on the 19th of April 1775, Great Britain commenced her military operations against what she termed her rebellious colonies.

From that time a congress directed the affairs of the country. The British authorities were every where put down and all were left without even the form of government, except the colonies of Connecticut and Rhode-Island, who alone had retained their charters, and the election of their governors and all the functionaries of their respective governments. These still continued their ancient forms. The other colonies, generally, resorted to the expedient of conventions and committes of safety to supply the place of regular government, until the 4th of July 1776, when the thirteen colonies were, with their consent, declared by congress to be free and independent; on which each colony, now state, formed for itself a constitution, generally after the model of the British government as to form, but, by the provisons of which, on the true principles of republican government, all the functionaries were to be elected, either directly or indirectly by the people, and made accountable to the tribunal of public sentiment for their conduct in office. Thus each assumed the character, and became, in fact, a sovereign and independent state. At the same time it was perceived and acknowledged by all that some bond of union was wanting and that it was necessary congress should be vested with powers adequate to the management of the common concerns of the whole. With this view, and in consequence of instructions from their constituents congress prepared articles of confederation, which on the 15th day of November 1776, were submitted to the several states for their approbation, and being approved constituted what was denominated the Federal Government. An examination of this confederation, its inefficiency, and the causes of that inefficiency will be the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER II.

Of the former Consideration of the United States.

Several instances occur both in ancient and modern history of small states confederated with a view to a national union in the pursuit of national measures. The great object, the means of accomplishing which, had always been a desideratum in federal politics-was to bring the people to have a sense of a common national interest and all the states of the confederacy, effectually, to act in concert in those measures, which relate immediately to the good of the whole. There are two principal modes, in which this has been attempted.

The first mode, because the most ancient, was by a council appointed to legislate on the several states composing the confederacy. Of this kind was the council of the Amphictions at the head of the confederated states of ancient Greece. But as this body were not furnished with executive power or means, they could do nothing more than issue their decrees. Under such a federal institution, as none but states can refuse to obey, a delinquent can be nothing less than a state already provided with arms or counsels for a formidable opposition. To enforce the decrees of the federal council, which ought to have the force of laws, it becomes necessary, in case of a refusal of any part, to draw out the powers of the complying states, and to compel obedience by force of arms. The history of ancient Greece is for many years, infamous for a succession of such Such was the sacred war. The famous Peloponesian war which raged for nearly thirty years, and drew in almost all the states of Greece on one side or the other, must be attri

wars.

buted to the same cause-the want of an efficient power in the national council. Such ever has been, and such ever will be the effect of this kind of federal government if it deserve that name, unless its decrees are suffered to fall into neglect producing in the end a total disolution of the confederacy.

The second mode is by a council empowered to propose measures to the confederated states, subject to the ratifications of the states individually before they acquire the force of laws, or can be carried into effect by the general authority. The United Provinces of the Netherlands furnished at that time, an example of this mode of confederation. The state's general was the grand council of the confederacy. This council, though pompously styled their high mightinesses, had in all matters of national concern, whether of greater or less moment, a power to propose only. The several states had reserved to themselves the right of ratification, and which in each state descended even to the burghs. No law could be constitutionally binding until it had been ratified by each. The veto of a single state, or of a single burgh, might disconcert, and actually has disconcerted the national counsels in measures of pressing necessity. Frequently on great emergencies, such has been the delay before all the states could be brought to agree, that the opportunity of acting was wholly lost. This induced the state's general, aided by the prince of Orange, who, as stadtholder administered the republic, sometimes to act without the authority of the smaller states. Such a disregard of the constitutional principles of the confederacy, produced at times, among that people, not remarkable for a spirit of faction, high domestic violence, and convulsed the government with dangerous insurrections.

The congress of the United States had nominally more power than the council of Amphictions, but they were not authorized to call one state to arm against another for the purpose of enforcing their ordinances. Nor like the government of the United Provinces, had the several states reserved to themselves the right of final ratification; but in a total absence of all executive power, in congress, the execution of their measures depended on the good pleasure of each state. In my observations on the articles of confederation, I shall be

ca."

more particular, because the prominent defects of that system, as discovered in its administration, will serve as a key to the construction, to the true intent of some of the most important provisions of the present constitution of the United States, which has at times, been the occasion of no small degree of jealousy with some.-From a perusal of the several articles of that confederation, it is evident that it was intended to form a national union, and to serve as a national government, so far as the general interests were concerned. It is evident, that it did not contemplate, or certainly that it could not effect a national union of the people of several states. It was, in fact, nothing more than a treaty of perpetual alliance and federal union, between sovereign and independent states, by which in that capacity, they agreed to submit their common concerns and interests to a board of delegates to be appointed by each state, but without the provision of a common judge or of an executive power. The first article merely declares the style of the confederacy to be "The United States of AmerThe second article is in the following words :-"Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation delegated to the United States in congress assembled." Article third is "The said states hereby enter into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defence,the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or made upon them, or any of them on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever." These articles fully develope the nature of the confederation. For the more convenient management of the affairs of the United States, delegates were to be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state should direct, to assemble on a certain day in each yeareach state to be represented by not less than two, nor more than seven members. In determining questions in congress, as all independent sovereigns are equal in dignity, however unequal in other respects, each state was to have one vote only.

Most of the powers stipulated in this federal league to be

conferred on congress, were in many respects, nearly the same as those afterwards delegated to the general government by the constitution of the United States, and the limitations and prohibitions, nearly the same. Congress were not provided with any power to raise a revenue, with any semblance of an executive power, or judiciary commensurate with their stipulated powers. Congress were, indeed, empowered to appoint courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and courts for receiving appeals in all cases of capture. And also for the determination of controversies between two or more states, and in controversies between private persons respecting certain grants of land, congress were empowered on application to nominate a certain number of persons, from whom judges were to be selected much in the manner of a struck jury with a power of final decision.

All the acts of congress, as well as the articles of confederation, were subject to the interpretation of the legislatures and judicial tribunals of thirteen sovereign and independent states, and their execution was dependent on the good pleasure of the same sovereign states. Congress had the power of making treaties, but not the power of fulfilling them-that rested with the several states-congress had the power of declaring war; but had the command of no resources for maintaining a war. They had no power to lay and collect taxes of any kind direct or indirect. Their power went no farther than to ascertain the sum necessary to be raised for the public service, and apportion it according to a rule prescribed, among the several states, with a request that they should raise, and pay over to the general treasury the amount of their respective quotas ;—which each as an independent sovereign might choose or refuse, and often did refuse with impunity. They were empowered to borrow money, and to emit bills of credit of the United States; but without the command of funds to pay the one or redeem the other. They issued their acts which they denominated ordinances. They never ventured to give them the name of laws; for what property of a law has an act, which all and every of the parties is at liberty to obey or not at its sovereign will and pleasure?

It is true, that the pressure of the war, and the patriotic zeal