If we recur to the positions we have taken in regard to the three elements of morality, we shall find that Buckle's view is true as regards one element of virtue, and Paley's as regards another.

§ 3. The basis of Ethics immutable. Primal convictions. Truth and Love. The place of utility in ethics. There is an immutable basis to ethics, though not exactly what Buckle assumes. The sentiment of right is always the same. It may be stronger or weaker, greater in quantity in some periods, less in others, but its quality is unchangeable.

There are also two moral convictions which are to be found in all races, from the lowest to the highest. These are of justice and mercy, or truth and love. Everywhere it has been accounted a duty to be just to others, not to take what belongs to them, to pay one's debts, to tell the truth, to keep one's promises, to be faithful to one's engagements. This is radical in morality. And again it has always been considered morally beautiful to do actions of kindness, of charity, to be benevolent to the poor, to be hospitable to strangers, to return good for evil. There is, therefore, not only a fundamental sentiment of right, but these two fundamental ideas of right.

But these ideas of justice and mercy are often found in apparent conflict. Justice requires one course, mercy another. Which ought we to fol

low? Truth demands this action, love that; what ought we to do? All the cases of conscience, all practical problems of morals, arise from this antagonism of two fundamental ideas. When we have a real difficulty in knowing what we ought to do, we shall usually find that truth requires one course of action and love another.

It is at this point of conflict that the doctrine of utility comes in; and here comes in also the possibility of progress in morality. We find out, more and more, what course of action is, on the whole, for the best, and how we can do what is right without sacrificing either justice or mercy. This constitutes the ethical education of mankind; and the moral progress of the world consists in the gradual lifting up of the moral ideal, as well as in an increasing moral enthusiasm for goodness. Better knowledge of what is right, and a stronger impulse to do it, marks the history of the growth of mankind in virtue.

The two types of morality which I have designated as rooted, one in the idea of justice, the other in that of mercy, are to be found among all people; in a rudimentary condition among the primitive races, more developed in the more civilized. Assuming that most of our moral actions have justice and mercy at their foundation, we shall find them constituting two families, or groups of qualities. The justice-group includes honesty,

truthfulness, obedience to law, courage to do, fortitude to endure, and the love of individual freedom. The mercy-group of virtues includes sympathy with suffering, hospitality to strangers, domestic affection, loyalty to one's chief, the love of fame or glory, kindly manners, civility, and the desire for equality.

Some races by a natural instinct or by acquired habit, lean more to one of these classes of virtues; and other races to its opposite. Take for example the English and French. The English virtues are those belonging to the group of which justice is the root. The French qualities to those of mercy. The English are truthful, the French, civil. The English believe in honesty, in keeping one's word, in faithfulness to all contracts, obedience to law. The French are more kindly, more sympathetic, are remarkable for the strength of their domestic affections, have a great love of glory, are fond of approbation. The English care greatly for freedom, demand their individual rights, wish to be governed as little as possible, but do not care much for equality. They rather prefer to have an aristocracy to look up to. The French love equality, dislike aristocrats, are democratic in every fibre of their being, but are willing to be governed by any Louis XIV. or Napoleon who will give them national glory. They will die for their chief, but wish him to speak to them as a comrade or equal.

These distinctions may be traced throughout the Teutonic races on one side, and the Keltic races on the other.

§ 4. Manly and Womanly Virtues.

All the virtues may be distributed in a large way into these two classes, the manly and the womanly virtues.

The manly virtues include conscientiousness, courage, justice, love of truth, independence, reverence for right, and love of freedom. The womanly virtues include benevolence, prudence, sympathy with suffering, reverence, hospitality, domestic affection, loyalty to one's chief, desire of approbation, love of beauty, kindly manners, universal charity, and love of equality. The manly and womanly virtues are both necessary to make a good moral character; both should be united in every man and every woman. Not only is neither class by itself adequate, but any one of them, unless united with the opposite, loses its own quality and becomes a vice instead of a virtue. Thus the virtue of courage, unless joined with the virtue of prudence and caution, ceases to be courage, and becomes rashness. So the virtue of benevolence or sympathy, unless joined with the virtues of conscientiousness and independence, will degenerate into a transient emotion of weak sentimentalism. These cannot exist as virtues unless united with their an

tagonist qualities. Independence unbalanced by humility becomes pride; firmness without reverence for others turns into obstinacy. The desire to be approved and esteemed, unless joined with the love of truth and right, runs into vanity.

What we mean then by distinguishing these as manly and womanly virtues is only this: That the natural man, without culture, tends more to one, and the woman more to the other. The most courageous and heroic among men have been those who added to their courage, tenderness; to their independence, reverence. This union constituted the chivalric character of a Bayard, who was not only without fear, but without reproach; of a Douglas, who was not merely true, but also tender; of Jeanne d'Arc, whose unflinching courage enhances her womanly sweetness and purity. Each grace can only attain its own perfection when it has the opposite for its companion. The manly virtues culminate in truth, and the womanly in love. But truth without love is not fully truth, and love without truth is not love. In God both are perfectly one, and man approaches the divine perfection only as he unites both in himself.

§ 5. Morality among Primitive Races.

It is extremely difficult to ascertain the moral character of the primitive races. The reports concerning them have come from travelers who usu