principles of good government to intrust it with those additional powers which, even the moderate and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in the United States.' If that plan should not be adopted, and if the necessity of the Union should be able to withstand the ambitious aims of those men who may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from its dissolution, the probability would be that we should run into the project of conferring supplementary powers upon Congress, as they are now constituted; and either the machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will molder into pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it; or, by successive augmentations of its force and energy, as necessity might prompt, we shall finally accumulate, in a 'The Continental Congress had illustrated the evils of a single legislative body. Frequently it had adopted resolutions only to repeal them the next day, and in several cases had rejected, reconsidered, and adopted, and again rejected in the course of a week, the same motion; the change being due to the arrival or departure of members, and to the lack of any check. A want of stability had likewise been shown in the single assembly body of Pennsylvania, the history of which had been marked by extremely impulsive and variable legislation. The value of a dual-bodied legislative power seems not merely to consist in the additional check on hasty legislation which the delay of separate consideration necessarily involves, but in a still greater degree, in the inevitable competition in which they become involved. Both seek public favor, and they therefore become rivals. Necessarily a measure originated by one encounters in the other a stern criticism, and this is so keen that frequently each house prepares its own bill, and having done so, adheres to it with a positiveness that has compelled the introduction of a new legislative element in the shape of a third or union chamber, usually termed a conference committee, made up of an equal number of members from the two bodies, whose joint action in practice has become almost dictatorial. The tendency the world over (in spite of Congressional adoption of the “previous question" and the parliamentary introduction of closure," to say nothing of a steadily increasing power over legislative action granted to presiding officers) is to make legislation slower and otherwise more difficult. While this may have its apparent disadvantages it is probable that the public gain far more than they lose, for it is certain that, in sharply critical moments, Congress can still act with the greatest celerity (notably in their vote of the funds entailed by the Venezuelan message), and the ordinary delay not merely gives more time for consideration, but even prevents much legislation. The dissolution of each Congress is á grave to many thousand bills, which would have been passed had they but been reached in the session; their uselessness is well proven by subsequent events.-EDITOR. Hamilton] POPULAR CONSENT A TRUE BASIS. 143 single body, all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert. It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting on no better foundation than the consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers, and has, in some instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. However gross a heresy it may be to maintain that a party to a compact has a right to revoke that compact, the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority. PUBLIUS. (New York Journal, December 18, 1787.*) Hamilton. No. 23 Objects to be provided for by national government-Armies and fleetsCondition under present confederation-Vain project of legislating upon the States-Laws must be extended to individual citizens- The essential point in a compound government a discrimination of powerFleets and armies from this point of view. To the People of the State of New York: The necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived. This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches: the objects to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon whom that power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will more properly claim our attention under the succeeding head. The principal purposes to be answered by union are these: the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries. * Yesterday the manuscript copy of the subsequent was communicated to the editor, with an assurance that his press should be preferred, in future, for the first ushering into public view the succeeding numbers. If the public are pleased to stigmatize the editor as a partial printer, in the face of his reiterated assertions of being influenced by none,' what more can be said! This stigma he prefers to that of a slavish copyist ; consequently, unless manuscripts are communicated, he will be constrained (however injudicious) still to crouch under the weighty charge of partiality."-New York Journal, December 18, 1787. Hamilton] NATIONAL AUTHORITY. 145 The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense. This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal; the means ought to be proportioned to the end; the persons from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained. Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care of the common defense is a question, in the first instance, open for discussion; but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow that that government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its trust. And unless it can be shown that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy—that is, in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the NATIONAL FORCES. Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of it; though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise. Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and money; to govern the army and navy; to direct their operations. As their requisitions are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who are in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them, the intention evidently was that the United States should command whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the "common defense and general welfare." It was presumed that a sense of their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges for the punctual performance of the duty of the members to the federal head. The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation was ill-founded and illusory; and the observations made under the last head will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change in the first principles of the system; that if we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities; we must extend the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of America; we must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust. The result from all this is that the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will be required for the formation and support of an army and navy, in the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments. If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government, the essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate the OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the different provinces or departments of power; |