parts they follow, with a nearly literal precifion, the words and even the form of thankfgiving, which is found in these old declaratory ftatutes.

The two houfes, in the act of king William, did not thank God that they had found a fair op→ portunity to affert a right to choose their own governors, much lefs to make an election the only lawful title to the crown. Their having been in a condition to avoid the very appearance of it, as much as poffible, was by them confidered as a providential escape. They threw a politic, well-wrought veil over every circumstance tending to weaken the rights, which in the meliorated order of fucceffion they meant to perpetuate; or which might furnish a precedent for any future departure from what they had then fettled for ever. Accordingly, that they might not relax the nerves of their monarchy, and that they might preferve a clofe conformity to the practice of their ancestors, as it appeared in the declaratory ftatutes of queen Mary* and queen Elizabeth, in the next clause they vest, by recognition, in their majefties, all the legal prerogatives of the crown, declaring, "that in them they are most

fully, rightfully, and intirely invefted, incorpo"rated, united, and annexed." In the clause which follows, for preventing questions, by reafon of any pretended titles to the crown, they declare (obferving alfo in this the traditionary

* ft Mary, Seff. 3. ch. 1.

language,

language, along with the traditionary policy of the nation, and repeating as from a rubric the Janguage of the preceding acts of Elizabeth and James) that on the preferving" a certainty in the SUCCESSION thereof, the unity, peace, and tranquillity of this nation doth, under God, wholly "depend."

They knew that a doubtful title of fucceffion would but too much refemble an election; and that an election would be utterly destructive of the "unity, peace, and tranquillity of this na"tion," which they thought to be confiderations of fome moment. To provide for these objects, and therefore to exclude for ever the Old Jewry doctrine of "a right to choose our own

governors," they follow with a clause, containing a moft folemn pledge, taken from the preceding act of Queen Elizabeth, as folemn a pledge as ever was or can be given in favour of an hereditary fucceffion, and as folemn a renunciation as could be made of the principles by this fociety imputed to them. "The lords "fpiritual and temporal, and commons, do, "in the name of all the people aforefaid, most

humbly and faithfully submit themselves, their "beirs and pofterities for ever; and do faith"fully promife, that they will ftand to, main"tain, and defend their faid majesties, and "alfo the limitation of the crown, herein fpecified "and contained, to the utmost of their powers," &c. &c.

So far is it from being true, that we acquired a right by the Revolution to elect our kings, that if we had poffeffed it before, the English nation did at that time most folemnly renounce and abdicate it, for themselves and for all their pofterity for ever. These gentlemen may value themselves as much as they please on their whig principles; but I never defire to be thought a better whig than Lord Somers; or to understand the principles of the Revolution better than those by whom it was brought about; or to read in the declaration of right any misteries unknown to those whose penetrating style has engraved in our ordinances, and in our hearts, the words and fpirit of that immortal law.

It is true that, aided with the powers derived from force and opportunity, the nation was at that time, in fome fenfe, free to take what courfe it pleafed for filling the throne; but only free to do fo upon the fame grounds on which they might have wholly abolished their monarchy, and every other part of their conftitution. However they did not think fuch bold changes within their commiffion. It is indeed difficult, perhaps impoffible, to give limits to the mere abstract competence of the fupreme power, fuch as was exercised by parliament at that time; but the limits of a moral competence, fubjecting, even in powers more indisputably sovereign, occafional will to permanent reason, and to the fteady maxims of faith, juftice, and fixed fundamental policy, are perfectly intelligible, and

perfectly

perfectly binding upon those who exercise any
authority, under any name, or under any title,
in the ftate. The house of lords, for inftance,
is not morally competent to diffolve the houfe of、
commons, no, nor even to diffolve itself, nor to
abdicate, if it would, its portion in the legifla-
ture of the kingdom. Though a king may ab-
dicate for his own perfon, he cannot abdicate for
the monarchy. By as ftrong, or by a stronger
reason, the house of commons cannot renounce its
fhare of authority. The engagement and pact of
fociety, which generally goes by the name of the
conftitution, forbids fuch invafion and fuch fur-.
render. The conftituent parts of a state are o-
bliged to hold their public faith with each other,
and with all those who derive any serious interest
under their engagaments, as much as the whole
state is bound to keep its faith with feparate com-
munities. Otherwife competence and power
would foon be confounded, and no law be left but
the will of a prevailing force. On this principle
the fucceffion of the crown has always been what
it now is, an hereditary fucceffion by law in the
old line it was a fucceffion by the common law;
in the new by the ftatute law, operating on the
principles of the common law, not changing the
fubftance, but regulating the mode, and defcrib-
ing the perfons. Both these descriptions of law
are of the fame force, and are derived from an
equal authority, emanating from the common a-
greement and original compact of the state, com-
muni fponfione reipublica, and as fuch are equally

binding

binding on king, and people too, as long as the terms are observed, and they continue the fame body politic.

It is far from impoffible to reconcile, if we do not fuffer ourselves to be entangled in the mazes of metaphyfic sophistry, the use both of a fixed rule and an occafional deviation; the facredness of an hereditary principle of fucceffion in our government, with a power of change in its application in cafes of extreme emergency. Even in that extremity (if we take the measure of our rights by our exercife of them at the Revolution) the change is to be confined to the peccant part only; to the part which produced the neceffary deviation; and even then it is to be effected without a decompofition of the whole civil and political mafs, for the purpose of originating a new civil order out of the firft elements of fociety.

A ftate without the means of fome change is without the means of its confervation. Without fuch means it might even rifque the lofs of that part of the conftitution which it wifhed the most religiously to preferve. The two principles of confervation and correction operated ftrongly at the two critical, periods of the Restoration and Revolution, when England found itself without a king. At both thofe periods the nation had loft the bond of union in their antient edifice; they did not, however, diffolve the whole fabric. On the contrary, in both cafes they regenerated the deficient part of the old conftitution through

the