a decisive victory over the Allies. The interesting point now is: what did that effort cost? Obviously a great deal; otherwise it would not have been arrested, but would have gone on in an attempt to overwhelm the retiring FrancoBritish troops before they could settle themselves in the defensive positions prepared for them. It is the German policy when once a movement is launched to go all out and not to stop hammering the enemy-especially a retreating enemy-as long as a blow can be struck.

"We may therefore be permitted to assume that when the British withdrew from Mons and the French from Charleroi, the German effort had spent itself owing to the heavy punishment received."

The Change of Fortune for the Germans.

No such defeats as were inflicted upon the French

armies in 1870 at Vionville, Gravelotte and Sedan have marked the progress of the German armies from the Belgian frontier since the early part of August, cbserves the competent and informing military expert of the New York Tribune in a masterly analysis of the events around Paris. And the employment of a force of more than half a million men for the investment of Paris could only be justified by such triumphs in the field. The capture of Paris would give Germany no distinct military advantage in a war with a nation in arms battling for its territorial integrity, if not its independent political existence. It is questionable whether the German Empire, which has been changed largely

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Allies Gain by Their Long Retreat.

THE well-conducted retreat of the Allies led the Ger

mans into a greater and greater extension of their line, affirms the military expert of the New York Times. At last, he says, the Germans were exposed to the possibility of a disastrous blow through their center. Such was the strategy, we read further, by which Napoleon won his decisive victory over the combined Austrian and Russian armies in the great battle of Austerlitz in 1805. The Austro-Russians greatly extended their line in the effort to turn the French right flank and cut off their communications with their base at Vienna. Napoleon suffered this move to be pushed to its greatest extension; then, leaving a portion of Marshal Bernadotte's corps to delay the Austrian turning force, he concentrated his other corps at the center, burst through the Austrian line, and destroyed one wing of their army during its retreat. The successful retreat of the Allies' left wing until their left flank rested upon the strong support of the Paris fortifications forced the Germans to choose between a great additional extension of their line in the effort to turn Paris or the abandonment of this first plan of operations. To avoid the danger of such a blow as that delivered by Napoleon at Austerlitz, they gave up the turning movement and drew in their columns for the effort to break through the center of the Allies' left wing.

"This change of plan was not made until after an energetic pushing of the attempt to turn the Allies' left flank. At Mons on Aug. 23-26 this almost succeeded. The German cavalry corps under Gen. von Marnitz made a wide movement just south of Lille which was stopped only by the prompt retreat of the British from Mons and their stiff fighting at Cambrai.

"Again, at St. Quentin, the British foiled the execution of another similar attempt. Finally, in driving back the German cavalry raid into the woods of Compiègne, they defeated the last attempt of the German move to get at the rear of the Allies' left flank. This army, under Gen. French, seems to have well fulfilled the military duty assigned it of protecting the Allies' left flank."

from an agricultural to a manufacturing state, could feed its armies in France and in eastern Prussia during the length of time it would require an investing force of 500,000 or 600,000 men to reduce the French capital. The retention of Paris by France is of sentimental rather than military or even political importance, adds the lucid expert of our brilliant New York contemporary. The machinery of government has been set up at Bordeaux. The manufacture of cannon and small ordnance and other military supplies is conducted elsewhere. Unless the Germans evince a disposition to place in front of the fortifications of Paris a containing force at least as great as the garrison, sound military policy would dictate its abandonment and the throwing upon the battle line the garrison intrusted to General Gallieni for its defense.

THE MOTHER

-Donahey in Cleveland Plain Dealer

TALY, if her newspapers be any guide, remains un

ITALY

convinced by the arguments Germany employs to bring her into the war on the side of the Triple Alliance. Italy, a member of that alliance, insists that its terms do not bind her to make war with Emperor William and with Vienna. Premier Salandra, nominally the adviser of King Victor Immanuel, is said to be a cipher in the

against France and Great Britain she would commit suicide as a naval and colonial Power-a fact her best statesmen well perceive; she will only go in if her worst advisers get the upper hand."

