before mentioned that the principal object Mr. King had in view, in prosecuting the voyage, was the laudable one of returning to their native land several shipwrecked sailors. The whole memoranda of Mr. King is highly interesting, and filled with romantic incidents, but we must content ourselves with barely mentioning a few facts, relative to the subject. After remaining a few days in the harbor of Napa, the Morrison departed for the bay of Yeddo; Yeddo the reader need not be told is the capital, and as Mr. King hoped to be able to effect some arrangement by which American vessels might be permitted to enter the ports of Japan, he concluded to proceed directly to that city. On arriving in the harbour, Mr. King prepared a paper addressed to his imperial majesty, from which the following is extracted : "The American vessels sail faster than those of other nations. If permitted to have intercourse with Japan, they will communicate always the latest intelligence."

"Our countrymen have not yet visited your honorable country, but only know that in old times the merchants of all nations were admitted to your harbors. Afterwards, having transgressed the law, they were restricted or expelled. Now, we coming for the first time, and not having done wrong, request permission to carry on a friendly intercourse on the ancient footing.'

On arriving at the bay of Yeddo, the Morrison was visited with a large number of boats filled with Japanese, who were treated in the kindest manner, and presented with ornamented pattern cards of British Goods, American five cent pieces, and other trifles, which they appeared to value highly. Mr. King vainly endeavoured to obtain a mandarin to convey his papers and presents to the capital, which lay at the head of the bay. "We had inquired," says our author, "of the Japanese, how their officers was distinguished; whether they wore any badges besides the ever-famous 'two sabres.' The answer was, if you see a man come on board that trembles very much, he is a mandarin."

The friendly intercourse maintained on the first day of Mr. King's visit gave strong hopes of a favorable issue of the undertaking; but at day light on the following morning a fire opened upon the Morrison, from a battery which had been formed under cover of the night, and as the Morrison carried no guns, she was obliged to depart without having accomplished any thing-not even permission to land the exiles. Mr. King proposed to put the exiles on board one of the junks at sea, but they replied that the crews on board all the junks are registered, so that even when one dies on board, it is necessary to exhibit the body to the local officers on the vessel's return, to satisfy them that there has been no evasion of the law in this change in the original number. The law which prohibits a Japanese to go abroad, and that which prohibits the arrival of strangers, are enforced with equal vigor. In order to make one more effort to accomplish the chief object of the voyage, Mr. King set sail for Kagósima, and on his arrival there, prepared papers and presents for the prince of Satsuma, which, however, were not received, and the Morrison returned to Macao, and some of the exiles afterwards found their way to this country. For the inferences drawn from the results of this voyage, we refer the reader to the volume before us. There can be but little doubt but our government, by the exhibition of a small naval force, could effect arrangements with the Japanese government, highly advantageous to American commerce.

ART. V.- BANKS AND THE CURRENCY.

WE have determined upon the publication entire of Mr. Hamilton's parphlet on banks and currency, not because we agree with him in all that he advances, so much as from a desire to present to the public whatever the times may produce of interest upon the subject. The author is evidently a thinker. He perceives and points out many of the difficulties which now attend the action of the pecuniary system of the United States, and is at least ingenious in his suggestion of a remedy. We think there is much in the letter that deserves attentive consideration even from those who may disapprove its conclusions. New theories always require time to make their way into the confidence of the community. The principles upon which they rest, if really sound, are made better known after they have been subjected to the examination of different minds, and tested by opposite methods of analysis; and the difficulties which almost always are found to obstruct any immediate successful adoption of them, are more likely to be discovered and removed by discussion than in any other way.

The author starts with the proposition, that government, by which he means the sovereign power, whether residing in the several or the United States, has relinquished the control over the power to create money-this act or omission is the cause of the embarrassment which is now felt in the currency-hence no real remedy can be found excepting through the recovery of the lost power. This is therefore the object of the plan which he brings forward-a single bank of issues for each sovereign power.

