CHAPTER X.

ETHICS IN ALL RELIGIONS.

First element; the idea of

§ 1. The moral sentiment in man. Right and Wrong. § 2. Second element; knowledge of what is right and wrong. Third element: Habits of virtue. § 3. The basis of Ethics immutable. Primal convictions. Truth and Love. The place of utility in ethics. § 4. Manly and womanly virtues. § 5. Morality among primitive races, § 6. The races of Africa. §7. Development of moral impulse in character. Romans and Greeks. Socrates. The Stoics. § 8. Ethics of Buddhism. § 9. Ethics in ancient Egypt. The oldest book of the world. § 10. Influence of Religion on Morality.

§ 1. The moral sentiment in man. First element; the Idea of Right and Wrong.

My purpose in the present chapter is to speak

of morality and ethics in all religions. I shall treat, first, of the ideas of right and wrong among the primitive races. Secondly, of the same ideas as taught in the ethnic religions. Thirdly, as they are taught in the monotheistic religions, and notably in Christianity.

But before entering on this discussion, we must understand what morality is. Man is a moral being

because he possesses a moral sentiment, moral ideas, and a moral power. The moral sentiment is the sense of right and wrong, producing the feeling of duty and obligation. Moral ideas consist in the belief that certain acts are right, and others wrong. Moral power is the ability to do what is right, and to refuse to do what is wrong.

Let us consider any moral act, and see how these three elements enter into it. A poor and hungry boy sees a loaf of bread in an open window. He is strongly urged by hunger to take it. But he knows that it is wrong to take what does not belong to him; he feels that he ought not to do what he knows or believes to be wrong; he, therefore, puts forth an effort and goes away, resisting the temptation.

This example will stand as a type of every moral act of which men or angels are capable. Into every such action these three elements of feeling, thought, and will must enter. Omit either, and there would be no morality.

In the case just cited there was a strong temptation, and a strong effort of the will to resist the temptation. This, however, is not essential to a moral action. The highest form of morality is that in which no effort is required to do right; when right-doing has become a part of the nature. It requires a great effort in a miser to give a small sum to a starving child. It requires no effort in a

benevolent man to give his whole income to good objects, for he finds his best pleasure in so doing. There is more merit in the first instance, but there is a higher goodness in the other. The latter possesses what in the striking language of the Bible is called "The Beauty of Holiness." So long as the effort to do right is visible, this beauty has not arrived.

The sense of right and wrong is a primitive element in the soul. It cannot be analyzed or resolved into anything more simple. All such attempts lead only to mental and moral confusion. To trace it back to a sensation of pleasure is to confound things wholly different. The desire for pleasure is one thing, the sense of obligation an entirely different thing. They are not only different, but often opposed, as in the instance of the hungry boy above mentioned. The desire for pleasure would have induced him at once to take the bread, if he could have done so without being seen. The sentiment of duty forbade his doing it; the two then were in exact opposition.

This first element of morality is not only primal, but also universal. It is one and the same thing, wherever it exists. The sense of an eternal distinction between right and wrong and of the eternal obligation to do what is right and to refuse to do what is wrong, must be the same in the child and the archangel. Kant found in it the proof of

the being of God, since it goes down so deep, and goes up so high, and speaks with the absolute authority which belongs to God alone. The desire for pleasure speaks with no such voice of command. We are not bound by any obligation to seek enjoyment. But the awful voice of conscience listens to no excuse, allows of no apology. says, "Do right, though the heavens fall."

It

§ 2. Second element. Knowledge of what is right and wrong. Third element. Habits of virtue.

The second element in morality is that of knowledge. In order to do right, we must know what right is. This is the domain of ethics, of instruction, of education. What some people think right, others believe to be wrong. Where some see a duty to be done, others find an error to be avoided. This is the part of morality which can be taught. The world advances in virtue, by seeing more clearly what its duty is.

The third element in morality is the habit of doing what we believe to be right. Many persons see their duty but fail to do it.

"Video meliora, proboque-deteriora sequor."

"I know what's right, and I approve it too

Condemn the wrong, and yet the wrong pursue."

It would not be necessary to give this analysis of morality, were it not that so many theories are

put forth which prevent all clear thought on these questions. For example, Buckle tells us that there is no change, and no progress in moral systems; that the rules of morality are as well understood in one age as in another. His words are these: "To do good to others; to sacrifice for their benefit your own wishes; to love your neighbor as yourself; to forgive your enemies; to restrain your passions; to respect those who are set over you, these, and a few others, are the sole essentials of morals; but they have been known for thousands of years, and not one jot or tittle has been added to them by all the sermons and textbooks of moralists and theologians." 1 1 Hence Buckle argues that there is no such thing as improvement in morality.

On the other hand, the utilitarian school of moralists assert that there is nothing fixed; no foundation of moral truth; that all is in progress. Paley expresses this doctrine most forcibly. He says that there is hardly a vice or crime which has not been considered right in some country or some period; that theft was rewarded in Sparta; that to put to death little children, or aged parents, has been thought proper in some places; that the Indians approve of cruelty; that Paul thought it his duty to persecute the Christians.

1 Mr. Buckle has omitted, in this list, truth, honesty, and temper

ance.