What Italy Must Consider Carefully.

the figurehead, men stronger than himself determining behind his back what he shall do. More than ever oracular in all their utterances, such Roman dailies as the Tribuna afford little light at present regarding the immediate future of their country from a diplomatic standpoint. A very well-informed writer in the London Saturday Review studies the subject at length, arriving at the conclusion that "if Italy does decide to come in against the German aggression presently, the civilized world will certainly welcome it as one more protest against that horrible brazen doctrine of the German Chancellor's-that necessity is above morality, and that one must 'hack one's way through.' Meanwhile we should be wise to leave Italy's decision to the ordinary channels of diplomacy and to the turn of events." If at the close of the struggle Italy should be found in the same camp as Great Britain and France, there may very well be a useful understanding between the three Powers as to the whole North African coastMorocco, Algeria, the Regency, Tripoli and Egypt, adds the London periodical. In

the exact words of this competent authority:

"Why did she not go into the war with the Triple Alliance? It may be said,

first, she did not go in because she was not obliged to do so by the terms. Austria attacked Servia, not Servia Austria, Germany attacked France-she was therefore not bound by her alliance to come to their aid. But that, of course, is a very small part of the explanation. If Italy had in with Austria and gone Germany she would have stood every chance of losing her Navy and Tripoli, of being, indeed, 'policed' out of existence for decades to come, perhaps, by France. Honor did not order Italy to rush into the arms of Germany and Austria; self-preservation told her to keep out of such a terrible grip. There are

whelming an extent as Italy. In Vienna the Neue Freie Presse sees fearful consequences if the Roman government does not adopt the point of view of former Chancellor von Bülow, who declared last month that Italy must without delay save herself by joining Germany and Austria-Hungary. The inspired KreuzZeitung of Berlin urges the treaty obligations of Italy, pointing out the humiliating position the unified kingdom would be in were the powers to assemble for the purpose of making a peace at this time or within the next few years. Italy, says the London Spectator, will have to consider one fact. The smaller nations-Rumania, Greece, Holland, Denmark and even Turkey are vitally concerned with the settlement which will take place after the war, but only the Powers which help to bring about the close of the war can expect to have any share in dictating the settlement:

"No doubt in theory the mere observance of neutrality may have been of great use to the Germans and Austrians, or to the Allies, as the case may be, and a Power like Italy

-Weed in N. Y. Tribune.

may be able to say to the winning States: 'You could not have won except for our neutrality. If we had thrown ourselves into the other scale you would have been beaten. Therefore we have a perfect right to say that we contributed to the result achieved, and we demand a hearing in the settlement.' Such logic, we venture to say, will be ignored by the winners. If, for example, Germany and Austria win, Italy's plea that they could not have won if she had gone against them instead of remaining neutral will avail her nothing. She will have to take the consequences of their victory. No doubt if the Allies win while Italy stands neutral they will not dream of doing anything hostile to her, but at the same time she cannot, as we have said again and again in these pages, expect to dictate the terms of settlement. Against one Power, exhausted tho victorious, her wishes might have prevailed, but Italy could do nothing against a victorious France, Russia, Britain, and Servia. She must in that case also take

Possibilities of the War on the High Seas.

BERLIN'S theory of the naval situation in a war between Germany and Great Britain, stated long ago, as given by the British daily we are following on this point, provides for a guerilla warfare on the water. It would be surprising to our contemporary if, when the full story of this campaign comes to be told, it were not found that the theory had been put into active practice. The other hope of the Germans is that they might be able to bring a superior force to bear against a separate squadron of the British fleet and deal with it before the remainder could come up to take part in the battle. This is a slender hope indeed, but it has to be remembered that the German Admiral does not look at the possibilities with English eyes. It was said some months ago that a naval convention was projected between England and Russia by which, in the event of war, the English fleet was to convey a Russian army in the Baltic, to be landed on the German coast. The German Naval Staff may possibly cherish the hope that some day, if they but wait long enough, the British Admiralty may be induced to divide its forces and send a part into the Baltic. At all events they no doubt feel that they lose nothing by waiting now which they could hope to gain by offering battle. "And, tho the set battle would be welcomed by the British fleet, both we and it may wait patiently, confident that now, as before in history, the British fleet can play the waiting game with man." The fog of war, as the naval expert of the London Nation tells us, has descended upon the North Sea, the Channel and the adjacent

any

Atlantic. Occasionally the fog lifts as when the Amphion was sunk, the Königin Luise pursued or the Pathfinder hit.

British Ideas of What the German Fleet Will Do.

-Johnson in Saturday Evening Post.

Has England Won the Naval War Already?

