LANDS AND POPULATION. 127 Hamilton] States. Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the circumstances which produce and constitute national wealth, must be satisfied that there is no common standard or barometer by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. Neither the value of lands nor the numbers of the people, which have been successively proposed as the rule of State contributions, has any pretension to being a just representative. If we compare the wealth of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if we at the same time compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of that contracted district with the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the three last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is no comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and that of the relative wealth of those Virginia about three-fifths; Pennsylvania nearly the whole; and New York more than her quota. "These proportions are taken on the specie requisitions; the indents have been very partially paid, and in their present state are of little account. "The payments into the Federal treasury have declined rapidly each year. The whole amount for three years past, in specie, has not exceeded $1,400,000, of which New York has paid one hundred per cent. more than her proportion. This sum, little more than $400,000 a year, it will readily be conceived, has been exhausted in the support of the civil establishments of the Union and the necessary guards and garrisons of public arsenals, and on the frontiers; without any surplus for paying any part of the debt, foreign or domestic, principal or interest. Things are continually growing worse; the last year in particular produced less than $200,000, and that from only two or three States. Several of the States have been so long unaccustomed to pay, that they seem no longer concerned even about the appearances of compliance. "Connecticut and New Jersey have almost formally declined paying any longer. The ostensible motive is the non-concurrence of this State in the impost system. The real one must be conjectured from the fact. "Pennsylvania, if I understand the scope of some late resolutions, means to discount the interest she pays upon her assumption to her own citizens; in which case there will be little coming from her to the United States. This seems to be bringing matters to a crisis. The pecuniary support of the federal government has of late devolved almost entirely upon Pennsylvania and New York. If Pennsyl vania refuses to continue her aid, what will be the situation of New York? Are we willing to be the Atlas of the Union? or are we willing to see it perish?"-EDITOR. nations. If the like parallel were to be run between several of the American States, it would furnish a like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the respective abilities of those States, in relation to revenue, bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in lands or to their comparative population. The position may be equally illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the same State. No man who is acquainted with the State of New York will doubt that the active wealth of Kings County bears a much greater proportion to that of Montgomery, than it would appear to be if we should take either the total value of the lands or the total number of the people as a criterion! The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes. Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry-these circumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious to admit of a particular specification, occasion differences hardly conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries. The consequence clearly is that there can be no common measure of national wealth, and, of course, no general or stationary rule by which the ability of a State to pay taxes can be determined. The attempt, therefore, to regulate the contributions of the members of a confederacy by any such rule cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and extreme oppression. This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a compliance with its requisitions. could be devised.' The suffering States would not long 1 An example of this truth was the attempted nullification by South Carolina of the protective tariff of 1832, which from her point of view placed unfair burdens on the South for the benefit of the North. More Hamilton] ADJUSTMENT OF INEQUALITIES. 129 consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of others would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight they were required to sustain. This, however, is an evil inseparable from the principle of quotas and requisitions. There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its own way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of consumption, may be compared to a fluid which will, in time, find its level with the means of paying them. The amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated by an attention to his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and private oppression may always be avoided by a judicious selection of objects proper for such impositions. If inequalities should arise in some States from duties on particular objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by proportional inequalities in other States from the duties on other objects. In the course of time and things, an equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be established everywhere. Or if inequalities should still exist, they would neither be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from quotas, upon any scale that can possibly be devised. recently, the East was almost as unanimous in opposing what it deemed an endeavor of the West and South to shift an undue share of taxation upon the former section, in the income tax, and though resistance to the law was only openly shown in the courts, there can be no doubt that a large portion of those who were liable to pay the tax were quite as determined to nullify the law by evasions or actual falsification, as the South Carolinians were in 1832, the sole difference being in the change of methods made necessary by the intervening years. Both incidents go to show how absolutely futile it is for one section to seek to impose discriminating burdens on another, for it must end either in evasion of the law, in eventual compromise, or in attempted separation.-EDITOR. It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption that they contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe their own limit, which. cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that "in political arithmetic, two and two do not always make four." If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.' See No. 35. Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land or the number of the people may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at large. PUBLIUS. 1 Hamilton scarcely conceived the passage of a tariff bill framed purposely for the reduction of revenue" by means of such excessive rates of duties as to reduce the importations to a minimum.-EDITOR, DEFECT OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AS TO COMMERCE, ARMY, STATE EQUALITY, JUDICIARY, AND CONGRESS. Want of power to regulate commerce-Commercial treaties impossible-Separate prohibitions of certain states-Irritation between the states of the United States-Commerce of Germany-Quotas of soldiers-Competition and results in expense and bounties-Equal suffrage of the states a great evil-And contradicts a fundamental maxim of republican government -Minority government-Resulting evils in Congress-A check on good legislation as well as on bad-Result as to foreign nations-Republics subject to foreign corruption—One advantage of monarchy—Example of United Provinces-Crowning defect of the confederation a want of judiciary power-Necessity for a supreme tribune-Thirteen separate courts an impossibility-Evils of a single assembly or congressThe confederation ratified by the states, not by the people. To the People of the State of New York: In addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union. The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed evident on the most superficial view that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given. occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges |