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now insist on the discussion

of prelimina

ries.

then to hear what they had further to ask !9 Is it possible to suppose that such a thing could be listened to by any country that was not prepared to prostrate itself at the feet of France; and in that abject posture to adore its conqueror, to solicit new insults, to submit to demands still more degrading and ignominious, and to cancel at once the honor of the British name? His Majesty had no hesitation in refusing to comply with such insolent and unwarrantable demands. Here, again, the House will see that the spirit of the violent part of the French government which, had the insolence to advance this proposition, had not acquired power and strength in that state of the negotiation to adhere to it. His Majesty's

Our proposal was received and allowed by the | (8) The French French plenipotentiaries, and transmitted for the consideration of the Directory. Months had elapsed in sending couriers weekly and daily from Paris to Lisle, and from Lisle to Paris. They taught us to expect, from time to time, a consideration of this subject, and an explicit answer to our project. But the first attempt of the Directory to negotiate, after having received our project, is worthy, of remark. They required that we, whom they had summoned to a definitive treaty, should stop and discuss preliminary points, which were to be settled without knowing whether, when we had agreed to them all, we had advanced one inch. We were to dis-explanations and remonstrances for a time precuss, (1) whether his Majesty would renounce the title of King of France, a harmless feather at most in the crown of England. We were to discuss, (2) whether we would restore those ships taken at Toulon, the acquisition of valor, and which we were entitled upon every ground to hold. We were to discuss, (3) whether we would renounce the mortgage which we might possess on the Netherlands, and which engaged much of the honorable baronet's attention; but it does so happen that what the honorable baronet considered as so important was of no importance at all; for a mortgage on the Netherlands we have none, and consequently we have none to renounce. Therefore, upon that condition, which they had no right to ask, and we had no means of granting, we told them the true state of the case, and that it was not worth talking about.8

(2) They next

surrender of all

made by En cland, as a preliminary.

The next point which occurred is of a nature which is difficult to dwell upon withJemand the out indignation. We were waiting the conquests the fulfillment of a promise which had been made repeatedly, of delivering to our embassador a counter-project, when they who had desired us to come for the purpose of concluding a definitive treaty, propose that we should subscribe, as a sine qua non preliminary, that we were ready, in the first instance, to consent to give up all that we had taken, and

s It may be remarked as to the first of these preliminary points, that all the French kings for three centuries had allowed this part of the title of the English monarch ("King of France") to stand at the head of treaties, and it was, therefore, certainly frivolous to raise any question about it. As to the second, touching the ships taken at Toulon, there was more plausibility in the claim, because they were given up on the condition of being "restored in the event of peace." But they were given up by French Royalists to create a diversion against the Republic, and the peace referred to was, therefore, plainly a peace with the regal government, and not with a revolutionary body like the Directory. The third preliminary related to a lien which England had on the hereditary possessions of Austria, as security for certain loans made to the Emperor; and the Directory demanded to know whether the Austrian Netherlands (then incorporated into France) were considered as subject to this lien. Mr. Pitt answered them as stated in the text.

vailed; and an interval ensued in which we had
a hope that we were advancing to a pacification.
His Majesty's refusal of this demand was received
by the French plenipotentiaries with assurances
of a pacific disposition, was transmitted to their
government, and was seconded by a continued
and repeated repetition of promises that a coun-
ter-project should be presented—pretending that
they were under the necessity of sending to
their allies an account of what passed, and that
they were endeavoring to prevail on them to ac-
cede to proposals for putting an end to the ca-
lamities of war-to terminate the calamities of
that war into which those allies were forced ; in
which they were retained by France alone; and
in which they purchased nothing but sacrifices
to France and misery to themselves.
told, indeed, in a conference that followed, that
they had obtained an answer; but that not being
sufficiently satisfactory, it was sent back to be
considered! This continued during the whole
period, until that dreadful catastrophe of the 4th
of September, 1797. Even after that event, the
same pretense was held out: they peremptorily
promised the counter-project in four days; the
same pacific professions were renewed, and our
minister was assured that the change of circum-
stances in France should not be a bar to the pa-
cification. Such was the uniform language of
the plenipotentiaries in the name of the govern-
ment-how it is proved by their actions, I have
already stated to the House. After this series

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This extraordinary demand was made on the ground (never mentioned or alluded to before) that there exists in the public and secret treaties by which the French Republic is bound to its allies, Spain and the Batavian Republic, articles by which those powers respectively guarantee the territories possessed by each of them before the war. French government, unable to detach itself froma these engagements, establishes as an indispensable preliminary of the negotiation for the peace with England, the consent of his Britannic Majesty to the restitution of all the possessions which he occupies, not only from the French Republic, but further and formally, of those of Spain and of the Batavian Republic." It is obvious that this was an afterthought to impede the negotiation, and that France, which overruled Spain and Holland at her will, had no difficulty on this subject except as she chose to make one.

ally demand of

has not power to do this, he shall obtain it from his gov ernment.

