From the second, is drawn the seventh article, in the followings terms, viz:

"That the use and navigation of the Ohio river, so far as the territory of the proposed state (Kentucky) or the territory which shall remain within the limits of this commonwealth lies thereon, shall be free and common to the citizens of the United States, and the respective jurisdictions of this commonwealth, and of the proposed state on the river as aforesaid, shall be concurrent only, with the states which may possess the opposite shores of the said river."

For the present, it will merely be remarked, as a fact too well known to need further proof, that the state of Kentucky is bounded on, and by the southeast side of the Ohio river; having no territorial right in or over its bed. While her right of navigation, and of jurisdiction, is defined in, if not solely derived from, the aforesaid seventh article of the compact. Nor can any right not recognised in that compact be justly claimed, or legally exercised, by this commonwealth: for if there could, then might she evade her agreement: a consequence not to be tolerated, upon the principles of our governments, state and federal. True, Kentucky possesses one of the shores of the river, and was she a plenary sovereign, unshackled by constitution, or other compact, she might rightfully claim to the middle of the river; as might also the nation possessing the opposite shore. By a compact between the two, they being free to contract, they might communicate to each other concurrent rights from shore to shore. In the case of Kentucky and Indiana, they have the concurrent right to use and navigate the river with all the other citizens of the United States, in virtue of the compact as set forth in the article recited; and the jurisdiction concurrent over the said river with each other only. Thus, in all respects, are the two states placed on a reciprocal footing of equality in, and over, the river. And were they the only parties concerned, they might agree that either, or both, should make a canal on her own side, and drain a part, or the whole, of the water out of the river into such a channel. But

neither could do it, without the consent of the other: to attempt it, would give just cause of complaint-to persist, would be good cause of war. These two states are not, however, the only parties who have a right to the use and navigation of the river; it is expressly made common to all the citizens of the United States, by the same article of the compact; and were not that so, they would still have the right of use and navigation in, and on the river, by the constitution of the United States, which secures to all her citizens concurrent rights with the citizens of each state.

Hence the consent of congress becomes a necessary con comitant, in any agreement on the subject of opening a canal, by either state.

Were the river exclusively the property of Kentucky, and within her territorial limits, she might by an act of the legislature, divert its water from the present, into a future channel; taking care, nevertheless, to restore the stream again to its natural bed before it left the state. The common law principle with respect to individual rights on the subject of water courses, is applicable to nations; being the plain dictate of reason, and of justice, in both cases.

It is no argument, which can withdraw the subject from the operation of the principles above laid down, to say, that the navigation of the Ohio is not to be, or cannot be, affected by a canal. The mere possibility of its being otherwise, is sufficient to destroy the force of the observation, and deprive it of every ground of justification, or of right.

But the fact is, that both fishing and navigation may, and will be affected by a navigable canal, to the obvious impairation of the use and value of both. It has been asserted, and is true, that the whole current of the Ohio may be turned into a canal. This fact puts the subject of right, in a clear point of view. Suppose it were Indiana, instead of Kentucky, that was about to begin a work which might empty the bed of the Ohio of its water, by taking it into her exclusive territory; would not Kentucky have just cause to say to her, you have

no right to deprive me of the water of the river, in doing so you destroy my right of use and navigation, which I hold equal to yourself. Most undoubtedly she would. Most undoubtedly Kentucky would protest against the measure in its commencement, as its termination might be greatly injurious, if not ruinous, by obstruction and by tolls or taxes. Such right as she would have to complain were Indiana making the attempt to open a canal of the kind supposed, such right has Indiana to complain of a similar attempt on the part of Kentucky; and not only Indiana, but the union. Principles of such magnitude to the common rights of states, and of individuals, cannot be suffered to be reduced to practice with impunity, without compromitting the rights, and endangering the peace of the union: but by previous agreement, sanctioned by all the parties concerned, in the manner pointed out by the constitution of the United States, the desired object may be effected.

The execution of the act for opening a navigable canal at the falls of Ohio, it is believed, would be practising a violation of the seventh article of the compact, and hence a violation of the constitution of this state, as well as of that of the United States. It results, that the legislative act, which affects to sanction that measure, is itself a violation of both constitutions, Now, whether an act of a state legislature violates a contract, or compact, or not, in no manner depends upon the magnitude of such violation, or the extent of the effects flowing from it; for all impairation, even in the smallest degree, is forbidden. Is the house to be guarded from thieves, then keep the door shut: an entrance is a violation of its sanctity, and of its safety. More need not be said here, on this topic.

"An act to establish a state bank," was the offspring of this session.

It was fixed at Frankfort, but to follow the seat of government if moved-its capital of one million of dollars, was to be divided into ten thousand shares, of one hundred dollars each. Five thousand of these shares, were reserved for the use of the

state; two thousand to be subscribed for by the executive from time to time, as money came into the treasury for the sale of vacant lands; the other three thousand shares on the part of the state were reserved for future disposition, they have been in part subscribed and the residue sold. The other five thousand shares were to be taken by individuals, &c.

The general assembly to elect the president and six directors annually, the private stockholders were to choose six; making in all, twelve directors.

It was incorporated, to continue until the last day of December, 1821. Its powers were ample; and it soon went into operation.

Some attention will be paid to its progress, success, and declension; as affording an useful lesson to those who have money, never to take into partnership a legislature, the majority of whose members having little or none, desire it exceedingly, and with equal dislike see it in the hands of others with too little industry and too much impatience to acquire it in an honest way themselves, they will not even permit others to use their own advantageously.

"An act for raising the wages of the members of the general assembly," made their daily pay two dollars for attendance, and the usual allowance for travelling.

In all, ninety-four acts were made this session, embracing the usual objects, where they have not been particularized. The revenue yielded to the treasury in this year it can't be said what: the report is defective.

The disbursements were sixty-five thousand and six hundred dollars, sixty-two cents and two mills; which authorizes an infe rence that the receipts might be equal or more.

CHAP. X.

Sequel of Burr's conspiracy-- Review of the President's conduct— Wilkinson, &c. implicated-Trial of Burr in Richmond-Duces Tecum awarded to the President of the United States.-Treason as defined in the constitution--Burr not with assemblage in VirginiaMouth of Cumberland out of courts' jurisdiction--Burr acquittedH. Marshall elected, &c.--Attack on the Chesapeake a view of the case--Procceedings against Innis-Acts of the legislature, &c.

[1807.] The year 1807 succeeds, bearing the impressions and agitations of the past; which were, however, in the decline. The project of Colonel Burr, though deriving its resources from a great and diversified population, extending its ramifications from New York to Orleans, and making great pretence to support; is not, after its explosion, believed to have combined half the force he boasted of to Wilkinson. Enough, nevertheless, would have been assembled, had it not been interrupted, to have plundered the bank at Orleans, and seized Baton Rouge, or possibly, taking the vessels in the Mississippi, have effected a landing at Vera Cruz. Waving conjecture as useless, and having but little room for further notices, a rapid review only can be taken of the president's conduct, and that of a few others, who were implicated with Burr. The generals, Wilkinson, Dayton, and Adair, are the most prominent, and need only be further mentioned. And first, of Mr. Jefferson: That his true character in this affair of Burr, has not generally been understood, is most obviouswhether it ever will be, quite uncertain.

That with the positive information of its active existence from carly in February, 1806, he should have taken no one step to put the people on their guard, nor to arrest the conspiracy, until November, is a manifestation of motives, and a cause, utterly at variance with good government, as they were with his public duties.

That he at length, as is learned by his communications to congrees, of January in this year, 1807, instead of issuing his