We have no difficulty in conceding to the author that he has gone to the root of the evil. We agree with him in believing that the present plan of unlimited paper issues cannot be made safe to the community, and that, theoretically, it would be better to have these confined to a single source. But when we compare the state of things actually existing among us with the remedy which he proposes, in the manner in which he presents it, we confess ourselves to be doubtful of its beneficial operation. Mr. Hamilton does not attempt to go beyond the State of New York. His letter is addressed to the Legislature of this state only, and has reference to the creation of a system which may not be extended beyond its limits. We do not mean to be understood to say that he does not contemplate its possible adoption in other states, but that this is regarded only as a contingency, the failure of which will not affect its successful operation in a more confined sphere. This appears to us rather to evade the great difficulty of the present question. That difficulty is to be found in the necessity of concurrent legislation on the part of twenty-six separate and independent sources. These twenty-six states have all, without exception, exercised the right of authorizing the issue of paper money in the shape of bank bills, and many of them derive a direct benefit from the sale of that right, either by an annual tax on capital, or a large bonus, or they own some of the stock of the banks created, or they guarantee the repayment of the capital which has been borrowed abroad, which repayment must be secured by the profit upon a paper circulation. Here are causes of opposing legislation, various enough and powerful enough to destroy all prospects of harmony. The evil which afflicts us, is in the multitude of the sources of power which leads to an abuse of it, and puts an end to all hope of that unity of action regarded by us as indispensable to the introduction of a better state of things. This evil is aggravated by the connexion of

interest which exist between the creatures and the creators, and by the variety of local influences which may be brought to bear upon the latter, through which good principles may often be undermined and bad ones disseminated. Among so many discordant elements, it would be as unreasonable to expect harmony, as if a musician should expect his instruments to yield twenty-six notes precisely the same in sound, notwithstanding it was constructed to give them different, was set in different keys, and was subject to be put out of tune by all ordinary accidents, as well as the changes in the weather and the sea

son.

As a conse

Under these circumstances, to propose to New York to begin upon a scheme like this, without reference to the course of other states, seems to us to be at best of very little use. The currency of a people speaking the same language, having the same manners and habits, and subject to the same vicissitudes, never can nor will recognise any conventional lines of geographical distinction, nor any theoretical abstraction of state sovereignty. quence of this, it has always been found that the bank note money in circulation in any particular spot does not bear so close a relation to the state authority under which it is issued, as to the opinion entertained of the ability to redeem it, and the nearness of the place, or other facility of redemption. So long as there is no uniformity of action, New York cannot escape the effects of the policy of her neighbors in counteraction of her own. She must be subject to the operation of expansions or contractions of the currency growing out of their paper issues, nearly as much as if she herself was concerned in producing them. The credit which attaches to paper money is a subject which has not yet met with the full and complete analysis which it deserves. It can be arbitrarily destroyed just as little as it can be arbitrarily created. It is the result in a great degree of opinion, which every body knows not to be easily regulated in these days. Hence we are inclined to believe that in a country like our's, where the supply of the precious metals for money is acknowledged to be entirely unequal to the demand created by the activity of the trading disposition of the people, paper resting upon credit will be made to serve the turn; and inasmuch as the paper does rest upon credit, or in other words, upon the good opinion which the parties receiving it has of the solvency of the party that issues it, we think it will find a circulation for itself wherever it is not positively forbidden. And the extent of that circulation will depend upon other considerations more than even upon the prohibition itself.

If our view of the matter is correct, then the proper method of executing the author's plan can only be through the agency of the national power in the first instance. Against the expediency of this, in an abstract view of the case, we are not prepared to object-on the contrary, we incline to the opinion that it would be a material improvement upon our past system of legislation; but there is a practical difficulty in the way which appears to us very serious. The whole theory upon which it rests runs counter to the feelings and prejudices, and even the principles, of a majority of the people of these states. It is in its nature prohibitory of a right which has been for fifty years exercised without restraint or question, the surrender of which would involve the sacrifice of many private interests built upon its continuance. It has also the appearance of giving additional strength to the national power, deemed by many people to be too strong already. The argument against all consolidating doctrines has ever been received with favour by great numbers of persons in the union, and within proper limits may be allowed to be a safe

and reasonable one. We should therefore despair of ever making a project of this kind generally acceptable. In proposing schemes for the public good, it is as necessary for the statesman to consider the character of the people for whom he is acting, as the value of the object he has in view. Their habits, passions, and prejudices, require as much attention as their interests. The point always must be, not so much what might be best as what is most practicable. Many plans could be devised, which considered in themselves would be likely to be of great service if adopted in this country, but which in the present state of public feeling it would be idle even to discuss. We are inclined to think this one of a single bank of issue must be ranked among the number of them. For however we may be willing to admit that it has many things to recommend it, and avoids many of the objections which exist against the present unregulated state of the currency, there is one great difficulty in adopting it, which we do not see our way to get over; and this is, that it is suited neither to the character of our institutions nor to the prevailing notions of our people; for it creates a central power, not in accordance with the principles of government held to be sound by a very great majority of those whose consent with us makes a necessary part of every law.