England to

of professions, what was the first step taken [by | or that such a negotiation was likely to lead to a the French], to go on with the negotiation in good end; all I can say is, that with Impossible for this spirit of conciliation? Sir, the first step such a man I will not argue. I leave grant this. was to renew (as his Majesty's Declaration has others to imagine what was likely to have been well stated), in a shape still more offensive, the the end of a negotiation in which it was to have former inadmissible and rejected demand-the been settled as a preliminary that you were to rejection of which had been acquiesced in by give up all that you have gained; and when, on themselves two months before; and during all the side of your enemy, not a word was said of which time we had been impatiently waiting what he had to propose afterward. They defor the performance of their promises. That de- mand of your embassador to show to them, not (10.) They fin mand was the same that I have al- only his powers, but also his instructions, before Lord Malmes ready stated in substance, that Lord they explain a word of theirs; and they tell bury that, if he Malmesbury should explain to them you, too, that you are never to expect to hear not only his powers, but also his in- what their powers are, until you shall be ready structions; and they asked not for to accede to every thing which the Directory the formal extent of his power, which may think fit to require. This is certainly the would give solidity to what he might conclude substance of what they propose; and they tell in the King's name, but they asked an irrevoca- you, also, that they are to carry on the negotiable pledge that he would consent to give up all tion from the instructions which their plenipotenthat we had taken from them and from their al- tiaries are to receive from time to time from lies without knowing how much more they had them. You are to have no power to instruct afterward to ask 10 It is true, they endeavor-your embassador! You are to show to the ened to convince Lord Malmesbury that, although emy at once all you have in view! And they an avowal of his instructions was demanded, it will only tell you from time to time, as to them would never be required that he should act upon shall seem meet, what demands they shall make. it since there was a great difference between knowing the extent of the powers of a minister and insisting upon their exercise. And here I would ask the honorable baronet whether he thinks if, in the first instance, we had given up all to the French plenipotentiaries, they would have given it all back again to us? Suppose I was embassador from the French Directory, and the honorable baronet was embassador from Great Britain, and I were to say to him, "Will you give up all you have gained; it would only be a handsome thing in you as an Englishman, and no ungenerous use shall be made of it ?" would the honorable baronet expect me, as a French embassador, to say I am instructed, from the good nature of the Directory, to say you have acted handsomely, and I now return what you have so generously given? Should we not be called children and drivelers, if we could act in this manner? And, indeed, the French government could be nothing but children and drivelers if they could suppose that we should have acceded to such a proposal. But they are bound, it seems, by sacred treaties! They are bound by immutable laws! They are sworn, when they make peace to return every thing to their allies! And who shall require of France, for the safety of Europe, to depart from its own pretensions to honor and independence?

If any person can really suppose that this country could have agreed to such a proposition,

10 The words used were these: "There is a decree of the Directory, that in case Lord Malmesbury shall declare himself not to have the necessary pow. ers for agreeing to all the restitutions which the laws

and treaties which bind the French Republic make indispensable, he shall return in twenty-four hours to his court to ask for sufficient powers." As the Directory knew the English could not grant this, certainly as a preliminary, such a communication was a direct dismissal of Lord Malmesbury.

It was thus it was attempted, on the part of the French, to commence the negotiation. RecapitulaIn July, this demand was made to Lord t Malmesbury. He stated that his powers were ample. In answer to this, they went no farther than to say that if he had no such power as what they required, he should send to England to obtain it. To which he replied, that he had not, nor should he have it if he sent. In this they acquiesce, and attempt to amuse us for two months. At the end of that time, the plenipotentiaries say to Lord Malmesbury, not what they said before, send to England for power to accede to proposals which you have already rejected; but go to England yourself for such powers, in order to obtain peace.

Such was the winding up of the negotiation. Such was the way in which the prospect of peace has been disappointed by the conduct of France; and I must look upon the dismissal of Lord Malmesbury as the last stage of the negotiation, because the undisguised insult by which it was pretended to be kept up for ten days after Lord Malmesbury was sent away, was really below comment. You send him to ask for those pow ers which you were told he had not, and in the refusal of which you acquiesced. You have asked as a preliminary that which is monstrous and exorbitant. That preliminary you were told would not be complied with, and yet the performance of that preliminary you made the sine qua non conditions of his return! Such was the last step by which the French government has shown that it had feeling enough left to think it necessary to search for some pretext to color its proceedings. artifice can cover them, as will appear more parBut they are such proceedings that no pretext or ticularly from the papers officially communicated

to the House.

