Hamilton] TAXES ON LAND. 217 for the most part useless; and that the influence and weight and superior acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a contest with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the public councils, unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. These considerations, and many others that might be mentioned, prove, and experience confirms it, that artisans and manufacturers will commonly be disposed to bestow their votes upon merchants and those whom they recommend. We must therefore consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the community. With regard to the learned professions little need be observed; they truly form no distinct interest in society, and, according to their situation and talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of the confidence and choice of each other, and of other parts of the community. Nothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a political view, and particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be perfectly united, from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be laid on land which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every landholder will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible; and common interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. But if we even could suppose a distinction of interest between the opulent landholder and the middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude that the first would stand a better chance of being deputed to the national legislature than the last? If we take fact as our guide, and look into our own Senate and Assembly, we shall find that moderate proprietors of land prevail in both; nor is this less the case in the Senate, which consists of a smaller number, than in the Assembly, which is composed of a greater number. Where the qualifications of the electors are the same, whether they have to choose a small or a large number, their votes will fall upon those in whom they have most confidence, whether these happen to be men of large fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no property at all. It is said to be necessary that all classes of citizens should have some of their own number in the representative body in order that their feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to. But we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free. Where this is the case. the representative body, with too few exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of the government, will be com posed of landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions. But where is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these three descriptions of men? Will not the landholder know and feel whatever will promote or insure the interest of landed property? And will he not, from his own interest in that species of property, be sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly allied? Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them; ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society? If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions which may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society, and to which a wise administration will never be inattentive, is the man whose situation leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely to be a competent judge of their nature, extent, and foundation than one whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and acquaintances? Is it not natural that a man who is a candidate for the favor of the people, and who is dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuance of his public honors, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations, and should be willing to allow them their proper degree of influence upon his conduct? This dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent, are the true and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the representative and the constituent. There is no part of the administration of government that requires extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political economy so much as the business of taxation. The man who understands those principles best will be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients or to sacrifice any particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will always be the least burdensome. There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the person in whose hands it is should be acquainted with the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking of the people at large, and with the resources of the country. And this is all Hamilton] INTERESTS OF CLASSES. 219 that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the people. In any other sense the proposition has either no meaning or an absurd one. And in that sense let every considerate citizen judge for himself where the requisite qualification is most likely to be found. PUBLIUS. No. 36 [34]. (New York Packet, January 8, 1788.) Hamilton. MORE ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS INTERNAL TAXES. Taxation for the benefit of individuals-Little affinity between various classes of society-Assertion that the nation cannot exercise the power of taxation with advantage—The same power in the state legislatures-Usual method of laying taxes-Internal taxes divided into direct and indirect-Indirect taxes are duties and excises on articles of consump tion-In laying these taxes the principal object should be to avoid objects already taxed by particular states-The objections to direct taxes-Method of laying land taxes-The nation can use the method of each stateDirect taxes must be apportioned by population-The abuse of direct taxes provided against with guarded circumspection-Proposition that the nation shall collect all internal taxes by requisition-Impossibility that the revenue laws of nation and states will clash-A small land tax sufficient for the states-Specters raised out of this power of internal taxation--Double sets of tax collectors-Probable employment of state officials-Unlikelihood of double taxation—Poll taxes. To the People of the State of New York: We have seen that the result of the observations to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted is that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly represent all those different interests and views. If it should be objected that we have seen other descriptions of men in the local legislatures, I answer that it is admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient number to influence the general complexion or character of the government. There are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The door ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit of human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation; but occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning founded upon the general course of things less conclusive. The subject might be placed in several other lights that would all lead to the same result; and in particular it might be asked, What greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter and blacksmith, and the linen manufacturer or stocking-weaver, than between the merchant and either of them? It is notorious that there are often as great rivalships between different branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there are between any of the departments of labor and industry; so that, unless the representative body were to be far more numerous than would be consistent with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its deliberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the spirit of the objection we have been considering should ever be realized in practice. But I forbear to dwell any longer on a matter which has hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit even of an accurate inspection of its real shape or tendency. There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that claims our attention. It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation in the national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as from an interference between the revenue laws of the Union and of the particular States. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge seems to be entirely destitute of foundation. If any question is depending in a State legislature respecting one of the counties, which demands a knowledge of local details, how is it acquired? No doubt from the information of the members of the county. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national legislature from the representatives of each State? And is it not to be presumed that the men who will generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence to be able to communicate that information? Is the knowledge of local circumstances, as Hamilton] INTERNAL TAXES OF TWO KINDS. 221 applied to taxation, a minute topographical acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams, highways, and bypaths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance with its situation and resources; with the state of its agriculture, commerce, manufactures; with the nature of its products and consumptions; with the different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry? Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular kind, usually commit the administration of their finances to single men or to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare in the first instance the plans of taxation which are afterwards passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or legislature. Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge of local circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation. See The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the direct' and those of the indirect Nos. 12, 21. kind. Though the objection be made to both, yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be understood duties and excises on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the nature of the difficulties apprehended. The knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can easily be procured from any well-informed man, espe 'It is interesting to note, in connection with the recent muddleheadedness as to the difference between direct and indirect taxes, that Hamilton, in The Federalist, drew the clearest distinction; but later, when the government sought to prove that a tax on carriages was indirect, his brief was the argument which led the court to take that view. Had the Supreme Court laid aside the definitions of "direct" taxes given by the dictionary and by the political economists, it does not seem possible that they could have been long in doubt as to what an income tax was under the constitution; and they would scarcely have come to their first indecision, and to the discreditable reversal which followed so |