WH WHERE is the German merchant marine to-day? In response to this query, that brilliant London journalist, Harold Begbie, tells us in The Daily Chronicle, England's radical organ, that the German merchant marine has ceased to exist. "It has perished." Three

thus, that the German fleet will not venture forth

as a squadron into the North Sea just yet-unless all calculations are set at nought by a factor as yet to appear. The German fleet, predicts the naval expert of the London Nation, will await its opportunity under the shelter of the fortifications of Heligoland and Wilhelmshaven. A subordinate situation is that in the Baltic, to which the German fleet has free access through the Kiel Canal. Germany's policy demands that the Russian fleet shall first be rendered ineffective at the earliest possible moment, before anything is attempted in the Western field. The Sound and the two Belts are capable of being mined or of being barred by submarines and torpedo-boats. "There is evidence that in that sea the Germans have attempted a decisive stroke, but have failed. A battle has taken place off the Aland Islands, and the Russian fleet forced to run for shelter into the Gulf of Finland, where it cannot easily be followed, but where it can probably be held. Yet the Russian fleet is still, to use the technical phrase, 'in being,' and while the war lasts, it will be a perpetual menace." A German containing fleet will watch it, and that fleet will be subject to all the vicissitudes of war. It will suffer from the Russian destroyers and submarines. Meanwhile, the imprisoned fleet will wait its chance. "The situation in the Baltic, if this surmise is correct, is a fairly close replica of that in the North Sea, with this difference, that there the German fleet is in the position of the British."

man "tramp" was swept off the sea. It is no exaggeration to say that the German merchant marine ceased to exist three days after war was declared. Never was

ZEPPELIN

-Minor in N. Y. Evening World:

-Pease in Newark Evening News. greater blow so swiftly struck. This tremendous fact is a victory for the British Navy and the British Empire the magnitude of which is scarcely realized by the general public. "For it is not only a victory on the sea, meaning life to these islands, but a victory on land, meaning ultimate death to the Prussians. While every one of our communications is open, while even on the North Sea, the veritable theater of war, Scandinavian ships are bringing us every day thousands of tons of bacon, butter and eggs, the German communications are cut, and the Fatherland, do what it may in Belgium, can only replenish its failing larder-and that but feebly -via Sweden and Holland." Consequent upon the fact

ON THE MARCH

-Minor in N. Y. Evening World.

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BUT

even in England, replies Mr. Harold Begbie, are aware of one of the most important facts about the Kaiser's navy. "This fact is the pregnant paradox that the German Navy is not a navy at all. It is a corps d'armée, a very powerful and vigorous corps d'armée, but still only a corps d'armée. It acts in conjunction with the Prussian army, takes its orders from the Prussian army, and has no soul apart from the Prussian army." We find it in the early days of war, not guarding the German communications, not protecting the German mercantile marine, not destroying England's commerce, but waiting "probably with its heart in its mouth" for instructions from the Prussian generals. "Compare with this servile and paralysing condition the British fleet scattered all over the seas, each admiral responsible for his sea-work, and each ship a fighting member of a purely naval force. The difference is enormous.' Here and there mistakes have been made, mistakes swiftly punished by an Admiralty which is now practically purged of social influence; but on the whole the various fleets have acted with consummate skill, and British communications are open, the German mercantile marine has ceased to exist, and the German navy, two of its units sold to the Turks, is in hiding. The British journalist who thus sums up the naval situation indulges in these further reflections:

"But it is possible, of course, that the German navy, even tho its orders come from the Prussian generals, may yet strike a death-blow at the British fleet. We are perfectly secure now, but when the battle begins the continuance of that security will depend upon the destruction of the German fleet. Accidents occur. The German fleet is a formidable corps d'armée. It may be that we shall be crippled, it may be that we shall suffer defeat. If so, nothing but surrender can save us from starvation. But here comes in the human factor. Our fate is in the hands of a young and resolute admiral, who is wise and courageous and resourceful. The commander-in-chief is the absolute best we have got. In his iron hands is an instrument of war superior to the German. We can trust Jellicoe. We can trust the British Navy to follow up its first blow with another which will end the war on land and sea. We can still sleep quietly in our beds.

"There is no figure in the world at the present moment so dramatic as that of Sir John Jellicoe. A British admiral is always a solitary man; but in war, and such a war as this, his solitude is appalling. When he stands on the bridge there is no one at his side to consult with; he looks over the sea, and on every battleship, cruiser, destroyer, and torpedo boat swarming around him a man with a spyglass watches his face; if he were to be seen, like a general, consulting with a staff, the whole fleet would curl its lip and feel a sinking of its heart; no, he stands alone, and in an instant he must make up his mind, in a flash his orders must be given to every ship under his command, in the twinkling of an eye he must decide for every ship at sea. It is a one-man job; the whole issues of the British Empire hang upon that single brain; Sir John Jellicoe is England as Nelson was England, and he is Europe and the world as no other man that ever lived was Europe and the world."