But here the subject does not rest. If we look to the whole complexion of this transaction, the

not the French

ble for their acts.

They are di rected against

ence of the British empire.

rightly the lot in which Providence has placed us, and the contrast between ourselves and all the other countries in Europe, gratitude to that Providence should inspire us to make every ef fort in such a cause. There may be danger; but on the one side there is danger accompanied with honor; on the other side, there is danger with indelible shame and disgrace: upon such an alternative, Englishmen will not hesitate. I wish to disguise no part of my sentiments upon the grounds on which I put the issue of the contest. I ask, whether up to the principles I have stated, we are prepared to act? Having done so, my opinion is not altered: my hopes, however, are animated by the reflection that the means of our safety are in our own hands; for there never was a period when we had more to encourage us. In spite of heavy burdens, the rad

duplicity, the arrogance, and violence which has | stake is so small that would not be ready to A revolutionary appeared in the course of the nego- sacrifice his life in the same cause. If we look government, and tiation, if we take from thence our at it with a view to safety, this would be our people, responsi opinion of its general result, we shall conduct. But if we look at it upon the princibe justified in our conclusion-not ple of true honor, of the character which we that the people of France-not that the whole have to support, of the example which we have government of France-but that part of the gov-to set to the other nations of Europe; if we view ernment which had too much influence, and has now the whole ascendency, never was sincere was determined to accept of no terms but such as would make it neither durable nor safe; such as could only be accepted by this country by a surrender of all its interests, and by a sacrifice of every pretension to the character of a great, a powerful, or an independent nation. This, sir, is inference no longer. You have their own open avowal. You have the very exist stated in the subsequent declaration of France itself that it is not against your commerce, that it is not against your wealth, it is not against your possessions in the East, or your colonies in the West, it is not against even the source of your maritime greatness, it is not against any of the appendages of your empire, but against the very essence of liberty, against the foundation of your independ-ical strength of the nation never showed itself ence, against the citadel of your happiness, against your Constitution itself, that their hostilities are directed. They have themselves announced and proclaimed the proposition, that what they mean to bring with their invading army is the genius of their liberty. I desire no other word to express the subversion of the British Constitution, and the substitution of the most malignant and fatal contrast-the annihilation of British liberty, and the obliteration of every thing that has rendered you a great, a flourishing, and a happy people.

Issue now

more conspicuous; its revenue never exhibited
greater proofs of the wealth of the country; the
same objects which constitute the blessings we
have to fight for, furnish us with the means of
continuing them.
I rest. There is one great resource, which I
trust will never abandon us, and which has shone
forth in the English character, by which we have
preserved our existence and fame as a nation,
which I trust we shall be determined never to
abandon under any extremity; but shall join hand
and heart in the solemn pledge that is proposed
to us, and declare to his Majesty that we know
great exertions are wanted; that we are prepared
to make them; and are, at all events, determined
to stand or fall by the LAWS, LIBERTIES, and

But it is not upon that point

This is what is at issue. For this are we to declare ourselves in a manner that depbefore the recates the rage which our enemy will country. not dissemble, and which will be little moved by our entreaty! Under such circum-RELIGION of our country. stances, are we ashamed or afraid to declare, in a firm and manly tone, our resolution to defend ourselves, or to speak the language of truth with The House was completely electrified by this the energy that belongs to Englishmen united speech. Sir John Sinclair, at the suggestion of in such a cause? Sir, I do not scruple, for one, Mr. Wilberforce, withdrew his motion for an to say, If I knew nothing by which I could state amendment, and the Address was passed (as in to myself a probability of the contest terminating the House of Lords) without one dissenting voice. in our favor, I would maintain that the contest, The great body of the nation, with their characwith its worst chances, preferable to an acqui-teristic energy in times of danger, rallied around

escence in such demands.

Appeal to

terests of

all.

If I could look at this as a dry question of Peroration: prudence; if I could calculate it upon the honor the mere grounds of interest, I would and the in- say, if we love that degree of national power which is necessary for the independence of the country and its safety; if we regard domestic tranquillity, if we look at individual enjoyment from the highest to the meanest among us, there is not a man whose stake is so great in the country that he ought to hesitate a moment in sacrificing any portion of it to oppose the violence of the enemy-nor is there, I trust a man in this happy and free nation whose

King and Parliament. A subscription was raised of fifteen hundred thousand pounds sterling, as a voluntary donation to meet the increased expenses of the war; and Mr. Pitt was permitted so to modify his system of taxation as to produce a vast accession to the regular income of the government. This relieved him from his main difficulty, and enabled him to renew the contest with increased vigor.

The Directory sent Bonaparte to invade Egypt early in 1798, and Turkey immediately declared war against France. Russia now entered eagerly into the contest; and Austria, which had been negotiating with the French at Radstadt, since

the treaty of Campo Formio, respecting the con- | unpopular throughout France, but no party was cerns of the German Empire, encouraged by the advance of the Russians, again resorted to arms. Thus was formed the third great confederacy against France, which was sustained by immense subsidies furnished by Mr. Pitt out of the increased means now placed at his disposal. The scene of warfare at the close of 1798, and throughout the year 1799, was extended over the whole surface of Italy, along the banks of the Rhine, amid the marshes and canals of Holland, and among the lakes and mountains of Switzerland. France, after gigantic efforts, lost all Italy, with the exception of Genoa, but retained her borders upon the Rhine and the barriers of the Alps. Russia withdrew from the contest in the autumn of 1799.

The Directory had now become extremely

strong enough to relieve the country from its ar-
rogance and rapacity, until Bonaparte suddenly
returned from Egypt, and, throwing himself on
the army for support, usurped the government
on the 9th of November, 1799. A new Consti-
tution was immediately formed, under which
Bonaparte was nominated First Consul for ten
years, and this was adopted by a vote through-
out France of 3,012,659 to 1562.
The new
government was inaugurated with great pomp
Bonaparte
on the 24th of December, 1799.
made every effort to unite and pacify the peo-
ple; and with a view to present himself before
Europe as governed by a spirit of moderation,
he instantly dispatched a courier to England
with proposals for negotiating a peace. This
brings us to the subject of the next speech.

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SPEECH

OF MR. PITT ON AN ADDRESS TO THE THRONE APPROVING OF HIS REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH BONAPARTE FOR A PEACE WITH FRANCE, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 3, 1800.

INTRODUCTION.

On the 25th of December, 1799, the day after he was inaugurated as First Consul of France, Bonaparte addressed a letter to the King of England, written with his own hand, and couched in the following terms: "Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the first magistracy of the Republic, I think it proper, on entering into office, to make a direct communication to your Majesty. The war which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the world, must it be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding? How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, powerful and strong beyond what their safety and independence require, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the benefits of commerce, internal prosperity, and the happiness of families? How is it that they do not feel that peace is of the first necessity as well as of the first glory? These sentiments can not be foreign to the heart of your Majesty, who reigns over a free nation, and with the sole view of rendering it happy. Your Majesty will only see in this overture my sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a step speedy, entirely of confidence, and disengaged from those forms which, necessary perhaps to disguise the dependence of weak states, prove only in those which are strong the mutual desire of deceiving each other. France and England, by the abuse of their strength, may still for a long time, to the misfortune of all nations, retard the period of their being exhausted. But I will venture to say it, the fate of all civilized nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world. Of your Majesty, &c. BONAPARTE."

From the feelings expressed by Mr. Pitt in the preceding speech, we should naturally have expected him to embrace this overture with promptitude, if not with eagerness. But the resentment which he justly felt at the evasive and insulting conduct of the Directory during the last negotiation, seems wholly to have changed his views, and he rejected the proposal in terms which were too much suited to awaken a similar resentment in the new French rulers. The reply of Lord Grenville went back to the com mencement of the war, declaring it to have been "an unprovoked attack" on the part of the French. It assumed, that "this system continues to prevail," and that on the part of England "no defense but that of open and steady hostility can be availing." In reference to peace, it pointed to the restoration of the Bourbons, as "the best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence;" and while the English minister did not "claim to prescribe to France what shall be her form of government," he did say, as to any ground of confidence in the one recently organized, "Unhappily no such security hitherto exists; no sufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reasonable ground by which to judge of its stability." The French minister, Talleyrand, replied to these remarks in a pointed note, and Lord Grenville closed the correspondence in a letter reaffirming his former positions. These communications were laid before the House of Commons, February 3d, 1800, when an Address was proposed by Mr. Dundas, approving of the course taken by ministers. He was followed by Mr. Whit bread, Mr. Canning, and Mr. [afterward Lord] Erskine, who complained in strong terms of the uncourteous language used by Lord Grenville. Mr. Pitt then rose, and without making any defense on this point, or touching directly upon the question, "Why should we not now treat?" took up the subject on the broadest scale, going back to the origin of the war, the atrocities of the French in overrunning a