But even if the scheme were more likely to be popular than we suppose, there is yet one portion of it which appears to us to be liable to objections that should not be overlooked, even in so general a notice as this of ours. Mr. Hamilton's project can hardly be said to be entirely original with him, but appears rather to be the result of the reflections which he, in common with most of the late writers on the subject upon the other side of the water, has made upon the evils of the present system. If we understand him rightly, he is for introducing into New York the idea which has been heretofore suggested in the Edinburgh Review as fit to be acted upon in England, namely, that the issue of paper to serve as money should be confined to one body. This issuing bank is not to be either a bank of discount nor deposite, but these sorts of business are to be left to another class of institutions, which are to be in their turn denied the privilege of circulating any paper of their

own.

Now, if the issuing bank neither discounts notes nor receives money in deposite, it will not possess either of the channels by which paper most easily finds its way into circulation, but they will be in the hands of the other class of institutions already alluded to. These must therefore become the great customers of the issuing bank for its bills. But if they are, and give to her the security which she may deem to be sufficient in exchange for those bills, they will not trouble themselves nor incur the additional expense of keeping on hand any supply of the precious metals with which to redeem them, but will always look to the issuing bank as the source of that supply, which may enable them at any moment of panic among their depositors to stand a run. Hence the bank of circulation will almost unavoidably become involved to a considerable extent in the good or bad fortune of the other banks; and she must always be prepared to stand alone the brunt of every commercial difficulty that may occur. This is found to be the constant effect of a partial adoption of the system in Great Britain. The private bankers are always the first to feel the effects of a convulsion, and to support themselves they immediately look to the Bank of England as the great reservoir of specie, from which they seek to draw as much as their command of the notes of that bank will enable them. Hence the run which begins upon the private bankers, concentrates itself upon the Bank of England through their agency. It is

clear that results of the same kind would follow the adoption of Mr. Hamilton's plan here. Indiscretion on the part of the discounting bankers would bring on a run from the depositors, to meet which, the notes of the issuing bank will be amassed in quantities, and returned upon it for immediate conversion into coin. This operation would go on, too, with very little reference to the terms upon which those notes were supplied, or to the goodness of the security which was given in exchange for them. An inevitable consequence must be, that the issuing bank, whether willing or unwilling, would be obliged to share largely in the risk of the business of the private bankers, and be exposed to bear the whole of the burden of any pecuniary convulsion consequent upon their mismanagement.

This difficulty is thought to have been removed in England by the insertion of a provision in the new charter of the Bank of England, by which its notes are made a legal tender in the hands of any one, excepting those of the bank itself. A private banker, therefore, who deals in those notes, has no longer any anxiety about converting them into coin, inasmuch as they are as good to him as coin for the purpose of releasing himself from any demands that may be made upon him. Doubtless this is a very convenient arrangement, and may, for aught we know, work very well; but we must be permitted to doubt whether it rests upon any sound principle of commerce, or, indeed, any thing but an arbitrary distinction. The measure seems to assume that as a fact which can never be a fact that paper is the same thing as coin. Knowing as we do the history of paper money throughout the world, we have no right to presume that the notes of the Bank of England are an unfailing standard of value. They are liable to be affected by political events to an extent which can never be felt by coin, and any loss in their value would, as things now stand, not merely be felt by the creditors of the Bank itself, but would extend to all contracts, however honestly entered into, with every private banker who does not circulate his own notes throughout Great Britain. While, therefore, they are, as a class, shielded from much danger by the present provision, it is plain that the public incurs all that they are saved.

We are not, however, called at this time to go into any detailed exposition of our views upon this subject. Mr. Hamilton does not appear to contemplate any such measure in his plan, and, if he did, we very well know that the adoption of it would not be possible consistently with the terms of the constitution of the United States. We are very glad that it is not, on many accounts, but most particularly on this, that a bar is put by it to the possibility of making political conjunctures the apology for the issue of irredeemable government paper, or of that which, originally professing to be redeemable, would, in process of time, cease to be so. The great danger of all national moneyed institutions, which do not rest upon private responsibility and commercial interests for their safe management, is to be found in the abuses to which they are liable in moments of political crisis. With all the difficulties attending our present system, we candidly confess we would rather take our chance of the solvency of any of our honestly managed commercial banks, than of government paper under a succession of partisan administrations. We fear that the tendency of much of the doctrine of the present day respecting the currency, leads to some experiment of this kind, imperceptibly event o the minds of those who advocate it. To any such we cannot too earnestly give expression to our opposition, as being in principle.