confederation a want of judiciary power-Necessity for a supreme tribune-Thirteen separate courts an impossibility-Evils of a single assembly or congress-The confederation ratified by the states, not by the people, NO. 23. 131 HAMILTON. NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST Objects to be provided for by national Government--Armies and fleets-Condition under present confederation-Vain project of legislating upon the states-Laws must be extended to individual citizens-The essential point in a compound government a discrimination of power-Fleets and armies from this point of view, NO. 24. 144 HAMILTON. POWERS CONFERRED BY NEW CONSTITUTION IN REGARD TO NATIONAL FORCES. Alleged want of proper provision against the existence of standing armies in time of peace-Restriction of the legislative authority as regards military establishments an unheard of EDITOR'S TABLE OF CONTENTS. Ivii principle-Where the constitution vests control-Clauses in the state constitutions in regard to a standing army-The same clause in the Articles of Confederation-Dangers threatening America-Necessity for Western garrisons-British and Spanish colonies-Protection of navy yards and arsenals, NO. 25. . 150 HAMILTON. NATIONAL FORCES COMPARED WITH STATE FORCES. Necessity of national control of army and navy-Situation of states as regards foreign enemies-Critical position of New York-State governments natural rivals of the national-Likelihood that the people will support their local governmentThe states restrained from standing forces-Want of definition in proposed negative on standing armies-Impossibility of a conspiracy between the executive and the legislative departments-Actual effect of a prohibition on standing armiesInadequacy of the militia-Recent experience of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts-Experience of the Lacedæmonians, 156 NO. 26. HAMILTON. ABSURDITY OF RESTRAINING THE LEGISLA- Popular revolutions not able to apportion power and privilege The restraint on legislatures as to defense in the state constitutions-General decision of America opposed to such restraint-History of the restriction on standing army in Great Britain-Present condition in that country-An hereditary prejudice against standing armies in America-The state constitutions-Clause in Pennsylvania and North Carolina constitutions-Biennial appropriations under the new constitution for army-Absurdity of the predictions of the subversion of the liberty of America-Impossibility of greatly augmenting the army-Danger from the executive-Danger all the greater in a disunited state, . 162 NO. 27. HAMILTON, IMPOSSIBILITY OF A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WITHOUT A NATIONAL FORCE. Alleged disinclination of the people to federal authority-A people's obedience to a government proportioned to its goodness or badness-Likelihood that the general government will be better administered than those of the states-Especial value of the national senate-Greater power of the nation in controlling sedition and faction-Government should be felt by citizens -Certainty that a union will need to employ force less often than separate confederacies-The general government able to use ordinary legal processes-Peculiar advantage enjoyed by national laws, 169 NO. 28. HAMILTON. CONDITIONS WHICH NECESSITATE A NATIONAL FORCE. Insurrections a malady inseparable from the body politic-An insurrection a danger to all government-Experience of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania-New York vs. Vermont-Separate confederacies subject to same conditions as the Union-A full answer to objection is that the power is in the hands of the representatives of the people-Certain success of popular resistance to usurpation-Advantage of large territory and of state governments-Impossibility of a large standing army, NO. 29 [35]. 174 HAMILTON. THE POWER OF REGULATING THE MILITIA. A natural incident to common defense-Uniformity in the militia beneficial-Limited powers of national government concerning state forces-Contention concerning posse comitatusAbsurdity of the militia proving a danger if controlled by general government-Certain grievance of frequent military exercises-Advantage of select corps-The states certain to have a preponderant influence over the militia-Example of publications against the constitution-Exaggerated suggestions concerning misuse of militia-Conduct of militia in case of attempted despotism-The general government alone able to use the militia to protect the states, NO. 30 [29]. 179 HAMILTON. GENERAL POWER OF NATIONAL TAXATION. National needs for revenue-Money the vital need in government--Evils resulting from lack of revenue-Example of the Turkish Empire-Example in breakdown of confederationRevenue unlimited under Articles of Confederation-Erroneous principles in that compact-Consequences of the system-A remedy in abandonment of quotas and requisitions-The wishedfor distinction between internal and external taxes-The fundamental principle of national government-The resources of a nation equal to its necessities-Proposition to supply the deficiencies in external taxes by requisition-Result of limited taxation in times of war-The national government should possess an unrestrained power of taxation-The power of taxation a certain means of borrowing, . 187 NO. 31 [30]. UNLIMITED NATIONAL HAMILTON. TAXATION NOT A ROAD TO DESPOTISM. Principles of logic applied to the necessity of a general power of taxation-Recapitulation of the necessity of unlimited national revenue-View of the opponents of the constitution-Necessity of revenue for local administrations-Probable absorption of all taxation by national government-Improbability of usurpation EDITOR'S TABLE OF CONTENTS. lix by the federal government-Why not in state governments as well?-Disposition of the state governments to encroach on the union-State governments will probably possess most influence over people-The people alone can preserve the equilibrium between the general and state government, . 193 NO. 32 [31]. HAMILTON. DIFFERENTIATION OF POWERS BETWEEN TAXATION. Necessity that the states should possess independent objects of revenue-The federal constitution only a partial union -Three cases of alienation of state sovereignty--Exclusive legislation by national government-Three instances of such powerPower of taxation a concurrent right-A double tax a question of expediency and not of inability-Concurrent jurisdiction results from the division of the sovereign power, NO. 33 [31]. . 197 HAMILTON. TAXATION CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO GENERAL POWERS. The general clauses sources of unnecessary alarm-Definition of power-The sweeping clauses chargeable with tautology, but perfectly harmless-Reason for their introduction-The national government necessarily its own judge in law making-Supposed case of invasion of state sovereignty-Nature of laws considered in regard to supreme law-A national law not supreme when a usurpation-The power of the states as to revenue, NO. 34 [32]. 201 HAMILTON. THE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION IN TAXA- The states will retain abundant sources of revenue-An example of co-ordinate authority from Roman history-The wants of the state will reduce themselves to very narrow compass-Necessity to provide for more than existing national exigencies of revenue-The nation must be in a position to protect itself—The passions of war reign in the human breast-War expenses of Europe compared with expenses of civil list--Especial illustration in Great Britain-Example of Revolutionary debt-Amount needed for expense of states-Possible partition of revenue_between states and nation-External and internal taxation-Concurrent taxation the only admissible system, NO. 35 [33]. 206 HAMILTON. ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS TO INDEFINITE A limitation of taxation will result in undue burdens on particular objects-A restriction to duties would result in their increase to an injurious excess-High duties produce smuggling, undue |