ter ar

large part of Europe during the last ten years, the genius and spirit of the Revolution, the instability of its successive governments, his motives for treating with such men on a former occasion, and the characeds of Bonaparte from the commencement of his career as a military chieftain. This was the most elaborate oration ever delivered by Mr. Pitt. Of the vast variety of facts brought forward or referred to, very few have ever been disputed; they are arranged in luminous order, and grow out of each other in regular succession; they present a vivid and horrible picture of the miseries inflicted upon Eu. rope by revolutionary France, while the provocations of her enemies are thrown entirely into the back. ground.

It will interest the reader to compare this speech with the reply of Mr. Fox, in respect to the standpoint of the speaker. That of Mr. Fox was this, that peace is the natural state of human society, and ought, therefore, to be made, unless there is clear evidence that the securities for its continuance are inadequate. Mr. Pitt's stand-point was this, that as the war existed, and sprung out of a system of perfidy and violence unparalleled in the history of the world, it ought not to be ended except on strong and direct evidence that there were adequate securities for the continuance of peace if made. The question was whether the new government under Bonaparte offered those securities. But Mr. Pitt showed great dexterity in treating this government as merely a new phase of the Revolution, and thus bringing all the atrocities of the past to bear on the question before the House. His speech was admirably adapted to a people like the English, jealous of France as their hereditary rival, couscious of their resources, and prepared to consider a continuation of the contest, as the safest means of defending "their liberties, their laws, and their most holy religion."

Some of the facts referred to in this speech have been already explained in connection with Mr. Fox's reply on this subject, as given on a preceding page. For the convenience of the reader, however, these explanations will, in a few instances, be given again.

SPEECH, &c.

SIR, I am induced, at this period of the de- would, in any case, be impossible to separate the bate, to offer my sentiments to the House, both present discussion from the former crimes and from an apprehension that at a later hour the at- atrocities of the French Revolution; because tention of the House must necessarily be exhaust- both the papers now on the table, and the whole ed, and because the sentiment with which the hon- of the learned gentleman's argument, force upon orable and learned gentleman [Mr. Erskine] be- our consideration the origin of the war, and all gan his speech, and with which he has thought the material facts which have occurred during its proper to conclude it, places the question pre- continuance. The learned gentleman [Mr. Ercisely on that ground on which I am most desir-skine] has revived and retailed all those arguous of discussing it. The learned gentleman ments from his own pamphlet, which had before seems to assume as the foundation of his reason- passed through thirty-seven or thirty-eight ediing, and as the great argument for immediate tions in print, and now gives them to the House treaty, that every effort to overturn the system embellished by the graces of his personal delivof the French Revolution must be unavailing; ery. The First Consul has also thought fit to and that it would be not only imprudent, but al-revive and retail the chief arguments used by all most impious to struggle longer against that or- the opposition speakers and all the opposition der of things which, on I know not what princi-publishers in this country during the last seven ple of predestination, he appears to consider as years. And (what is still more material) the immortal. Little as I am inclined to accede to question itself, which is now immediately at issue this opinion, I am not sorry that the honorable-the question whether, under the present cirgentleman has contemplated the subject in this cumstances, there is such a prospect of security serious view. I do, indeed, consider the French from any treaty with France as ought to induce Revolution as the severest trial which the visita- us to negotiate, can not be properly decided upon tion of Providence has ever yet inflicted upon the without retracing, both from our own experience nations of the earth; but I can not help reflecting, and from that of other nations, the nature, the with satisfaction, that this country, even under causes, and the magnitude of the danger against such a trial, has not only been exempted from which we have to guard, in order to judge of the those calamities which have covered almost every security which we ought to accept. other part of Europe, but appears to have been reserved as a refuge and asylum to those who fled from its persecution, as a barrier to oppose its progress, and perhaps ultimately as an instrument to deliver the world from the crimes and miseries which have attended it.

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one of which

who are

I say, then, that before any man can concur in opinion with that learned gentleman; Three opinions, before any man can think that the sub- must be held by stance of his Majesty's answer is any those who re other than the safety of the country gotiation. required; before any man can be of opinion that, to the overtures made by the enemy, at such a time and under such circumstances, it would have been safe to return an answer concurring in the negotiation-he must come within one of the three following descriptions: He must either believe that the French Revolution neither does now exhibit,

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